Minoves 2018a - Revision history

Scipediacontent at 11:06, 17 July 2018

2018-07-17T11:06:32Z

Scipediacontent at 11:06, 17 July 2018

2018-07-17T11:06:02Z

Danielquer: Danielquer moved page Review 354299763962 to Minoves 2018a

2018-05-11T10:57:32Z

Danielquer moved page Review 354299763962 to Minoves 2018a

Danieldomingo: Danieldomingo moved page Draft Domingo 815795280 to Review 354299763962

2018-04-29T21:46:04Z

Danieldomingo moved page Draft Domingo 815795280 to Review 354299763962

Danieldomingo: Created page with "

@@ Line 2: / Line 2: @@
-==Economic and Political Globalization==
+<div class="center" style="width: auto; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;">
-<span id='_GoBack'></span>Juli Minoves-Triquell<sup><span id="fnc-2"></span><span style="text-align: center; font-size: 75%;">[[#fn-2|<sup>2</sup>]]</span></sup>. Professor associat de Ciència Política a la Universitat de Laverne, Califòrnia. President de la Internacional Liberal.
+<div class="center" style="width: auto; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;">
 -->
-Abstract: This paper surveys opposing interpretations of globalization of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. Since there are multiple definitions of globalization it focuses mainly on economic globalization and political globalization. It argues that the economic benefits of globalization are not evenly distributed, with China being among the winners within the developing world. Unskilled workers in the de-industrializing developed nations are among the losers; they fuel protectionist political discourses and have helped Trump become the US President. This paper also argues that in a globalized world liberal democracy has two main competitors as ideal types of political regimes, namely Chinese market-oriented authoritarianism and Russian/Turkish style illiberalism. This paper also reasserts the prevalence of the State. Nationalist movements in Europe, such as the ones in Scotland or Catalonia, desire their own states for reasons that are not alien to globalization. Also the State seems to be the necessary instrument to fight effectively against the main negative effects of economic globalization: climate change and the destruction of the environment.
+==Abstract==
-''''''1.''' Introduction'''
+=1. Introduction=
 Introductory ''Ex Cursus'' on Catalonia
@@ Line 19: / Line 25: @@
 The Seattle WTO Ministerial Conference of 1999 was supposed to be a relatively sedate meeting of trade experts and politicians. Instead it became known to history as the Battle of Seattle.<sup><span id="fnc-3">[[#fn-3|<sup>3</sup>]]</span></sup> It was the first major face-to-face between angry groups of anti-globalists and the political and economic establishment. Francis Fukuyama, towards the end of the Cold War, proclaimed the “end of history”.<sup><span id="fnc-4">[[#fn-4|<sup>4</sup>]]</span></sup> To many it seemed that there was no alternative to the triumphant march of the liberal political and economic order with ever-increasing free trade and the expansion of democracy as the dominant regime for the conduct of human affairs. Yet today protectionism is increasingly compelling, in democracies, and promulgated by elements of both the right or the left.
-In the last US Presidential election there was much correspondence, for example, between protectionist measures on trade proposed by the winner, Donald Trump, and also by Democratic contender Bernie Sanders. Trump’s recent pressures on Mexico and Canada for a renegotiation of NAFTA and his moves to impose tariffs on steel and aluminum illustrate an attachment— symbolic, if not particularly effective—to a protectionist outlook on the welfare of nations and on the welfare of the United States. In Europe several indicators of preference for what is not global have arisen both in the fields of economics and in politics.  In economics, the resistance to the TTIP from trade unions, environmental groups and civil society has been steady. In politics, the rise of anti-EU sentiment either through Brexiteers in the UK or right-wing political movements on the continent is not negligible. Interestingly enough, the drive for statehood of nationalist political movements in Scotland and Catalonia, while focusing on bringing the state closer to the citizen, have not rejected the EU but rather believe that its existence provides an opportunity for redefining national boundaries without losing unity with their neighbors.
