== Abstract ==

​

<p><span style="font-size: 16px; font-style: normal; font-weight: 400; text-align: justify;">Economic inequality is often portrayed as an objective fact that can only be changed by redistributive policies. This leads economists to link inequality to other strictly economic factors &ndash; first and foremost, economic growth. This approach is based on Simon Kuznets&rsquo; famous hypothesis on the association between growth and inequality. This association has long been treated as economic in nature: after a certain level of economic development is reached, inequality begins to decline. However, in this paper, we deal with theories that refuse to consider inequality to be a purely economic phenomenon. We focus on Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson&rsquo;s model that indicates the Kuznets curve having a political nature. This model treats inequality as a result of the conflict between masses and </span><span style="border-bottom: 1px solid transparent; font-size: 16px; font-style: normal; font-weight: 400; text-align: justify;">elites, and</span><span style="font-size: 16px; font-style: normal; font-weight: 400; text-align: justify;"> suggests searching for a strategic compromise by building democratic institutions. We investigate the model&rsquo;s assumptions and through studying empirical works we indicate possible ways to advance Acemoglu and Robinson&rsquo;s theory. We conclude that the model&rsquo;s basic structure is sound, however, its development requires detailed case studies, not just general econometric analysis. We also claim that Acemoglu and Robinson&rsquo;s model should involve a more nuanced understanding of the causes and effects of collective action both before and after democratization</span></p>

​

​

​

== Full document ==

<pdf>Media:Draft_Семенов_370412050-8030-document.pdf</pdf>

​