# Generative A.I. Shaping Social Dynamics and Competitive Landscapes: Insights on Augmentation and Automation

# Esteve Almirall esteve.almirall@esade.edu

The emergence of generative artificial intelligence (AI) represents a transformative moment in the reconfiguration of economic and social systems. As we navigate the initial phases of this technological revolution, the profound potential of generative AI to reshape competitive market dynamics is becoming increasingly evident. This study undertakes a comprehensive examination of the ways in which generative AI is influencing societal patterns and revolutionizing the competitive business landscape through its dual capabilities: augmentation and automation.

In March 2023, Geoffrey Hinton, one of the pioneers of generative AI, offered a poignant reflection on the future of labor markets. When asked about career advice for younger generations, his single-word response—plumbing—captured the profound shifts that AI may bring to employment. Hinton's remark underscores the sweeping changes that generative AI could unleash, particularly by redefining the division of labor, displacing highly skilled roles, and introducing new dimensions of economic activity. This paper endeavors to scrutinize the breadth of generative AI's societal repercussions, particularly in the realms of innovation, job market, and market dynamics.

This study explores the dual effects of generative AI on tasks, focusing on both automation and augmentation, and examines its organizational impact through the lenses of market elasticities, task characteristics, and the influence of generative AI on marginal costs. Additionally, it investigates the emergence of

new expertise driven by the technological opportunities and demands created by generative AI. Through this comprehensive approach, the study seeks to shed light on the transformative potential of generative AI, providing insights into its profound implications for businesses and society at large.

#### 1.- Introduction

The disruptive impact of generative AI has taken the world by storm. In a matter of weeks after its launch, ChatGPT amassed over 100 million users, becoming the fastest-growing consumer application in history. Its adoption has been both widespread and global, driving a market valued at \$10 trillion according to Sequoia Capital (Sequoia, 2024), and surpassing even the most optimistic expectations.

This rapid expansion has been accompanied by significant concerns regarding its societal effects, particularly its impact on the labor market. Unlike previous technological disruptions, which often targeted blue-collar jobs, generative AI has predominantly affected white-collar roles, displacing highly skilled labor (Suleyman and Bhaskar, 2023). Geoffrey Hinton has articulated this shift by pointing out that jobs requiring physical adaptability and manual skill, such as plumbing, may be among the least vulnerable to AI. Whether Hinton's prediction will fully materialize remains uncertain, but the concern is real and shared across societies.

Economists have examined the disruption caused by generative AI from two primary perspectives. One approach has been to analyze its microeconomic impact by focusing on specific tasks that AI can automate. This task-based analysis, pioneered by Acemoglu and Restrepo in 2018 (Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2018; Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2022), identifies individual tasks and assesses how AI might replace or enhance them. However, this approach faces significant challenges due to the rapid pace of AI evolution. Generative AI continuously introduces novel capabilities, redefining tasks in ways that make it difficult to keep analyses up to date. For example, in software engineering, tasks like updating versions of programming languages—once labor-intensive—have already been nearly fully automated by AI systems.

Another approach has been to consider the broader, macroeconomic implications of generative AI, particularly its effects on labor markets. Studies such as those by Acemoglu, Autor, Hazell, Patterson, and Restrepo (2022), as well as recent publications by the IMF, suggest that nearly 40% of global employment could be exposed to automation driven by AI. These findings highlight the sweeping scope of this disruption and the uncertainty it creates across industries and economies.

Private-sector research has also added to the conversation by attempting to identify the sectors and roles most affected by generative AI, while simultaneously projecting its potential to drive economic growth. However, these projections vary widely. Some, like Goldman Sachs (Goldman Sachs, 2024), anticipate that generative AI could contribute to a 7% increase in global GDP, while others, such as McKinsey, have provided more cautious estimates (Mckinsey, 2023). The disparity in these forecasts underscores the complexity of predicting the full impact of this technology.

Despite the growing body of research, there remains a significant gap in our understanding of how organizations can systematically evaluate the adoption of generative AI. Current models often fail to integrate a comprehensive view of how AI-driven projects evolve over their life cycle, particularly in terms of balancing immediate productivity gains with longer-term transformational potential. A robust framework is needed to enable organizations to model different technological scenarios, including the shift from augmentation to full automation, and to understand how these changes might reshape organizational structures and strategies.

