Optimal patrol scheduling of hazardous pipelines using game theory

Abstract

  An approach based on game theory is proposed to schedule security patrolling for a pipeline system. The method proposes numbers of patrolling paths according to the risk of security incidents on the pipeline system, in order to allow the patrolling team to covering high-risk segments more than low-risk segments. Patrolling of the pipeline system was modeled mathematically, based on time and distance discretization. The overall approach also examines the presence of security countermeasures on a pipeline system, and their effects on the patrolling schedule. The application of the method is explained by an illustrative case study.

Original document

The different versions of the original document can be found in:

• http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.psep.2017.03.039

• http://hdl.handle.net/11585/590042

• https://hdl.handle.net/10067/1427150151162165141

• https://repository.uantwerpen.be/docman/irua/03af18/142715_2019_04_12.pdf

• https://api.elsevier.com/content/article/PII:S0957582017301052?httpAccept=text/xml,

https://api.elsevier.com/content/article/PII:S0957582017301052?httpAccept=text/plain,

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.psep.2017.03.039 under the license https://www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/

• https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0957582017301052,

https://core.ac.uk/display/153426279,

https://academic.microsoft.com/#/detail/2606839309