Abstract

For the problem of taxi carpooling detour, this paper studies driver strategy choice with carpooling detour. The model of taxi driver strategy evolution with carpooling detour is built based on prospect theory and evolution game theory. Driver stable strategies are analyzed under the conditions of complaint mechanism and absence of mechanism, respectively. The results show that passenger’s complaint mechanism can effectively decrease the phenomenon of driver refusing passengers with carpooling detour. When probability of passenger complaint reaches a certain level, the stable strategy of driver is to take carpooling detour passengers. Meanwhile, limiting detour distance and easing traffic congestion can decrease the possibility of refusing passengers. These conclusions have a certain guiding significance to formulating taxi policy.

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The different versions of the original document can be found in:

http://downloads.hindawi.com/journals/jat/2018/2385936.xml,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2018/2385936 under the license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
https://doaj.org/toc/0197-6729,
https://doaj.org/toc/2042-3195 under the license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
http://downloads.hindawi.com/journals/jat/2018/2385936.pdf,
https://core.ac.uk/display/153730498,
https://academic.microsoft.com/#/detail/2788256597
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Published on 01/01/2018

Volume 2018, 2018
DOI: 10.1155/2018/2385936
Licence: Other

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