This paper seeks to address this gap by focusing on the organizational level, exploring the opportunities and competitive pressures created by generative AI. By situating our analysis between the task-level micro perspective and the macroeconomic outlook, we aim to provide a framework that supports data-driven decision-making. This contribution aspires to enrich the management literature while equipping practitioners with tools to navigate the profound changes brought by this technological disruption.

# 2.- Models of the economic impact of disruption

One of the most prominent economic models addressing the disruption caused by generative Al is the task-based framework developed by Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018). This model has gained widespread popularity in the economic literature for its insightful analysis of how tasks are impacted by technological advancements.

$$\ln y_e = \int_{\mathcal{T}_e} \alpha(x) \ln y_e(x) dx, \qquad \quad y_e(x) = A_e \left[ \left( \gamma_\ell(x) \ell_e(x) \right)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} + \left( \gamma_a(x) a_e(x) \right)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}},$$

In this framework, a firm's output  $(y_e)$  is produced by the combination of various tasks (x) in the production process. Each task contributes differently to the final output, depending on its contribution  $A_e$ . These tasks can be performed by labor  $(I_e)$ , by AI  $(a_e)$ , or by a combination of both. A critical parameter in the model is the degree of substitutability between labor and AI  $(\sigma)$ , which determines how easily AI can replace human labor in specific tasks.

For instance, tasks like cashiering in supermarkets or bank transactions handled by ATMs represent high substitutability, where AI can seamlessly take over. On the other hand, some tasks face a gradual path toward substitution. There are also cases where labor and AI are complementary, as seen in roles like editing and coding, where tools like ChatGPT or other large language models (LLMs) enhance human productivity.

The model highlights that the impact of a new technology, such as generative AI, hinges on two factors: the technology's capability to perform a given task and the degree of substitutability between labor and AI ( $\sigma$ ). When labor and AI are highly substitutable, employment tends to decrease in those tasks. Conversely, if labor and AI are complementary, employment could increase. A practical example is Data Analytics, where AI-driven automation of analysis creates demand for experts who can interpret findings and integrate them into operational strategies, thus boosting employment in complementary roles.

The model also incorporates what is known as the **productivity effect**. As Al increases the marginal productivity of certain tasks and reduces marginal production costs, it can drive demand for non-automated tasks, particularly when demand is elastic. In such cases, overall employment may rise due to increased production and hiring in complementary areas.

An alternative perspective shifts the focus from tasks to technologies. David Autor (2024) is a leading economist advocating this approach. He classifies technologies as either laboraugmenting or labor-automating and uses patent data to support this classification. His research demonstrates the relationship between automation and augmentation technologies and their effects on occupational levels from 1980 to 2018. For instance, automation patents correlate with declining employment in certain sectors, while augmentation patents often signal growth in roles that leverage human-Al collaboration.




Figure 1.- Relationship between automation and augmentation patents and occupation level 1980-2018 (Autor, 2024).

In a later paper, Autor (2024) delves into the societal implications of AI, particularly its potential to revitalize the middle class. He argues that while humanity has an abundance of jobs, it is facing a shortage of workers. Generative AI, Autor suggests, offers a unique opportunity to create quality, engaging jobs, but achieving this outcome is not solely a technological challenge—it is a societal choice requiring deliberate action.

Acemoglu (2024) also addresses the future of jobs but emphasizes the broader societal impact of AI, particularly its influence on inequality. Unlike previous technological disruptions, Acemoglu suggests that generative AI's effects on inequality are more evenly distributed, as it affects both low- and high-skilled workers across a wide range of tasks. This more universal impact, he

argues, marks a departure from traditional patterns of technological change that disproportionately affected specific segments of the workforce.

Together, these models and perspectives provide a comprehensive foundation for understanding the complex interplay between generative AI, labor, and economic structures, offering valuable insights into both its challenges and opportunities.

# 3.- A model for management

To evaluate the potential impact of generative AI across parts of an organization or the organization as a whole, we adopt a simple economic framework where innovation—here, the generative AI disruption—is treated as exogenous. As a foundation, we rely on the Solow-Swan growth model (1956) and its Cobb-Douglas production function:

$$Y_t = K_t^{\alpha} (A_t L_t)^{1-\alpha}$$

Here,  $Y_t$  represents output at time t,  $K_t$  is capital,  $L_t$  is labor,  $A_t$  is total factor productivity (the state of technology), and  $\alpha$  denotes the output elasticity of capital.

