Abstract

The heated debate on the regulatory framework for airports has highlighted the importance of creating good institutions for air transport in general. This paper defines the concept of effective regulatory institutions for air transport. It also describes the value chain for air transport and how the state intervenes with what type of regulatory institution. The paper concludes by highlighting the institutional reforms necessary to make regulation effective. Document type: Part of book or chapter of book

Abstract

This publication is based on research carried out in the frame work of the Florence School of Regulation of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute. We propose a merchant-regulatory framework to promote investment in the European natural gas network infrastructure based on a price cap over two-part tariffs. As suggested by Vogelsang (2001) and Hogan et al. (2010), a profit maximizing network operator facing this regulatory constraint will intertemporally rebalance the variable and fixed part of its two-part tariff so as to expand the congested pipelines, and converge to the Ramsey-Boiteaux equilibrium. We confirm this with actual data from the European natural gas market by comparing the bi-level price-cap model with a base case, a no-regulation case, and a welfare benchmark case, and by performing sensitivity analyses. In all cases, the incentive model is the best decentralized regulatory alternative that efficiently develops the European pipeline system.