Side-channel attacks are performed on increasingly complex targets, starting to threaten superscalar CPUs supporting a complete operating system. The difficulty of both assessing the vulnerability of a device to them, and validating the effectiveness of countermeasures is increasing as a consequence. In this work we prove that assessing the side-channel vulnerability of a software implementation running on a CPU should take into account the microarchitectural features of the CPU itself. We characterize the impact of microarchitectural features and prove the effectiveness of such an approach attacking a dual-core superscalar CPU.

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3195970.3196112 under the license http://www.acm.org/publications/policies/copyright_policy#Background

DOIS: 10.1145/3195970.3196112 10.1109/dac.2018.8465784

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Published on 01/01/2018

Volume 2018, 2018
DOI: 10.1145/3195970.3196112
Licence: Other

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