S. Loo, S. Proost
federal government tries to force local governments to implement welfare optimal tolling and investment. Welfare optimal tolling requires charging for marginal external costs. Local governments have an incentive to charge more than the marginal social cost whenever there is transit traffic. We analyse the pricing and investment issue in an asymmetric information setting where the local governments have better information than the federal government. The case of air pollution and of congestion are discussed. ispartof: CES - Discussion paper series DPS11.19 pages:1-33 status: published
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Published on 01/01/2011
Volume 2011, 2011DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1934137Licence: CC BY-NC-SA license
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