https://www.scipedia.com/wd/index.php?action=history&feed=atom&title=Ivaldi_Mccullough_2010aIvaldi Mccullough 2010a - Revision history2026-04-18T17:14:49ZRevision history for this page on the wikiMediaWiki 1.27.0-wmf.10https://www.scipedia.com/wd/index.php?title=Ivaldi_Mccullough_2010a&diff=182519&oldid=prevScipediacontent: Scipediacontent moved page Draft Content 626113697 to Ivaldi Mccullough 2010a2021-01-21T13:54:22Z<p>Scipediacontent moved page <a href="/public/Draft_Content_626113697" class="mw-redirect" title="Draft Content 626113697">Draft Content 626113697</a> to <a href="/public/Ivaldi_Mccullough_2010a" title="Ivaldi Mccullough 2010a">Ivaldi Mccullough 2010a</a></p>
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</td></tr></table>Scipediacontenthttps://www.scipedia.com/wd/index.php?title=Ivaldi_Mccullough_2010a&diff=182518&oldid=prevScipediacontent: Created page with " == Abstract == The renegotiation of regulatory contracts is known to prevent regulators from achieving the full commitment efficient outcome in dynamic contexts. However, as..."2021-01-21T13:54:19Z<p>Created page with " == Abstract == The renegotiation of regulatory contracts is known to prevent regulators from achieving the full commitment efficient outcome in dynamic contexts. However, as..."</p>
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== Abstract ==<br />
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The renegotiation of regulatory contracts is known to prevent regulators from achieving the full commitment efficient outcome in dynamic contexts. However, assessing the cost of such renegotiation remains an open issue from an empirical viewpoint. To address this question, we fit a structural principal-agent model with renegotiation on a set of urban transport service contracts. The model captures two important features of the industry. First, only two types of contracts are used in practice (fixed-price and cost-plus). Second, subsidies increase over time. We compare a scenario with renegotiation and a hypothetical situation with full commitment. We conclude that the welfare gains from improving commitment would be significant but would accrue mostly to operators.<br />
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== Original document ==<br />
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The different versions of the original document can be found in:<br />
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* [http://idei.fr/sites/default/files/medias/doc/wp/2010/wp_idei_344.pdf http://idei.fr/sites/default/files/medias/doc/wp/2010/wp_idei_344.pdf]<br />
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* [http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr/2748 http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr/2748]<br />
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* [http://tse-fr.eu/pub/23459 http://tse-fr.eu/pub/23459]<br />
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* [http://tse-fr.eu/pub/4235 http://tse-fr.eu/pub/4235]<br />
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* [http://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/medias/doc/wp/io/10-196.pdf http://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/medias/doc/wp/io/10-196.pdf]</div>Scipediacontent