This framework allows us to explore the effects of a technological expansion—specifically, the introduction and adoption of generative AI. As outlined in previous models, this technological frontier has a dual effect: some tasks are automated while others are augmented, each with differing multipliers and consequences.




Figure 2.- New technologies have the dual effect of automating and/or augmenting tasks.

Our first step is to examine the potential multiplier effect of both automation and augmentation. In the case of automation, the multiplier can be exceptionally large when certain conditions are met: the technological opportunity exists for automation to achieve the required level of accuracy, the cost differential between human labor and automated labor is substantial, and

scalability is high. Under these circumstances, the multiplier effect is not only significant but also grows exponentially as scale increases.

In contrast, the multiplier effect of augmentation is inherently limited by the capacity of the human being enhanced. Unlike automation, which can scale almost indefinitely with minimal marginal costs, augmentation is constrained by human factors—namely, time, attention, and cognitive bandwidth. For example, tools like ChatGPT can dramatically speed up tasks such as copy editing by correcting and refining text in a fraction of the time, but the process still requires user input and oversight. Users can only dedicate a finite amount of time and attention to interacting with the tool, meaning the multiplier effect is capped.

Thus, we are confronted with two distinct cases in terms of scalability and multipliers. Automation has the potential for near-unbounded growth, limited only by the systems and infrastructure implementing it. Augmentation, on the other hand, yields a smaller, more constrained multiplier, as it depends on the finite capacity of the human being using the technology.

#### Automation

Automation can be modeled as a decomposition of labor into human labor ( $L_H$ ) and automated labor ( $L_R$ ), where the latter represents tasks performed by AI, robots, or other forms of automation. Conceptually, automated labor ( $L_R$ ) can be viewed as capital, reflecting its investment-driven nature and its significant impact on production at scale. The production function, therefore, becomes:

$$Y_t = K_t^{\alpha} (A_t L_t)^{1-\alpha}$$
 $L = L_H + L_R$ 
 $Y_t = K_t^{\alpha} (A_t (L_H + L_R))^{1-\alpha}$ 

Automation tends to exhibit a high multiplier effect under specific conditions. When the technological opportunity exists, marginal costs of automation are significantly lower than

human labor, and scalability is virtually unconstrained, automation achieves exponential effects. However, four preconditions must be satisfied for automation to be feasible:

- Cost differential: A significant cost difference must exist between human labor and automation. For example, in the case of robotaxis, high upfront costs and operational complexity often challenge their competitiveness against flexible, platform-based human labor.
- 2. **Scalability**: Marginal costs must decrease—or at least remain constant—to enable automation to scale effectively. Without scalability, automation faces barriers to adoption.
- 3. **Availability of expertise**: Talent and knowledge must be available to enable automation, but this shift results in the erosion of expertise. Once tasks are encoded into machines, the original skills are often lost and cannot easily be reintroduced.
- 4. **Affordable sunk costs**: Investment in automation typically increases the capital share (*K*) of the production function, making it critical that firms can absorb these upfront costs.

Where these conditions hold, automation achieves large-scale productivity gains. However, the tradeoff is the loss of human expertise, which can reduce organizational agility when unforeseen challenges arise that the automated systems cannot address.

conditions	consequences
cost differential	substitution of labor, faster if differential is higher
scalability of $L_{_{\rm R}}$ – non-increasing marginal cost	Increasing difficulty to compete, higher if marginal cost is lower
availability of talent and expertise	talent lost
affordable sunk costs	higher representation of capital (K) in the production function

Table 1. Conditions and consequences of automation.

### Augmentation

Augmentation, by contrast, enhances productivity through a technological improvement represented as an increase in total factor productivity ( $A_t$ ). This can be expressed as:

$$Y_t = K_t^{\alpha} (A_t L_t)^{1-\alpha}$$

$$A = A_{old} + A_{new}$$

In this case, generative AI expands the technological frontier, increasing both productivity and quality. Early adopters of generative AI, such as McKinsey or Cuatrecasas, have quantified these effects. For instance, their internal McKinsey chatbot "Lilli" has been shown to improve report quality by 20% while reducing research time by 30%. Similar productivity gains are observed in programming, where generative AI enhances output, particularly in tasks like programming language translation, which are nearing full automation.

