Abstract

Pricing measures (e.g., a kilometre charge or cordon toll) are used to improve the external effects of transportation (e.g., congestion or emissions). This working paper presents a planning model for pricing while taking the preferences and interactions of multiple stakeholders (e.g., governments or public transport operators) into account. Because we do not restrict ourselves to a single stakeholder, the model can analyse the interdependencies between measures and, particularly, the positive effects of cooperation between stakeholders. The presented model framework uses game theory for the interaction of stakeholders, who each have an objective function and control some pricing measure. Two concepts are considered, which both result in different pricing strategies. The first is non-cooperation which assumes selfish behaviour; we defined the stakeholder equilibrium to determine the solution strategy. Second, the cooperative solution concept allows coalitions to be formed; we developed a transferable utility game with its corresponding core to determine stable solution strategies. The model is tested on a stylised case study with travellers between three cities in which the government implements a kilometre charge on the road and the railway operator changes the train fares. Analysis of the different concepts showed that cooperation between the government and railway operator results in different and better pricing strategies. So, our model can analyse the benefits of cooperation in a transport system; furthermore, it can identify the coalitions and corresponding pricing strategies needed to achieve these benefits.

Abstract

Pricing measures (e.g., a kilometre charge or cordon toll) are used to improve the external effects of transportation (e.g., congestion or emissions). This working paper presents a planning model for pricing while taking the preferences and interactions of multiple stakeholders (e.g., governments or public transport operators) into account. Because we do not restrict ourselves to a single stakeholder, the model can analyse the interdependencies between measures and, particularly, the positive effects of cooperation between stakeholders. The presented model framework uses game theory for the interaction of stakeholders, who each have an objective function and control some pricing measure. Two concepts are considered, which both result in different pricing strategies. The first is non-cooperation which assumes selfish behaviour; we defined the stakeholder equilibrium to determine the solution strategy. Second, the cooperative solution concept allows coalitions to be formed; we developed a transferable utility game with its corresponding core to determine stable solution strategies. The model is tested on a stylised case study with travellers between three cities in which the government implements a kilometre charge on the road and the railway operator changes the train fares. Analysis of the different concepts showed that cooperation between the government and railway operator results in different and better pricing strategies. So, our model can analyse the benefits of cooperation in a transport system; furthermore, it can identify the coalitions and corresponding pricing strategies needed to achieve these benefits.