Abstract

To increase investment in infrastructure, in the early 1990s Chiles government introduced private capital into the transport infrastructure sector, covering roads and highways, bridges, tunnels, and airports. The chosen mechanism: a concession scheme through which private firms would finance and build a given project and then operate the infrastructure for a set of number of years, recovering their investment by collecting tolls from users. Among the lessons learned from the experience: 1) As much as possible, avoid concessioning roads for which there are convenient alternative freeways nearby. 2) Choose the right variable for awarding a concession. Avoid mechanisms that (by promoting large payments to the state or short-term concession periods) encourage high tolls, and if you choose to award a concession to the firm charging the lowest tolls, place a floor and ceiling on possible bids. The floor is to guarantee the concessions financial viability; the ceiling is to prevent inefficient traffic diversions. Ties at either end should be resolved by a second variable, such as the level of transfers between the state and the firm. 3) Allow downward toll flexibility so that the concessionaire can react to unexpectedly low traffic flows, especially for certain types of vehicles. 4) Pay special attention to the tendering mechanism and to the general incentive structure. There are limits to the pure least-present-value-of-revenue (LPVR) auction, but income guarantees do enhance liquidity. In fact, a minimum-income guarantee through an LPVR auction is an instrument for credit enhancement, not income support. Alternatively, some form of financial innovation should be encouraged to make debt service commitments more flexible. 5) If concessions are tendered by traditional methods and income guarantees will be given, cover only a fraction of the concessionaires expected income stream, to reduce the states financial exposure and to improve the incentives to the concessionaire. 6) Make the contracts as complete as possible but allow for later modifications or renegotiations, and include a well-designed dispute resolution mechanism. Document type: Book

Abstract

The Malaysian economy decelerated as solid domestic demand was not sufficient to offset a weakening external environment. Private consumption growth continued at a healthy pace. Favorable rubber and palm oil prices drove up incomes of smallholders while continued employment and wage growth supported urban incomes. In contrast, fixed investment was more volatile, with private investment showing signs of picking up while public investments lagged. Malaysia's overall balance of payments recorded a larger surplus in the first half of the year reflecting a widening current account surplus and substantial net financial inflows. Malaysia's open economy is expected to slow further in the remainder of 2011 and into early 2012 mainly due to the deterioration in the outlook for external demand. Cities are central to Malaysia's aspiration to become a high-income economy. Smart cities are skilled and innovative. They play a crucial role in catalyzing economic growth by generating productivity gains through agglomeration economies. Smart cities are green and sustainable. They ensure a high quality of life to all citizens and the sustainability of economic gains. Finally, smart cities are resilient.

Abstract

This study is a product of the Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD), a project designed to expand the world's knowledge of physical infrastructure in Africa. Infrastructure contributed 1.8 percentage points to Cote d'Ivoire's annual per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth in the mid-2000. Raising the country's infrastructure endowment to that of the region's middle-income countries could boost annual growth by a further two percentage points per capita. Cote d'Ivoire made major strides with respect to infrastructure during the 1990s. As a result, the country has broad-reaching national backbones in the road, energy, and Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) sectors, and relatively high levels of household coverage for utility services. However, much ground was lost to conflict in the mid-2000s. Very little investment has taken place in the last fifteen years, leading to recent power shortages, the deterioration of the road network, and the deceleration of progress on safe water access. Cote d'Ivoire's most pressing challenge will be to regain the financial equilibrium needed to restore a reliable energy supply. Reestablishing the prominence of Abidjan's port will require investments in terminal capacity, as well as road and rail infrastructure upgrades on hinterland linkages. The underfunding of road maintenance must also be addressed. Another challenge lies in sanitation, as it is currently unlikely that the country will meet the associated millennium development goal. This report presents the key AICD findings for Cote d'Ivoire, allowing the country's infrastructure situation to be benchmarked against that of its African peers. A social and economic crisis in Cote d'Ivoire has crippled its growth trajectory, which had been that of a middle-income country. It will therefore be compared to low-income countries (fragile and non-fragile groups) and middle-income countries, as well as immediate regional neighbors in West Africa. The study presented several methodological issues.