Capital-Intensive Projects Induce More Effort Than Labor-Intensive Projects

Abstract

Central governments often subsidize capital spending by local governments, instead of subsidizing operating expenses or labor-intensive projects. This paper offers one explanation, focusing on the incentive effects for local officials. a local official can more easily shift the cost of optimizing a project to his successor on a labor-intensive project than on a capital-intensive project. ispartof: CES - Discussion paper series (DPS) 08.31 pages:1-12 status: published

Original document

The different versions of the original document can be found in:

• http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1323301

• http://www.economics.uci.edu/files/docs/workingpapers/2008-09/glazer-13.pdf

• https://lirias.kuleuven.be/handle/123456789/211403

• https://www.economics.uci.edu/files/docs/workingpapers/2008-09/glazer-13.pdf

• https://lirias.kuleuven.be/bitstream/123456789/211403/1/DPS0831.pdf,

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https://academic.microsoft.com/#/detail/1730904929