Abstract

A leak testing plan for a portion of the Liquid Low-Level Waste (LLLW) system at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is provided in the two volumes that form this document. This plan was prepared in response to the requirements of the Federal Facilities Agreement (FFA) between the US Department of Energy and two other agencies, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC). The effective date of this agreement was 1 January 1992. The LLLW system is an interconnected complex of tanks and pipelines. The FFA distinguishes four different categories of tank and pipeline systems within this complex: new systems (Category A), doubly contained systems (Category B), singly contained systems (Category C), and inactive systems (Category D). The FFA's specific requirements for leak testing of the Category C systems is addressed in this plan. The plan also addresses leak testing of the Category B portions of the LLLW system. Leak testing of the Category B components was brought into the plan to supplement the secondary containment design demonstration effort that is under way for these components. Document type: Report

Abstract

Analyses were performed using MELCOR and RADTRAD to investigate main steam isolation valve (MSIV) leakage behavior under design basis accident (DBA) loss-of-coolant (LOCA) conditions that are presumed to have led to a significant core melt accident. Dose to the control room, site boundary and LPZ are examined using both approaches described in current regulatory guidelines as well as analyses based on best estimate source term and system response. At issue is the current practice of using containment airborne aerosol concentrations as a surrogate for the in-vessel aerosol concentration that exists in the near vicinity of the MSIVs. This study finds current practice using the AST-based containment aerosol concentrations for assessing MSIV leakage is non-conservative and conceptually in error. A methodology is proposed that scales the containment aerosol concentration to the expected vessel concentration in order to preserve the simplified use of the AST in assessing containment performance under assumed DBA conditions. This correction is required during the first two hours of the accident while the gap and early in-vessel source terms are present. It is general practice to assume that at {approx}2hrs, recovery actions to reflood the core will have been successful and that further core damage can be avoided. more » The analyses performed in this study determine that, after two hours, assuming vessel reflooding has taken place, the containment aerosol concentration can then conservatively be used as the effective source to the leaking MSIV's. Recommendations are provided concerning typical aerosol removal coefficients that can be used in the RADTRAD code to predict source attenuation in the steam lines, and on robust methods of predicting MSIV leakage flows based on measured MSIV leakage performance. « le Document type: Report

Abstract

Uncontained, high-energy gas turbine engine fragments are a potential threat to air-transportable containers carried aboard jet aircraft. The threat to a generic example container is evaluated by probability analyses and penetration testing to demonstrate the methodology to be used in the evaluation of a specific container/aircraft/engine combination. Fragment/container impact probability is the product of the uncontained fragment release rate and the geometric probability that a container is in the path of this fragment. The probability of a high-energy rotor burst fragment from four generic aircraft engines striking one of the containment vessels aboard a transport aircraft is approximately 1.2 {times} 10{sup {minus}9} strikes/hour. Finite element penetration analyses and tests can be performed to identify specific fragments which have the potential to penetrate a generic or specific containment vessel. The relatively low probability of engine fragment/container impacts is primarily due to the low release rate of uncontained, hazardous jet engine fragments. Document type: Report

Abstract

The stress analysis performed on the 1''-PCC-76-A piping system inside containment penetration S-1A is described. Deadweight, thermal expansion, and seismic loads were considered. Results of this analysis show that the subject piping system will meet ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Class 2 requirements provided that supports S8 and S9 are installed as recommended. Document type: Report

Abstract

This Project Management Plan (PMP) establishes the organizational responsibilities, control systems, and procedures for managing the execution of project activities for Project W-178, the 219-S Secondary Containment Upgrade. The scope of this project will provide the 219-S Facility with secondary containment for all tanks and piping systems. Tank 103 will be replaced with a new tank which will be designated as Tank 104. Corrosion protection shall be installed as required. The cells shall be cleaned and the surface repaired as required. The 219-S Waste Handling Facility (219-S Facility), located in the 200 West Area, was constructed in 1951 to support the 222-S Laboratory Facility. The 219-S Facility has three tanks, TK-101, TK-102, and TK-103, which receive and neutralize low level radioactive wastes from the 222-S Laboratory. For purposes of the laboratory, the different low level waste streams have been designated as high activity and intermediate activity. The 219-S Facility accumulates and treats the liquid waste prior to transferring it to SY Tank Farm in the 200-W Area. Transfers are normally made by pipeline from the 219-S Facility to the 241-SY Tank Farm. Presently transfers are being made by tanker truck to the 200-E Area Tank Farms due to the diversionmore » box catch tank which has been removed from service.« le Document type: Report