Scipediacontent: Scipediacontent moved page Draft Content 603933087 to King et al 2007a

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Scipediacontent moved page Draft Content 603933087 to King et al 2007a

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== Abstract ==

The political feasibility of using prices to mitigate congestion depends on who receives the toll revenue. We argue that congestion pricing on freeways will have the greatest chance of political success if the revenue is distributed to cities, and particularly to cities through which the freeways pass. In contrast to a number of previous proposals, we argue that cities are stronger claimants for the revenue than either individual drivers or regional authorities. We draw on theory from behavioral economics and political science to explain our proposal, and illustrate it with data from several metropolitan areas. In Los Angeles, where potential congestion toll revenues are estimated to be almost $5 billion a year, distributing toll revenues to cities with freeways could be politically effective and highly progressive.

== Original document ==

The different versions of the original document can be found in:

* [http://dx.doi.org/10.4337/9781848441453.00028 http://dx.doi.org/10.4337/9781848441453.00028]

* [http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/9js9z8gz http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/9js9z8gz]

* [https://escholarship.org/content/qt9js9z8gz/qt9js9z8gz.pdf?t=mc2szj https://escholarship.org/content/qt9js9z8gz/qt9js9z8gz.pdf?t=mc2szj]

* [https://www.elgaronline.com/view/9781847203809.00028.xml https://www.elgaronline.com/view/9781847203809.00028.xml]

* [https://api.elsevier.com/content/article/PII:S0967070X06000813?httpAccept=text/xml https://api.elsevier.com/content/article/PII:S0967070X06000813?httpAccept=text/xml],
: [https://api.elsevier.com/content/article/PII:S0967070X06000813?httpAccept=text/plain https://api.elsevier.com/content/article/PII:S0967070X06000813?httpAccept=text/plain],
: [http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tranpol.2006.11.002 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tranpol.2006.11.002] under the license https://www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/

* [https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9js9z8gz https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9js9z8gz],
: [https://trid.trb.org/view/869483 https://trid.trb.org/view/869483],
: [https://core.ac.uk/display/10133385 https://core.ac.uk/display/10133385],
: [https://ideas.repec.org/p/cdl/uctcwp/qt9js9z8gz.html https://ideas.repec.org/p/cdl/uctcwp/qt9js9z8gz.html],
: [https://www.elgaronline.com/view/9781847203809.00028.xml https://www.elgaronline.com/view/9781847203809.00028.xml],
: [http://shoup.bol.ucla.edu/PoliticalCalculusCongestionPricing.pdf http://shoup.bol.ucla.edu/PoliticalCalculusCongestionPricing.pdf],
: [http://www.mrbrklyn.com/resources/PoliticalCalculus.pdf http://www.mrbrklyn.com/resources/PoliticalCalculus.pdf],
: [https://asu.pure.elsevier.com/en/publications/the-political-calculus-of-congestion-pricing https://asu.pure.elsevier.com/en/publications/the-political-calculus-of-congestion-pricing],
: [http://www.cleanairinstitute.org/cops/bd/file/gdt/56-Congestion-Pricing-PoliticalCalculus.pdf http://www.cleanairinstitute.org/cops/bd/file/gdt/56-Congestion-Pricing-PoliticalCalculus.pdf],
: [https://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:elg:eechap:12789_19 https://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:elg:eechap:12789_19],
: [https://academic.microsoft.com/#/detail/1986826971 https://academic.microsoft.com/#/detail/1986826971]

* [https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0967070X06000813 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0967070X06000813],
: [https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/trapol/v14y2007i2p111-123.html https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/trapol/v14y2007i2p111-123.html],
: [https://trid.trb.org/view/806182 https://trid.trb.org/view/806182],
: [https://asu.pure.elsevier.com/en/publications/the-political-calculus-of-congestion-pricing-2 https://asu.pure.elsevier.com/en/publications/the-political-calculus-of-congestion-pricing-2],
: [https://academic.microsoft.com/#/detail/3022964384 https://academic.microsoft.com/#/detail/3022964384]

* [http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/9js9z8gz.pdf;origin=repeccitec http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/9js9z8gz.pdf;origin=repeccitec]

* [ ]

DOIS: 10.1016/j.tranpol.2006.11.002 10.4337/9781848441453.00028

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King et al 2007a - Revision history

Scipediacontent: Scipediacontent moved page Draft Content 603933087 to King et al 2007a

Scipediacontent: Created page with " == Abstract == The political feasibility of using prices to mitigate congestion depends on who receives the toll revenue. We argue that congestion pricing on freeways will h..."