Abstract

The modern-day vehicle is evolved in a cyber-physical system with internal networks (controller area network (CAN), Ethernet, etc.) connecting hundreds of micro-controllers. From the traditional core vehicle functions, such as vehicle controls, infotainment, and power-train management, to the latest developments, such as advanced driver assistance systems (ADAS) and automated driving features, each one of them uses CAN as their communication network backbone. Automated driving and ADAS features rely on data transferred over the CAN network from multiple sensors mounted on the vehicle. Verifying the integrity of the sensor data is essential for the safety and security of occupants and the proper functionality of these applications. Though the CAN interface ensures reliable data transfer, it lacks basic security features, including message authentication, which makes it vulnerable to a wide array of attacks, including spoofing, replay, DoS, etc. Using traditional cryptography-based methods to verify the integrity of data transmitted over CAN interfaces is expected to increase the computational complexity, latency, and overall cost of the system. In this paper, we propose a light-weight alternative to verify the sensor data’s integrity for vehicle applications that use CAN networks for data transfers. To this end, a framework for 2-dimensional quantization index modulation (2D QIM)-based data hiding is proposed to achieve this goal. Using a typical radar sensor data transmission scenario in an autonomous vehicle application, we analyzed the performance of the proposed framework regarding detecting and localizing the sensor data tampering. The effects of embedding-induced distortion on the applications using the radar data were studied through a sensor fusion algorithm. It was observed that the proposed framework offers the much-needed data integrity verification without compromising on the quality of sensor fusion data and is implemented with low overall design complexity. This proposed framework can also be used on any physical network interface other than CAN, and it offers traceability to in-vehicle data beyond the scope of the in-vehicle applications.

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The different versions of the original document can be found in:

https://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/20/19/5530,
https://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/20/19/5530/pdf,
https://academic.microsoft.com/#/detail/3088587768 under the license cc-by
https://doaj.org/toc/1424-8220
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/s20195530
under the license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
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Published on 01/01/2020

Volume 2020, 2020
DOI: 10.3390/s20195530
Licence: Other

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