+<span id='_GoBack'></span>In the last US Presidential election there was much correspondence, for example, between protectionist measures on trade proposed by the winner, Donald Trump, and also by Democratic contender Bernie Sanders. Trump’s recent pressures on Mexico and Canada for a renegotiation of NAFTA and his moves to impose tariffs on steel and aluminum illustrate an attachment— symbolic, if not particularly effective—to a protectionist outlook on the welfare of nations and on the welfare of the United States. In Europe several indicators of preference for what is not global have arisen both in the fields of economics and in politics.  In economics, the resistance to the TTIP from trade unions, environmental groups and civil society has been steady. In politics, the rise of anti-EU sentiment either through Brexiteers in the UK or right-wing political movements on the continent is not negligible. Interestingly enough, the drive for statehood of nationalist political movements in Scotland and Catalonia, while focusing on bringing the state closer to the citizen, have not rejected the EU but rather believe that its existence provides an opportunity for redefining national boundaries without losing unity with their neighbors.
 In developing nations, where globalization has lifted millions out of poverty, the challenge is to make sure trade is fair but also that the newly created wealth does not cause huge inequalities. Finally, we should address the globalization of political systems: the 90s seemed to favor the irreversible expansion of democratic forms of government. Today that is less certain; China offers a model of successful economic development combined with an authoritarian regime; Russia has evolved towards an illiberal democracy if not a hybrid regime where authoritarianism combines with elections and corruption. Turkey, Hungary, the Philippines seem to favor some form of this hybrid combination of a democratic façade, illiberalism, and the weakening of the rule of law.
@@ Line 41: / Line 47: @@
 Rather than elaborating definitions of globalization that are so general that it becomes difficult to apprehend the term, Ian Goldin and Kenneth Reinert tackle globalization in a practical manner. They specify a global policy checklist on issues concerning trade (market access, trade-related capacity building, arms trade, forced labor), finance (macro-prudential policies to reduce systemic risk, standards for multinational enterprises), foreign aid (meeting commitments on aid flows, untying aid, harmonization and alignment, evaluation and knowledge sharing, debt relief), migration (multilateral coordination of migration policy, temporary movement of persons, brain drain, brain waste and diaspora, remittances, research and data), ideas (knowledge management, intellectual property harmonization, access to medicines, increased technology transfer to developing countries) and what they call global commons (insurance for climate related risks, combating anti-microbial resistance, agricultural development for food security and enhancing human security).<sup><span id="fnc-14"></span><span style="text-align: center; font-size: 75%;">[[#fn-14|<sup>14</sup>]]</span></sup> Although their checklist is geared towards globalization for development, it is very useful to help us focus on some concrete aspects of globalization and its multidirectional flows.
-''''''3.''' The Economics of Globalization'''
+=3. The Economics of Globalization=