Augmentation also leads to the creation of new expertise. As Autor (2024) observes, expertise is inherently technology-dependent: no programmers existed before computers, nor web designers before the internet. Similarly, generative AI redefines what expertise means in fields like accounting, programming, and content creation. Over time, tools like generative AI erode expert monopolies by democratizing access to specialized knowledge, shifting the value from knowing the dots to connecting them.

The final consequence of augmentation is an increase in profits, driven by cost reductions and productivity improvements. Unlike automation, however, augmentation has inherent limits. Its multiplier is constrained by the human factors it seeks to enhance—specifically, time and attention. While AI tools can drastically speed up tasks, the human user remains a bottleneck, limiting scalability.




Table 2. Effects of augmentation.

# **Automation – Augmentation Dynamics**

Automation and augmentation are not static phenomena; rather, they operate on a continuum, often transitioning from one to the other. The distinctive advantage of automation lies in its scalability and ability to create new services with near-zero marginal costs. For example, search engines automated website classification, replacing the labor-intensive processes of early internet directories like Yahoo and AltaVista. This automation enabled exponential growth through highly scalable services subsidized by advertising.




Figure 3.- Automation - Augmentation dynamics.

Generative AI presents a similar opportunity, but only when tasks reach full automation. The downside, however, is the loss of expertise that automation entails. As organizations become increasingly reliant on automated systems, they risk losing agility when confronted with new, unexpected circumstances that fall outside the system's capabilities.

In contrast, augmentation, while valuable, does not exhibit the same scalability as automation. Limited by human attention and time, augmentation primarily redefines tasks and expertise rather than creating entirely new markets or services. For example, while generative AI tools enhance programming efficiency, they do not fundamentally change the nature of programming tasks—at least until those tasks themselves become automated.

A key dynamic in this continuum is the transition from augmentation to automation through micro-automation and task subdivision. For example, updating versions of programming languages such as Java or Python, often begins as an augmented process, where human programmers leverage AI tools to assist with repetitive tasks. Over time, as prompts are refined and processes streamlined, these tasks become increasingly automated, with verification conducted through unit testing. This gradual shift not only transforms specific tasks but also reshapes the organizational structure, leading to significantly higher productivity multipliers.

In conclusion, understanding the interplay between automation and augmentation is critical for organizations aiming to harness generative AI effectively. While automation drives scalability and efficiency, augmentation enhances productivity and redefines expertise. The strategic challenge lies in balancing these dynamics to unlock the full transformative potential of generative AI while mitigating its inherent risks, such as expertise loss and reduced organizational agility.

# 4.- Disruptions and Market Elasticity

Organizations do not endure disruptions in isolation; they operate within markets characterized by specific conditions and compete on the basis of delivering better versions of existing products or introducing novel offerings. To assess the effects of generative AI, it is essential to consider the market's capacity to absorb new production, either by capturing competitors' share or by creating a new market equilibrium at a different price point.

When analyzing automation and augmentation, two primary factors must be accounted for: **market elasticity**—whether the market can expand in response to technological advancements—and the scalability of the technology itself. Let's focus first on market elasticity.

#### **Automation and Market Elasticity**

In **inelastic markets**, the effects of automation are slower and more gradual, despite the existence of technological opportunities. This scenario is particularly common in industries operating within pre-defined networks, such as the automobile supply chain. Here, production volume is largely determined by a parent company, with adjustments often exogenous to price considerations and driven instead by geographic or strategic factors. In such contexts, incentives for rapid automation are weak due to limited prospects for quickly recovering investment costs. Instead, firms tend to implement partial automation or seek efficiencies in related or complementary industries, which can exert downward pressure on wages even when job displacement is slow.

Conversely, in **highly elastic markets**, the impact of automation is far more pronounced. When cost differentials favor automated solutions and the technology scales with minimal marginal costs, adoption occurs rapidly. This, in turn, reshapes the market structure, often leading to a **winner-takes-all dynamic** where outcomes approximate a power-law distribution. The extent of this market transformation depends on the speed and magnitude of the multiplier effect. As automation scales, job replacement accelerates, leading to lower wages and the rapid erosion of knowledge monopolies as expertise is encoded into systems. Organizational changes follow, driven by the need to serve significantly larger markets with more streamlined operations. In extreme cases—where scalability is near-infinite, marginal costs approach zero, and automation

is complete—we witness the emergence of digital monopolies, as seen in markets dominated by search engines and social networks.

