Abstract

How can one account for the puzzling behavior of insider-managers who, in stripping assets from the very firms they own, appear to be stealing from one pocket to fill the other? The authors suggest that such asset-stripping and failure to restructure are the consequences of interactions between insiders (manager-owners) and regional governments in a particular property rights regime. In this regime, the ability to realize value is limited by uncertainty and illiquidity, so managers have little incentive to increase value. As the central institutions that rule Russia have ceded their powers to the regions, regional governments have imposed various distortions on enterprises to protect local employment. Prospective outsider-investors doubt they can acquire the control rights they need for restructuring firms and doubt they can avoid the distortions regional governments impose on the firms in which they might invest. The result: little restructuring and little new investment. And regional governments, knowing the firms' taxable cash flows will have been reduced through cash flow diversion, have responded by collecting revenues in kind. To disentangle these vicious circles of control, the authors propose a pilot for transforming ownership in insider-dominated firms through a system of simultaneous tax-debt-for-equity conversion and resale through competitive auctions. The objective: to show regional governments, for example, that a more sustainable way to protect employment is to give managers incentives to increase enterprises' value by transferring effective control to investors. The proposed mechanism would provide cash benefits to insiders who agree to sell control to outside investors. The increased cash revenue (rather than in-kind or money surrogates) would enable regional governments to finance safety nets for the unemployed and to promote other regional initiatives. Document type: Book

Abstract

Many empirical studies have demonstrated the close relationship between a country’s economic development and its stock of infrastructure. Decades of deferred maintenance and lack of long-term financing have taken a heavy toll on Zimbabwe’s infrastructure that at one time was ranked at the top in Africa. Only the information and communications technologies (ICT) sector has been performing relatively well but its high tariffs add to the cost of doing business in Zimbabwe. The strategy in the infrastructure sectors is to encourage public private partnerships (PPPs) for the financing and execution of the different sub-projects. This strategy has been emerging in the electric power, road transport, and ICT sectors and is now being extended to water supply and sanitation. This review builds on the findings from an October-November 2013 mission that, upon the request of the Ministry of Finance, assessed the ministerial submissions for the 2014 public sector investment program (PSIP). The review concludes that the perception of the predictable policies is key for attracting responsible private partners for sustainable PPPs. The review recommends less risky options such as: (i) outsourcing operations of existing plants; (ii) lease contracts of existing plants; and (iii) sales of existing thermal plants. The review notes that the analytical multi donor trust fund (AMDTF) is programmed to close on June 30, 2014. It is of the essence to explore the possibilities to locate concessionary funding for a successor to the AMDTF given the high priority of additional studies in the power, water, and ICT sectors to prepare for the reforms suggested.