 Is Globalization a matter of winners and losers? The perception is certainly there.  And there are, in developed countries, quite a number of jobs that have been lost to free trade. Guillermo de la Dehesa recounts that “lower-skilled workers in developed countries will have a very high probability of being net losers, given that they encounter difficulties in adapting to new technologies and productive internationalization and will be forced to accept lower productivity and lower wage jobs, if their labor markets are flexible. Or alternatively, they may become unemployed if their labor markets are rigid or if they work for low skill labor-intensive firms, which have to compete with firms in developing countries (…)”.<sup><span id="fnc-15">[[#fn-15|<sup>15</sup>]]</span></sup> Donald Trump should be credited with having had the political flair to appeal to some of those displaced by delocalization in Michigan or Pennsylvania, for example, and win their electoral votes.  It is paradoxical that a billionaire whose trademark was coined in the vanities of the 80s has been able to become the conduit for the lament of those left-behind by globalization. Petras and Veltmeyer argue that “the world ascendancy of globalist classes has provoked a serious social crisis affecting wage workers, peasants, employees, and the self-employed throughout the world. The growth and penetration of globalist policies have engendered a significant increase in inequality between the minority within the globalist loop and those exploited by it”.<sup><span id="fnc-16">[[#fn-16|<sup>16</sup>]]</span></sup> The US President, a member of these ‘globalist classes, has become the spokesman for those affected by globalization in the developed world, not unlike the Perons of the 1940s in Argentina.
@@ Line 59: / Line 65: @@
 Some scholars, like Robert Hunter Wade. are more cautious in their assessments of the positive effects of globalization. Although he asserts that “it is plausible, and important, that the proportion of the world’s population living in extreme poverty has probably fallen over the past two decades or so, having been rising for decades before then,” he is wary of the large margin of error that affect World Bank numbers and make the trend look rosier than it really is; he also distinguishes the large effect that China has on measures of inequality: “one combination of inequality measures does yield the conclusion that income inequality has been falling—PPP-income per capita weighted by population, measured by an averaging coefficient such as the Gini” but “ take out China and even this measure shows widening inequality”.<sup><span id="fnc-28"></span><span style="text-align: center; font-size: 75%;">[[#fn-28|<sup>28</sup>]]</span></sup>
-''''''4.''' The Politics of Globalization'''
+=4. The Politics of Globalization=
 Susan Strange links “a pace of change more rapid than human society had ever before experienced” with the disillusion with national leaders whose peoples “no longer believe them”.<sup><span id="fnc-29">[[#fn-29|<sup>29</sup>]]</span></sup> Harold James posits that corruption scandals have increased the disenchantment with politics and politicians: “it is no longer simply a matter of corruption as a way of life in the peculiar circumstances of post-Communist transition economies, notably Russia. In Western Europe, the end of the Cold War broke some bands that had previously held political systems together. Ideology became less important, and many people began cynically to see in politics just a mechanism for distributing the spoils of political power”.<sup><span id="fnc-30">[[#fn-30|<sup>30</sup>]]</span></sup> Certainly, in relation to our beginning ''ex cursus'' on Catalonia, the sorry state of affairs regarding corruption in Spain in general—and Catalonia not being much different in this respect—must be factored in to understand the rise of new political parties untainted by corruption and the appeal for the citizenry of political solutions that imply a break with the past.

