Delegatio Ex Machina: Institutions Without Agency

Abstract

This article examines the disappearance of agency in institutional governance when predictive systems become the locus of delegation. Delegatio Ex Machina proposes that institutional authority is no longer anchored in decision-makers but in reglas compiladas that execute without reference to a subject. Central banks, international agencies, and automated audit systems illustrate how syntactic delegation replaces political acts with repetitive formal structures. By tracing this displacement, the paper defines a framework for understanding authority without agency and its risks for accountability in predictive societies. Acknowledgment / Editorial Note This article is published with editorial permission from LeFortune Academic Imprint, under whose license the text will also appear as part of the upcoming book Syntactic Authority and the Execution of Form. The present version is an autonomous preprint, structurally complete and formally self-contained. No substantive modifications are expected between this edition and the print edition. LeFortune holds non-exclusive editorial rights for collective publication within the Grammars of Power series. Open access deposit on SSRN is authorized under that framework, if citation integrity and canonical links to related works (SSRN: 10.2139/ssrn.4841065, 10.2139/ssrn.4862741, 10.2139/ssrn.4877266) are maintained. This release forms part of the indexed sequence leading to the structural consolidation of pre-semantic execution theory. Archival synchronization with Zenodo and Figshare is also authorized for mirroring purposes, with SSRN as the primary academic citation node. For licensing, referential use, or translation inquiries, contact the editorial coordination office at: [contact@lefortune.org]

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