Abstract

In this paper we analyse the gap between present transport prices and efficient transport prices. Efficient transport prices are those prices that maximise economic welfare, including external costs (congestion, air pollution, accidents). The methodology is applied to six urban and interregional case studies using one common optimal pricing model. The case studies cover passenger as well as freight transport and cover all modes. We find that prices need to be raised most for peak urban passenger car transport and to a lesser extent for interregional road transport. Optimal pricing results for public transport are more mixed. We show that current external costs on congested roads are a bad guide for optimal taxes and tolls: the optimal toll that takes into account the reaction of demand is often less than one third of the present marginal external cost. ispartof: Working Papers pages:1-29 status: published

Abstract

Pricing measures (e.g., a kilometre charge or cordon toll) are used to improve the external effects of transportation (e.g., congestion or emissions). This working paper presents a planning model for pricing while taking the preferences and interactions of multiple stakeholders (e.g., governments or public transport operators) into account. Because we do not restrict ourselves to a single stakeholder, the model can analyse the interdependencies between measures and, particularly, the positive effects of cooperation between stakeholders. The presented model framework uses game theory for the interaction of stakeholders, who each have an objective function and control some pricing measure. Two concepts are considered, which both result in different pricing strategies. The first is non-cooperation which assumes selfish behaviour; we defined the stakeholder equilibrium to determine the solution strategy. Second, the cooperative solution concept allows coalitions to be formed; we developed a transferable utility game with its corresponding core to determine stable solution strategies. The model is tested on a stylised case study with travellers between three cities in which the government implements a kilometre charge on the road and the railway operator changes the train fares. Analysis of the different concepts showed that cooperation between the government and railway operator results in different and better pricing strategies. So, our model can analyse the benefits of cooperation in a transport system; furthermore, it can identify the coalitions and corresponding pricing strategies needed to achieve these benefits.

Abstract

en CD; International audience; Regulation by means of price in order to remove excess demand is generally perceived as being unfair. This paper empirically tests different principles of regulation including lotteries, rationing, a moral rule and compensation."br /"We start from the postulate that the perception of the fairness of a urban road pricing policy is important for a successful implementation. This perception is analysed through the results of an attitudinal survey held in Lyons area in 2003 (N 400). We confirm that peak-period pricing as a means of limiting demand is overwhelmingly rejected. Administrative allocation and lotteries are also rejected. The reference transaction can also lead to rejection of waiting line. Price compensation is overwhelmingly considered to be fair and the right to this is demanded both from public or private sector monopoly: it is possible therefore to reinstate pricing in the form of compensation."br /"Those surveyed express rather definite preferences for some principles of regulation (moral rule, compensation) to the detriment of pricing or even the administrative or traditional regulation (queuing). Ways of unfreezing the situation are identified, who could be exploited in order to form coalitions likely to support this kind of policy. Finally, certain dimensions of the equity are revealed through the analysis of the survey.

Abstract

bility of pricing changes in the transport sector : how to reconcile efficiency and equity ? – This paper elaborates an analytical framework of the acceptability of pricing changes in the transport sector. This framework is built on the confrontation of the economic efficiency, territorial equity, horizontal equity, and vertical equity dimensions. This analytical framework is then applied to some ongoing urban and suburban road toll schemes in various countries. The analysis shows that these efficiency and equity dimensions combine themselves, by most often reinforcing the ones the others in their negative or positive aspects. This analysis also shows that these various dimensions of equity cannot be ignored on pain of failure. It enables us to identify the ways according to which the acceptability of urban road pricing could be improved. Un cadre d'analyse de l'acceptabilité des changements tarifaires dans le secteur des transports est élaboré. Ce cadre analytique est bâti sur la confrontation des dimensions de l'efficacité économique, de l'équité territoriale, de l'équité horizontale et de l'équité verticale. Ce cadre analytique est appliqué à quelques expériences de péages routiers urbains ou suburbains dans divers pays. Leur analyse montre que les dimensions de l'efficacité et de l'équité se conjuguent, en se renforçant le plus souvent les unes les autres dans leurs aspects négatifs ou positifs. Cette analyse montre aussi que ces différentes dimensions de l'équité ne peuvent être ignorées sous peine d'échec. Elle permet ainsi d'identifier les voies selon lesquelles l'acceptabilité de la tarification de la circulation urbaine pourrait être améliorée.

Abstract

Pricing measures (e.g., a kilometre charge or cordon toll) are used to improve the external effects of transportation (e.g., congestion or emissions). This working paper presents a planning model for pricing while taking the preferences and interactions of multiple stakeholders (e.g., governments or public transport operators) into account. Because we do not restrict ourselves to a single stakeholder, the model can analyse the interdependencies between measures and, particularly, the positive effects of cooperation between stakeholders. The presented model framework uses game theory for the interaction of stakeholders, who each have an objective function and control some pricing measure. Two concepts are considered, which both result in different pricing strategies. The first is non-cooperation which assumes selfish behaviour; we defined the stakeholder equilibrium to determine the solution strategy. Second, the cooperative solution concept allows coalitions to be formed; we developed a transferable utility game with its corresponding core to determine stable solution strategies. The model is tested on a stylised case study with travellers between three cities in which the government implements a kilometre charge on the road and the railway operator changes the train fares. Analysis of the different concepts showed that cooperation between the government and railway operator results in different and better pricing strategies. So, our model can analyse the benefits of cooperation in a transport system; furthermore, it can identify the coalitions and corresponding pricing strategies needed to achieve these benefits.