However, constraints such as high infrastructure costs, as in cloud computing and generative AI, or regulatory interventions can limit the transition to power-law markets. These barriers prevent total market domination and preserve some degree of competitive equilibrium.

### **Augmentation and Market Elasticity**

The effects of augmentation differ considerably depending on market elasticity.

In **non-elastic or low-elasticity markets**, augmentation tends to enhance productivity and quality without significantly expanding demand. High-end consultancies and legal services offer prime examples. For firms such as McKinsey or global law firms, client bases are inherently limited consultancies serve only the largest organizations capable of rethinking strategies at scale, while legal firms operate in localized markets dictated by jurisdictional boundaries. As a result, even with generative AI driving substantial efficiency gains, the market size remains relatively fixed.

In this scenario, increased productivity leads to improved quality and higher profits, but without a corresponding rise in demand. Instead, firms typically respond by reducing headcount, often eliminating entry-level roles (e.g., juniors) as tasks they once performed become automated or augmented. This creates a redefinition of roles across the organization as firms capitalize on generative AI to reorganize workflows. To avoid cannibalizing their existing markets, some organizations attempt to expand or create new markets through separate brands or service offerings.

In **elastic markets**, the effects of augmentation are markedly different. Markets such as aesthetic medicine, including anti-aging treatments, exemplify this case, where demand grows as price decreases. Here, augmentation enables market expansion while maintaining the need for human labor to support growth. This results in a dual effect: wages and profits increase as market size expands, but the market structure remains relatively unchanged—typically following a Gaussian distribution—due to the inherent limitations of human attention and expertise.

Interestingly, elastic markets experiencing augmentation tend to foster the rise of new expertise. As technologies redefine tasks, existing knowledge monopolies erode, giving way to new professions and redefined roles. For example, graphic designers transitioned into web designers, machine learning practitioners evolved into data scientists, and software engineers shifted to cloud engineers. These new professions emerge to meet the demands of expanding or newly created markets, effectively generating new pools of employment.

# **Automation–Augmentation Dynamics and Disruption**

The dynamics of automation and augmentation reveal that disruption is most intense in elastic markets, particularly when automation enables low-cost scalability and market reshaping. Such scenarios can lead to the rapid consolidation of markets and the emergence of digital monopolies. In contrast, augmentation in elastic markets produces a significant but less extreme form of disruption, primarily characterized by the emergence of new expertise and professions.

In non-elastic markets, the transformative potential of both automation and augmentation is far more constrained. Automation advances slowly due to weak incentives for rapid adoption, while augmentation primarily drives quality improvements and cost savings without generating substantial market expansion. Nevertheless, even in these markets, the organizational landscape is redefined as entry-level roles diminish, and workflows are restructured to capitalize on generative AI.

In conclusion, market elasticity determines the speed, magnitude, and nature of disruption. Automation tends to dominate in elastic markets, driving rapid transformation and potential market concentration, while augmentation fosters gradual but significant shifts in expertise and organizational structures. Understanding these dynamics is critical for organizations seeking to navigate the profound changes brought about by generative AI.

augmentation	<ul> <li>no changes in demand but increasing productivity</li> <li>ability to lower job count</li> <li>ability to lower salaries &amp; increase profits</li> <li>ability to increase quality</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>demand absorbs increasing productivity</li> <li>ability to lower prices</li> <li>ability to increase salaries &amp; profits</li> <li>ability to increase quality</li> <li>rise of new &amp; valuable expertise</li> <li>erosion of expert monopolies</li> </ul>
automation	<ul> <li>slower adoption because time to recover sunk costs</li> <li>slow wage decrease</li> <li>slow job replacement</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>faster adoption if high cost diff.</li> <li>lower wages</li> <li>rapid job replacement</li> <li>rapid extinction of expertise</li> <li>erosion of expert monopolies</li> <li>power-law markets</li> <li>organizational changes</li> </ul>
	arepsilon < 1 inelastic markets	arepsilon > 1 elastic markets

Table 3. Effects of automation and augmentation given different market elasticities.