@@ Line 2: / Line 2: @@
-<div class="center" style="width: auto; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;">
+==Economic and Political Globalization==
-'''Economic and Political Globalization'''</div>
-<div class="center" style="width: auto; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;">
+<span id='_GoBack'></span>Juli Minoves-Triquell<sup><span id="fnc-2"></span><span style="text-align: center; font-size: 75%;">[[#fn-2|<sup>2</sup>]]</span></sup>. Professor associat de Ciència Política a la Universitat de Laverne, Califòrnia. President de la Internacional Liberal.
-Juli Minoves-Triquell<sup><span id="fnc-2"></span><span style="text-align: center; font-size: 75%;">[[#fn-2|<sup>2</sup>]]</span></sup></div>
-−
-<div class="center" style="width: auto; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;">
-Paper for the 3r Congrés d’Economia i Empresa de Catalunya – April 2018</div>
 -->
 Abstract: This paper surveys opposing interpretations of globalization of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. Since there are multiple definitions of globalization it focuses mainly on economic globalization and political globalization. It argues that the economic benefits of globalization are not evenly distributed, with China being among the winners within the developing world. Unskilled workers in the de-industrializing developed nations are among the losers; they fuel protectionist political discourses and have helped Trump become the US President. This paper also argues that in a globalized world liberal democracy has two main competitors as ideal types of political regimes, namely Chinese market-oriented authoritarianism and Russian/Turkish style illiberalism. This paper also reasserts the prevalence of the State. Nationalist movements in Europe, such as the ones in Scotland or Catalonia, desire their own states for reasons that are not alien to globalization. Also the State seems to be the necessary instrument to fight effectively against the main negative effects of economic globalization: climate change and the destruction of the environment.
-=1. Introduction=
+''''''1.''' Introduction'''
 Introductory ''Ex Cursus'' on Catalonia
@@ Line 24: / Line 19: @@
 The Seattle WTO Ministerial Conference of 1999 was supposed to be a relatively sedate meeting of trade experts and politicians. Instead it became known to history as the Battle of Seattle.<sup><span id="fnc-3">[[#fn-3|<sup>3</sup>]]</span></sup> It was the first major face-to-face between angry groups of anti-globalists and the political and economic establishment. Francis Fukuyama, towards the end of the Cold War, proclaimed the “end of history”.<sup><span id="fnc-4">[[#fn-4|<sup>4</sup>]]</span></sup> To many it seemed that there was no alternative to the triumphant march of the liberal political and economic order with ever-increasing free trade and the expansion of democracy as the dominant regime for the conduct of human affairs. Yet today protectionism is increasingly compelling, in democracies, and promulgated by elements of both the right or the left.
-<span id='_GoBack'></span>In the last US Presidential election there was much correspondence, for example, between protectionist measures on trade proposed by the winner, Donald Trump, and also by Democratic contender Bernie Sanders. Trump’s recent pressures on Mexico and Canada for a renegotiation of NAFTA and his moves to impose tariffs on steel and aluminum illustrate an attachment— symbolic, if not particularly effective—to a protectionist outlook on the welfare of nations and on the welfare of the United States. In Europe several indicators of preference for what is not global have arisen both in the fields of economics and in politics.  In economics, the resistance to the TTIP from trade unions, environmental groups and civil society has been steady. In politics, the rise of anti-EU sentiment either through Brexiteers in the UK or right-wing political movements on the continent is not negligible. Interestingly enough, the drive for statehood of nationalist political movements in Scotland and Catalonia, while focusing on bringing the state closer to the citizen, have not rejected the EU but rather believe that its existence provides an opportunity for redefining national boundaries without losing unity with their neighbors.
+In the last US Presidential election there was much correspondence, for example, between protectionist measures on trade proposed by the winner, Donald Trump, and also by Democratic contender Bernie Sanders. Trump’s recent pressures on Mexico and Canada for a renegotiation of NAFTA and his moves to impose tariffs on steel and aluminum illustrate an attachment— symbolic, if not particularly effective—to a protectionist outlook on the welfare of nations and on the welfare of the United States. In Europe several indicators of preference for what is not global have arisen both in the fields of economics and in politics.  In economics, the resistance to the TTIP from trade unions, environmental groups and civil society has been steady. In politics, the rise of anti-EU sentiment either through Brexiteers in the UK or right-wing political movements on the continent is not negligible. Interestingly enough, the drive for statehood of nationalist political movements in Scotland and Catalonia, while focusing on bringing the state closer to the citizen, have not rejected the EU but rather believe that its existence provides an opportunity for redefining national boundaries without losing unity with their neighbors.
 In developing nations, where globalization has lifted millions out of poverty, the challenge is to make sure trade is fair but also that the newly created wealth does not cause huge inequalities. Finally, we should address the globalization of political systems: the 90s seemed to favor the irreversible expansion of democratic forms of government. Today that is less certain; China offers a model of successful economic development combined with an authoritarian regime; Russia has evolved towards an illiberal democracy if not a hybrid regime where authoritarianism combines with elections and corruption. Turkey, Hungary, the Philippines seem to favor some form of this hybrid combination of a democratic façade, illiberalism, and the weakening of the rule of law.
