Scipediacontent: Scipediacontent moved page Draft Content 553030081 to Sweeting et al 2014a

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Scipediacontent moved page Draft Content 553030081 to Sweeting et al 2014a

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Created page with " == Abstract == Regulating bidder participation in auctions can potentially increase efficiency compared to standard auction formats with free entry. We show that the relativ..."

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== Abstract ==

Regulating bidder participation in auctions can potentially increase efficiency compared to standard auction formats with free entry. We show that the relative performance of two such mechanisms, a standard first-price auction with free entry and an entry rights auction, depends non-monotonically on the precision of information that bidders have about their costs prior to deciding whether to participate in a mechanism. As an empirical application, we estimate parameters from first-price auctions with free entry for bridge-building contracts in Oklahoma and Texas and predict that an entry rights auction increases efficiency and reduces procurement costs significantly.

== Original document ==

The different versions of the original document can be found in:

* [http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w19352 http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w19352]

* [http://www.nber.org/papers/w19352.pdf http://www.nber.org/papers/w19352.pdf]

* [https://doi.org/10.3386/w19352 https://doi.org/10.3386/w19352]

* [https://api.wiley.com/onlinelibrary/tdm/v1/articles/10.1111%2F1756-2171.12067 https://api.wiley.com/onlinelibrary/tdm/v1/articles/10.1111%2F1756-2171.12067],
: [http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12067 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12067] under the license http://doi.wiley.com/10.1002/tdm_license_1.1

* [https://www.nber.org/papers/w19352.pdf https://www.nber.org/papers/w19352.pdf],
: [https://www.econ.umd.edu/sites/www.econ.umd.edu/files/pubs/SWEETING_ERA_Mar2014.pdf https://www.econ.umd.edu/sites/www.econ.umd.edu/files/pubs/SWEETING_ERA_Mar2014.pdf],
: [https://www.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1756-2171.12067 https://www.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1756-2171.12067],
: [http://public.econ.duke.edu/~jr139/entry_rights.pdf http://public.econ.duke.edu/~jr139/entry_rights.pdf],
: [https://www.nber.org/papers/w19352 https://www.nber.org/papers/w19352],
: [http://econweb.umd.edu/~sweeting/SWEETING_ERA_Mar2014.pdf http://econweb.umd.edu/~sweeting/SWEETING_ERA_Mar2014.pdf],
: [https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=4864332 https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=4864332],
: [http://econweb.umd.edu/~sweeting/sweeting_regulatingentry.pdf http://econweb.umd.edu/~sweeting/sweeting_regulatingentry.pdf],
: [https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2315437 https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2315437],
: [https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/randje/v45y2014i4p675-704.html https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/randje/v45y2014i4p675-704.html],
: [https://www.scholars.northwestern.edu/en/publications/regulating-bidder-participation-in-auctions https://www.scholars.northwestern.edu/en/publications/regulating-bidder-participation-in-auctions],
: [http://www.terry.uga.edu/media/events/documents/entry_rights_uga1.pdf http://www.terry.uga.edu/media/events/documents/entry_rights_uga1.pdf],
: [https://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19352 https://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19352],
: [https://academic.microsoft.com/#/detail/2239250306 https://academic.microsoft.com/#/detail/2239250306]

DOIS: 10.3386/w19352 10.1111/1756-2171.12067

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Sweeting et al 2014a - Revision history

Scipediacontent: Scipediacontent moved page Draft Content 553030081 to Sweeting et al 2014a

Scipediacontent: Created page with " == Abstract == Regulating bidder participation in auctions can potentially increase efficiency compared to standard auction formats with free entry. We show that the relativ..."