This paper describes how user equilibrium in a congested network has been conventionally formulated using mathematical optimization procedures. These approaches assume drivers’ behaviors with complete information in the sense that each driver knows the other drivers’ behaviors and their payoff functions. If each driver doesn’t know the other drivers’ strategies, they cannot optimize each others’ strategy. In such a situation, an adaptive heuristics may be a relevant approach to obtain a better solution. To establish behavioral rules of route choice under incomplete information, the paper uses a smooth fictitious play and a regret matching model developed in game theory. The model combines these two approaches. The paper also proposes a new algorithm that can be applicable to a complex situation in traffic environments.
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Published on 01/01/2011
Volume 2011, 2011
DOI: 10.2495/ut110041
Licence: CC BY-NC-SA license
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