Abstract

To increase investment in infrastructure, in the early 1990s Chiles government introduced private capital into the transport infrastructure sector, covering roads and highways, bridges, tunnels, and airports. The chosen mechanism: a concession scheme through which private firms would finance and build a given project and then operate the infrastructure for a set of number of years, recovering their investment by collecting tolls from users. Among the lessons learned from the experience: 1) As much as possible, avoid concessioning roads for which there are convenient alternative freeways nearby. 2) Choose the right variable for awarding a concession. Avoid mechanisms that (by promoting large payments to the state or short-term concession periods) encourage high tolls, and if you choose to award a concession to the firm charging the lowest tolls, place a floor and ceiling on possible bids. The floor is to guarantee the concessions financial viability; the ceiling is to prevent inefficient traffic diversions. Ties at either end should be resolved by a second variable, such as the level of transfers between the state and the firm. 3) Allow downward toll flexibility so that the concessionaire can react to unexpectedly low traffic flows, especially for certain types of vehicles. 4) Pay special attention to the tendering mechanism and to the general incentive structure. There are limits to the pure least-present-value-of-revenue (LPVR) auction, but income guarantees do enhance liquidity. In fact, a minimum-income guarantee through an LPVR auction is an instrument for credit enhancement, not income support. Alternatively, some form of financial innovation should be encouraged to make debt service commitments more flexible. 5) If concessions are tendered by traditional methods and income guarantees will be given, cover only a fraction of the concessionaires expected income stream, to reduce the states financial exposure and to improve the incentives to the concessionaire. 6) Make the contracts as complete as possible but allow for later modifications or renegotiations, and include a well-designed dispute resolution mechanism. Document type: Book

Abstract

In most large cities in developing countries, buses continue to be the public transport option of choice, carrying a large share of urban travelers. However, transit bus companies in these countries are often cash-strapped. In many cases, the operating cost per bus kilometer exceeds revenues and bus fares are often kept low irrespective of the cost of providing service. Many cities are dominated by old and fuel-intensive buses with high operating costs. Transit systems are also often plagued by overcrowded and undependable service, congested roadways and chaotic operating environments. Across the board, city officials in developing countries are under strong pressure to improve the efficiency and enhance the attractiveness of bus transportation. Fuel makes up a relatively large fraction of total bus operating costs, especially when labor costs are low, as in many developing countries. Fuel costs can be reduced by improving the driving style of bus drivers and through sound maintenance practices. A safe and economical driving style can reduce variable costs, decrease down time due to repair work and maintenance, mitigate negative environmental impacts and improve road safety. This guidance note1 provides detailed and practical recommendations on how city bus operations managers and their technical staff can plan and implement such enhancements to their fleets through Operations and Maintenance (O and M) practices without significant capital investments. By implementing such recommendations, municipal officials and bus operators can increase the efficiency and fuel economy of their bus systems and reduce their cities' energy consumption, congestion and pollution. This guidance note provides detailed and practical recommendations on how city bus operations managers and their technical staff can plan and implement such enhancements to their fleets through O and M practices without significant capital investments.

Abstract

This study is part of the ongoing dialogue on reforming trade logistics, and facilitating trade and transportation in Central and South Asian countries. It presents key findings from several rounds of first-hand observations and interviews conducted with multiple stakeholders to measure the performance of key road transport corridors across the region, including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and to some extent, Pakistan and Afghanistan. The study identifies obstacles that hinder efficient movement of goods along transport corridors, and offers recommendations for short- and medium-term reforms for participating country governments with particular emphasis on the performance of border crossings. The overall objective of this study is to provide basic information on transport corridor performance so that national policy makers and private sectors have a basis to open discussions on how they might cooperate to facilitate international trade and transport by addressing infrastructure and operational bottlenecks in the region.