# 5.- Disruptions and Technological Scalability

Thus far, we have examined how market elasticity influences the trajectory of technological disruptions, particularly across the continuum of automation and augmentation. However, not even general-purpose technologies (GPTs) like generative AI impact all human activities equally. Some sectors experience significant disruption, while others remain only lightly affected. This differential impact can be economically evaluated by analyzing a technology's capacity to dramatically and rapidly reduce the **marginal cost** of specific activities at scale.

Disruptions occur most intensely in activities where GPTs significantly lower marginal costs while scaling easily. The entry point for such disruptions is often augmentation, which presents lower risk and is relatively easier to implement within existing organizational workflows without requiring substantial structural changes.

#### Early Targets: High Scalability and Low Risk

The activities most susceptible to early adoption are those that are:

- 1. **Digital in nature** and therefore inherently scalable.
- 2. **Low-risk environments** where generative AI can be deployed in internal operations with minimal disruptions.

Key examples include programming, software engineering, business intelligence, data analytics, and consulting. In these areas, generative AI is already achieving significant cost reductions, particularly in tasks like version control, data-driven reporting, and repetitive programming workflows. These activities have high potential for automation, but they often begin with augmentation.

As trust and confidence in generative AI grow, organizations begin targeting higher-risk areas, such as **customer service**. Here, the technology is first used to augment human operators, improving their efficiency while automating back-end processes. Over time, the goal shifts toward full automation of customer-facing roles. The payoff in these areas is considerable due to the vast scale of operations and the potential for generative AI to reduce marginal costs

dramatically. Customer acquisition and fully automated customer service represent the next frontiers, offering enormous opportunities for cost savings and value creation.




Figure 4. Impact of generative AI in different areas according to marginal cost and automation-augmentation.

#### The Opposite End: High Marginal Costs and Physical Limitations

At the other end of the spectrum lie activities involving **physical products** or systems, where marginal costs cannot be lowered as dramatically as in digital domains. Examples include robotaxis and humanoid robots, which, despite their significant potential for market creation and value capture, face high costs related to hardware, energy consumption, and maintenance.

In these cases, while the potential rewards are substantial, the disruption is slower and requires organizations with the resources, patience, and long-term vision to overcome technical and economic hurdles. For such activities, marginal costs can still decrease—albeit not to the near-zero levels of digital products—enabling significant cost reductions and productivity gains over time.

#### **Comparison to Consulting Analyses**

The patterns identified in this analysis align closely with assessments conducted by leading consultancies such as McKinsey. Their frameworks frequently highlight similar trends: early disruptions are concentrated in digital, scalable areas where marginal cost reductions are most pronounced, while physical, higher-risk sectors experience a slower but equally impactful transformation.

By mapping the effects of generative AI across functional areas—ranging from augmentation of knowledge work to the automation of physical processes—we can better understand the sequence, intensity, and economic implications of these disruptions.

This framework enables organizations to identify where generative AI can deliver the greatest value, balancing scalability, marginal cost reduction, and implementation risk to navigate the challenges and opportunities of technological disruption.




Figure 5. Analysis of the impact of Generative AI on functional areas, McKinsey.

# 6. Economics of Technological Disruptions

In this paper, we have presented a framework to help companies assess the present and future impacts of technological disruptions, using generative AI as a representative case.

We began by differentiating the mechanisms through which disruptions operate—automation and augmentation—and explored their effects in isolation from market conditions.

Subsequently, we introduced market elasticity and the ability of technology to influence marginal costs as critical dimensions shaping the scope and speed of these disruptions.

Our analysis demonstrated that market elasticity and technological impact on marginal cost play a decisive role not only in the magnitude of disruption but also in determining the broader societal transformation. Market elasticity, in particular, signals where the most significant changes will occur—whether within existing businesses and markets or through the creation of entirely new ones.

By examining the dynamics between automation and augmentation, we highlighted their evolutionary interplay. Augmentation often serves as a precursor to automation, as tasks initially enhanced by AI become fully automated over time. This progression redefines the nature of work, alters the composition of tasks, and ultimately reshapes society as a whole.

#### **Organizational Impacts**

At the organizational level, we identified two significant but often underexplored impacts of generative AI: **expertise** and **organizational structure**.