@@ Line 46: / Line 41: @@
 Rather than elaborating definitions of globalization that are so general that it becomes difficult to apprehend the term, Ian Goldin and Kenneth Reinert tackle globalization in a practical manner. They specify a global policy checklist on issues concerning trade (market access, trade-related capacity building, arms trade, forced labor), finance (macro-prudential policies to reduce systemic risk, standards for multinational enterprises), foreign aid (meeting commitments on aid flows, untying aid, harmonization and alignment, evaluation and knowledge sharing, debt relief), migration (multilateral coordination of migration policy, temporary movement of persons, brain drain, brain waste and diaspora, remittances, research and data), ideas (knowledge management, intellectual property harmonization, access to medicines, increased technology transfer to developing countries) and what they call global commons (insurance for climate related risks, combating anti-microbial resistance, agricultural development for food security and enhancing human security).<sup><span id="fnc-14"></span><span style="text-align: center; font-size: 75%;">[[#fn-14|<sup>14</sup>]]</span></sup> Although their checklist is geared towards globalization for development, it is very useful to help us focus on some concrete aspects of globalization and its multidirectional flows.
-=3. The Economics of Globalization=
+''''''3.''' The Economics of Globalization'''
 Is Globalization a matter of winners and losers? The perception is certainly there.  And there are, in developed countries, quite a number of jobs that have been lost to free trade. Guillermo de la Dehesa recounts that “lower-skilled workers in developed countries will have a very high probability of being net losers, given that they encounter difficulties in adapting to new technologies and productive internationalization and will be forced to accept lower productivity and lower wage jobs, if their labor markets are flexible. Or alternatively, they may become unemployed if their labor markets are rigid or if they work for low skill labor-intensive firms, which have to compete with firms in developing countries (…)”.<sup><span id="fnc-15">[[#fn-15|<sup>15</sup>]]</span></sup> Donald Trump should be credited with having had the political flair to appeal to some of those displaced by delocalization in Michigan or Pennsylvania, for example, and win their electoral votes.  It is paradoxical that a billionaire whose trademark was coined in the vanities of the 80s has been able to become the conduit for the lament of those left-behind by globalization. Petras and Veltmeyer argue that “the world ascendancy of globalist classes has provoked a serious social crisis affecting wage workers, peasants, employees, and the self-employed throughout the world. The growth and penetration of globalist policies have engendered a significant increase in inequality between the minority within the globalist loop and those exploited by it”.<sup><span id="fnc-16">[[#fn-16|<sup>16</sup>]]</span></sup> The US President, a member of these ‘globalist classes, has become the spokesman for those affected by globalization in the developed world, not unlike the Perons of the 1940s in Argentina.
@@ Line 64: / Line 59: @@
 Some scholars, like Robert Hunter Wade. are more cautious in their assessments of the positive effects of globalization. Although he asserts that “it is plausible, and important, that the proportion of the world’s population living in extreme poverty has probably fallen over the past two decades or so, having been rising for decades before then,” he is wary of the large margin of error that affect World Bank numbers and make the trend look rosier than it really is; he also distinguishes the large effect that China has on measures of inequality: “one combination of inequality measures does yield the conclusion that income inequality has been falling—PPP-income per capita weighted by population, measured by an averaging coefficient such as the Gini” but “ take out China and even this measure shows widening inequality”.<sup><span id="fnc-28"></span><span style="text-align: center; font-size: 75%;">[[#fn-28|<sup>28</sup>]]</span></sup>
-=4. The Politics of Globalization=
+''''''4.''' The Politics of Globalization'''
 Susan Strange links “a pace of change more rapid than human society had ever before experienced” with the disillusion with national leaders whose peoples “no longer believe them”.<sup><span id="fnc-29">[[#fn-29|<sup>29</sup>]]</span></sup> Harold James posits that corruption scandals have increased the disenchantment with politics and politicians: “it is no longer simply a matter of corruption as a way of life in the peculiar circumstances of post-Communist transition economies, notably Russia. In Western Europe, the end of the Cold War broke some bands that had previously held political systems together. Ideology became less important, and many people began cynically to see in politics just a mechanism for distributing the spoils of political power”.<sup><span id="fnc-30">[[#fn-30|<sup>30</sup>]]</span></sup> Certainly, in relation to our beginning ''ex cursus'' on Catalonia, the sorry state of affairs regarding corruption in Spain in general—and Catalonia not being much different in this respect—must be factored in to understand the rise of new political parties untainted by corruption and the appeal for the citizenry of political solutions that imply a break with the past.

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