Abstract

SDN approaches to inter-domain routing promise better traffic engineering, enhanced security, and higher automation. Yet, naïve deployment of SDN on the Internet is dangerous as the control plane expressiveness of BGP is significantly more limited than the data plane expressiveness of SDN, which allows fine-grained rules to deflect traffic from BGP’s default routes. Most notably, this mismatch may lead to incorrect forwarding behaviors such as forwarding loops and blackholes, ultimately hindering SDN deployment at the inter-domain level. In this work, we make a first step towards verifying the correctness of inter-domain forwarding state with a focus on loop freedom while keeping private the SDN rules, as they comprise confidential routing information. To this end, we design a simple yet powerful primitive that allows two networks to verify whether their SDN rules overlap, i.e. the set of packets matched by these rules is non-empty, without leaking any information about the SDN rules. We propose an efficient implementation of this primitive by using recent advancements in Secure Multi-Party Computation and we then leverage it as the main building block for designing a system that detects Internet-wide forwarding loops among any set of SDN-enabled Internet eXchange Points. Master [120] : ingénieur civil en informatique, Université catholique de Louvain, 2017