#### 1. Expertise Transformation:

Expertise is inherently shaped by the tools we use and the degree to which tasks are embedded within those tools. Generative AI significantly amplifies this embedding process, enabling tools to encapsulate more knowledge and cognitive capability than ever before. This fundamentally alters the nature of expertise, requiring individuals to engage in higher-order activities such as conceptualization, integration, and critical analysis. For education and training systems, this shift will necessitate a redefinition of curricula, with universities adapting to equip future professionals for an era of **co**-

**intelligence**, a world where humans collaborate, contrast, and interact with intelligent tools to produce new ideas and solutions. Such a paradigm, where tools act as complements, substitutes, and thought partners, is unprecedented in human history.

# 2. Organizational Structure:

The digital revolution already triggered a flattening of organizational hierarchies by eliminating the need for extensive layers of management. Technologies like the internet enabled instant communication, reducing the autonomy of geographic divisions and streamlining coordination processes. In factories and supply chains, scheduling, logistics, and overall coordination have been embedded in code, minimizing human involvement. Generative AI will further advance this trend by injecting intelligence and knowledge into the **digital layer** of organizations. Processes that require coordination, decision-making, and analytical insight will increasingly be automated, further reducing the need for human intermediaries.

#### **Broader Societal Transformations**

The transformation of expertise and organizational structures will not only reshape business operations but also have profound societal implications, likely equal to or even surpassing the economic impacts. The redefinition of expertise will democratize access to knowledge while simultaneously creating new professions and roles, fostering a continuous cycle of skill adaptation, redefinition and creation. Similarly, the evolution of organizational structures will redefine how businesses interact internally and externally, accelerating the shift toward flatter, knowledge-driven organizations.

#### A Framework for the Future

This framework offers organizations a structured approach to evaluating the effects of technological disruptions, accounting for their economic, organizational, and societal dimensions. While no tool can predict the future with certainty, this framework provides a foundation for making **educated assessments** of technological opportunities and risks. By considering a comprehensive range of factors - from market elasticity and cost dynamics to expertise and organizational structure - firms can anticipate changes, prepare for them, and reflect on the transformations that generative AI and future disruptions are likely to bring.

Ultimately, this framework aims to serve as a strategic tool to enable organizations to navigate uncertainty, reflect on the evolving nature of work and value creation, and make informed decisions to remain resilient and competitive in an era of rapid technological change.

# **Bibliography**

AUTOR, DAVID (2024) "Applying AI to Rebuild Middle Class Jobs" NBER working paper 32140.

AUTOR, DAVID (2015) "Why Are There Still So Many Jobs? The History and Future of Workplace Automation," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 29(3):3–30.

ACEMOGLU, D., AUTOR, D., HAZELL, J., and RESTREPO, P. (2022). "Al and the Labor Market". NBER Working Paper No. 30074.

ACEMOGLU, DARON (2024) "The Simple Macroeconomics of Al" Pre-print of an Economic Policy paper, May 12, 2024.

ACEMOGLU, DARON and PASCUAL RESTREPO (2018) "Artificial Intelligence, Automation and Work" NBER working paper 24196.

ACEMOGLU, DARON and PASCUAL RESTREPO (2022) "Tasks, Automation, and the Rise in U.S. Wage Inequality," Econometrica, 2022, 90 (5), 1973–2016.

ACEMOGLU and SIMON JOHNSON (2023) Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity, PublicAffairs, 2023.

GOLDMAND SHACHS (2024) "Generative AI could raise global GDP by 7%" <a href="https://www.goldmansachs.com/insights/articles/generative-ai-could-raise-global-gdp-by-7-percent April 5">https://www.goldmansachs.com/insights/articles/generative-ai-could-raise-global-gdp-by-7-percent April 5">https://www.goldmansachs.com/insights/articles/generative-ai-

HENSHALL, WILL (2023) "Elon Musk Tells Rishi Sunak Al Will Eliminate the Need for Jobs," Time Magazine, November 2023.

McKinsey & Company (2023) "The economic potential of generative AI" June 2023.

SEQUOIA (2024) "Generative Al's Act o1. The Agentic Reasoning Era begins". https://www.sequoiacap.com/article/generative-ais-act-o1/, October 9, 2024.

SOLOW, R. M. (1956) "A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth". Quarterly Journal of Economics, 70(1), 65-94.

SWAN, T. W. (1956) "Economic Growth and Capital Accumulation". Economic Record, 32(2), 334-361.

SULEYMAN, MUSTAFA and MICHAEL BHASKAR (2023) The Coming Wave: Technology, Power, and the Twenty-first Century's Greatest Dilemma, Crown, 2023.