Abstract

Parents and students from different socioeconomic backgrounds value differently school characteristics, but the reasons behind this preference heterogeneity are not well understood. In the context of the centralized school assignment system in Mexico City, this study analyzes how a large household income shock affects choices over high school tracks exploiting the discontinuity in the assignment of the welfare program Oportunidades. The income shock significantly increases the probability of choosing the vocational track vis-a-vis the other more academic-oriented tracks. The findings suggest that the transfer relaxes the financial constraints that prevent relatively low-ability students from choosing the schooling option with higher labor market returns. Document type: Book

Abstract

Purpose : the aim of this study is to estimate monetary abatement values for road and rail traffic noise that can be used for policy purposes. However, a main objective is to critically discuss the assumptions necessary to convert the monetary values elicited in willingness to pay (WTP) studies to values than can be use for policy purposes. Methods : we employ the hedonic regression technique on Swedish data to elicit individuals’ preferences for noise abatement. Our elicited values are then converted to policy values and critically examined based on findings from a literature review. Results : we show that WTP for road and rail not only differs in levels but also that the relationship between the noise level and the marginal value differs between the two sources. We also show that a health cost component added to the WTP estimate, based on the assumption of uninformed property buyers, will be small but not negligible and that also modest differences in the assumption of the discount rates will have a significant effect on the estimated values. Conclusions : the main implications from this study are: (i) WTP for road and railway noise abatement differs not only on absolute but also marginal levels, (ii) Even small differences in the chosen discount rate, which is necessary to convert WTP values from a hedonic price study to policy values, have large effects on the policy values, and (iii) We show how to add a health cost component to the WTP estimates in order for the monetary estimates to reflect the total social cost. However, we argue that the motivation for doing so is weak and that more research is needed on this issue. Document type: Preprint

Abstract

Economic theory claims that contracts renegotiation prevents from reaching the informationally constrained efficient solution that could have been obtained under full commitment. Assessing the cost of renegotiation compared to the full commitment scenario still remains an open issue from an empirical viewpoint. To address this question, we fit a structural principal-agent model with renegotiation on a set of contracts for urban transport services. The model captures two important features of the industry. First, only two types of contracts are used in practice (fixed-price and cost-plus). Second, subsidies are greater when a cost-plus contract was signed earlier on than following a fixed-price contract. We then compare a scenario with renegotiation and a hypothetical situation with full commitment. We conclude that the welfare gains from improving commitment would be significant but would accrue mostly to operators. Document type: Preprint

Abstract

The renegotiation of regulatory contracts is known to prevent regulators from achieving the full commitment efficient outcome in dynamic contexts. However, assessing the cost of such renegotiation remains an open issue from an empirical viewpoint. To address this question, we fit a structural principal-agent model with renegotiation on a set of urban transport service contracts. The model captures two important features of the industry. First, only two types of contracts are used in practice (fixed-price and cost-plus). Second, subsidies increase over time. We compare a scenario with renegotiation and a hypothetical situation with full commitment. We conclude that the welfare gains from improving commitment would be significant but would accrue mostly to operators.

Abstract

International audience; We explore the estimation of origin-destination (OD), city-pair, air passenger flows. Our dataset contains 279 cities, worldwide, over 2010-2012. Allowing for two gravity model specifications (log-normal and Poisson), we compare non-spatial and spatial models. We are the first to apply spatial econometric flow models and eigenfunction spatial filtering approaches to air transport. Distinguishing between origin, destination and network effects, we determine the impact and significance of a change in a variable in a given city, on flows originating from and going to that city and originating from a different city and going to an alternative city. Finally, we compare models based on different specifications of the spatial weight matrix.

Abstract

The objective of the paper is to elaborate a simulation model to analyse inter and intra-modal competition in the transport industry, based on game theory models. In our setting, consumers choose a transport mode and an operator to travel on a given city-pair; operators strategically decide on prices for the types of service they provide. We derive the market equilibrium and simulate potential scenarios. In particular we measure the impact of entry by a low cost train operator and the effect of a kerosene tax. Hence our framework could serve as a tool to measure the effectiveness of competition on a relevant market or to design marketing strategies. More generally it can be applied in cases of oligopolistic competition when detailed data are not available.

Abstract

This paper investigates various options for the organization of the railway industry when network operators require the access to multiple national networks to provide international (freight or passenger) transport services. The EU rail system provides a framework for our analysis. Returns-to-scale and the intensity of competition are key to understanding the impact of vertical integration or separation between infrastructure and operation services within each country in the presence of international transport services. We also consider an option in which a transnational infrastructure manager is in charge of offering a coordinated access to the national networks. In our model, it turns out to be an optimal industry structure.

Abstract

We formulate and estimate a structural model for travel demand, in which users have hetero- geneous preferences and make their transport decisions considering the network congestion. A key component in the model is that users have incomplete information about the preferences of other users in the network and they behave strategically when they make transportation decisions (mode and number of trips). Therefore, the congestion level is endogenously determinate in the equilibrium of the game played by users. For the estimation, we use the first order conditions of the users' utility maximization problem to derive the likelihood function and apply Bayesian methods for inference. Using data from Santiago, Chile, the estimated demand elasticities are consistent with results reported in the literature and the parameters confirm the effect of the congestion on the individuals' preferences. Finally, we compute optimal nonlinear prices for buses in Santiago, Chile. As a result, the nonlinear pricing schedule produces total benefits slightly greater than the linear pricing. Also, nonlinear pricing implies fewer individuals making trips by bus, but a higher number of trips per individual.

Abstract

Based on the modern theory of regulation, the analysis aims to characterize the effective economic regulation of the French railway industry. The methodology consists in econometrically testing various scenarios of regulation and determining which of these best fits the data. Using aggregate data on the overall passenger traffic for the incumbent French rail operator (RO), SNCF, the two behavioral hypotheses of reference which we consider –absence of regulation of the rail operator which acts as a pure monopoly, and price regulation of services supplied by the RO– are both statistically significant and do not subtract from each other. This result is certainly related to the fact that passenger services include both high speed train services, for which the RO has some entrepreneurial freedom, and regional transport services, which are regulated by local authorities. In any case however, as the presence of unobservable efforts exerted by the RO to improve its productivity is statistically relevant, one concludes that the RO is not fully and properly regulated. This emphasizes that the design of policy reforms must account for the incentives they create on the RO. The analysis also shows that the most statistically significant scenarios are the ones in which the access tariff imposed by the infrastructure manager is such that the revenue generated by the access tariff is equal to the infrastructure spending. The pricing of the access to the infrastructure network therefore does not seem to be governed by economic principles, but more by budget considerations. While data limitations does neither allow to understand all the facets of a complex reality, nor to claim a high level of precision in the measure of all the parameters of interest, we believe however that we provide an objective methodology to characterize the optimal economic policies for the railway sector, in particular because it yields realistic estimates of the main structural parameters. Indeed the empirical results suggest that the railway industry as a whole exhibits increasing returns to scale, which incidentally is not compatible with the presence of multiple firms. In addition, the elasticity of demand for railway transport is relatively high, an indication of the competitive constraints this mode of transport faces from other transport modes or induced traffic.