Abstract

The aftermarkets occupy a dependent position in relation to the primary product market. The textbook examples of this kind of dependence are the car market and the service market, the printer market and the cartridge market, the shaving stick market and razor cartridge market, the markets for software products and their updates. In such cases, manufacturers in so-called primary markets may restrict competition in the aftermarkets through dealer licensing or through consumer contract terms related to warranty service. The study is relevant due to the emergence of new scenarios of anti-competitive behaviors and agreements (for example, restricting access to personal data of primary product owners – to the Big Data of a car engine’s control sensors – limits the possibility to enter the aftersales service market for new players). In this context, the Internet of Things and the digitalization of production chains give primary market participants the opportunity to control data flows and access conditions, which determines exclusive access to aftermarkets associated with the risk of monopolization. The purpose of the study is to identify the sources of anti-competitive behavior in the markets for the primary product and after-sales service (including consumables and components). The objectives of the study include: identifying the sources of antitrust law violations in the markets for the primary product and after-sales service; analyzing international and Russian antitrust practice in relation to the markets for the primary product and aftermarkets. The research methodology includes models of market analysis for various industries, quantitative methods of antitrust analysis, tools of the new institutional economic theory. The conclusions of the study describe the properties of the markets for the primary product and aftermarkets, which are significant for the antitrust regulation of such markets, and provide a theoretical justification of the need to use refined methods of quantitative analysis for the purposes of antitrust law enforcement, taking into account the specifics of the primary markets and aftermarkets.