Abstract

This paper considers a congested bottleneck. A fast lane reserves a more than proportional share of capacity to a designated group of travellers. Travellers are otherwise identical and other travellers can use the reserved capacity when it would otherwise be idle. The paper shows that such a fast lane is always Pareto improving under Nash equilibrium in arrival times at the bottleneck and inelastic demand. It can replicate the arrival schedule and queueing outcomes of a toll that optimally charges a constant toll during part of the demand peak. Within some bounds, the fast lane scheme is still welfare improving when demand is elastic.

Document type: Book

Full document

The PDF file did not load properly or your web browser does not support viewing PDF files. Download directly to your device: Download PDF document

Original document

The different versions of the original document can be found in:

Back to Top

Document information

Published on 01/01/2011

Volume 2011, 2011
DOI: 10.1016/j.trb.2011.03.001
Licence: CC BY-NC-SA license

Document Score

0

Views 1
Recommendations 0

Share this document

claim authorship

Are you one of the authors of this document?