

GREGORY X

THE POPE WHO
CHANGED THE RULES
OF POWER



AGUSTÍN V. STARTARI

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Amid one of the most turbulent periods in the history of the medieval papacy, **Gregory X: The Pope Who Changed the Rules of Power reconstructs**, with historical rigor and narrative clarity, the life and legacy of Teobaldo Visconti, an unexpected occupant of the throne of Saint Peter. His election after the longest papal election in history (nearly three years of internal divisions, enforced confinement, and external pressure) marked a turning point in thirteenth-century ecclesiastical politics.

From his beginnings as a cleric from Piacenza, archdeacon of Liège, and crusader in the Holy Land to his decisive role at the Second Council of Lyon, the pontificate of Gregory X (1271–1276) was brief yet profoundly reformist. This book examines his attempt at reconciliation with the Greek Orthodox Church, his promotion of the institutionalization of the conclave as the system for papal election, and his efforts to establish an equilibrium between the European powers and Rome's spiritual authority. Combining political, ecclesiological, and diplomatic analysis, the work offers a portrait of a pontiff whose historiographical reception has been uneven and, above all, a study of a government that left enduring institutional instruments to the medieval Church.

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Agustin V. Startari, born in 1982, is a Uruguayan author, thinker, and researcher with a strong academic background in Historical Sciences and Linguistics from the University of the Republic (UdelaR). His work spans a wide range of fields, from historical research books to fiction and Buddhism, reflecting the breadth of his interests and his sustained engagement with diverse subjects.

Among his notable works are *Creation of an Empire: The Old Kingdom of Egypt*, which examines the consolidation of this enigmatic civilization, and *Propaganda Machinery: National Socialism*, which analyzes a historical phenomenon of major significance. He has also written *Evangelization in the Pen of Fray Bartolomé*, a study of the influence of evangelization on history, and *Ukraine and Russia: A Conflict in Progress*, an examination of the continuing conflict between the two countries.

Startari is distinguished by his ability to make specialized subjects accessible to readers with a strong interest in history through his **Work Papers** series. His extensive knowledge and critical approach make his works informative and stimulating reading for those seeking a deeper understanding of diverse historical and cultural questions.

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INTRODUCTION

This study examines the pontificate of Gregory X (1271–1276) from a systemic, institutional, and geopolitical perspective, situating it within the web of crises, tensions, and processes of reconfiguration that characterized the Church and Latin Christendom in the second half of the thirteenth century. Rather than offering a pontifical biography or a chronology of events, the book advances an integrated interpretation that reads the government of Gregory X as a response directed toward institutional stabilization at a moment of internal destabilization within the ecclesiastical system.

The central hypothesis interprets the election of Teobaldo Visconti (archdeacon of Liège, not a cardinal, and in Acre when he was elected) as a functional solution to the paralysis produced by the prolonged interregnum of 1268–1271; this characterization belongs to the interpretive level and is not terminology used by the sources. This election (the longest in history) is interpreted here not merely as a temporal anomaly but as evidence of a crisis of legitimacy and representation within the College of Cardinals, divided by networks of power and competing factions. The constitution *Ubi Periculum* (1274), which institutionalized the confinement of the cardinals and codified the electoral process, may be read as a systemic mechanism of self-regulation intended to prevent future deadlocks. From the perspective of Niklas Luhmann's systems theory, one might speak of a mechanism of control in response to the "self-generated risk of dysfunction within the religious subsystem". From a sociological perspective (in particular, through Pierre Bourdieu's analysis of the religious field) the episode acquires crucial symbolic significance. Within an ecclesiastical field fractured by rival claims to legitimacy (among French, Italian, imperial, and Angevin cardinals), the election of a non-cardinal (external to the immediate curial conflict and endowed with prestige acquired in the East) may be interpreted as a relatively neutral solution at the symbolic level. From this perspective, the election and subsequent government of Gregory X can be analyzed as an attempt temporarily to reconfigure relations within the ecclesiastical field through an institutional recentring. At a third level of analysis, the book considers the Second Council of Lyon (1274) not merely as an ecclesiastical event but as one

of the thirteenth century's most ambitious attempts to restore political and ecclesial unity between Latin and Greek Christendom. In the face of the inertia of the Crusades, the loss of Jerusalem (1244), the consolidation of the Mamluk sultanate, and the progressive assertion of territorial monarchies as autonomous powers, the documented sequence of decisions makes it possible to read Gregory X as a pontiff strategically oriented toward reinforcing Roman centrality through structural instruments: (1) union with Byzantium, (2) reform of the Latin clergy, and (3) a renewed call for crusade, now supported by systematic ecclesiastical taxation. This effort at universalist synthesis (theological, juridical, and military) may be interpreted as one of the thirteenth century's most coherent attempts to articulate the Church as a supranational diplomatic actor in a context marked by the growing assertion of territorial monarchies.

The present research is grounded in primary sources such as the acts of the Council of Lyon, the bull *Ubi Periculum*, and the diplomatic correspondence preserved in the *Registra Vaticana*, together with a critical review of specialized historiography ranging from classic works such as those of Ferdinand Gregorovius to modern scholarship by Walter Ullmann, Kenneth Pennington, Jean Richard, and Brian Tierney. Throughout, priority is given to an interdisciplinary reading that combines tools of political analysis, institutional theory, historical sociology, and canon law without sacrificing the documentary rigor proper to the Historical Sciences. Through this approach, the pontificate of Gregory X is reread not as a mere transition between two phases of papal history but as a conjuncture of high structural density in which new forms of legitimacy, regulation, and ecclesiastical articulation were tested. The juridical reception of some of these reforms (*Ubi Periculum* in particular) outlived his brief reign and forms part of the conclave's *longue durée*. Connections with later developments, such as fifteenth-century conciliarism, are treated in this work as historiographical comparisons requiring specific textual evidence, rather than as an automatic doctrinal genealogy.

The Man and His Times

Chapter 1. The Fracture in the Ecclesiastical System

The Latin Church of the mid-thirteenth century was experiencing tensions in its internal governance and growing difficulties in exercising authority beyond its own structures. Following the death of Clement IV in 1268, the Roman see remained vacant for thirty-three months, reflecting the fragmentation of the College of Cardinals and its inability to reach sufficient consensus. In the interpretation advanced here, the episode forms part of a broader transformation of the papacy's universalist project: the strengthening of territorial monarchies, the contraction of the Crusader states, and pressure from powers such as Charles of Anjou. The interregnum thus serves as a particularly visible indicator of the difficulties faced by ecclesiastical government in reproducing its leadership under conditions of fragmentation.

In systemic terms, and therefore as an analytical category, the phenomenon may be interpreted as a critical fracture within the ecclesiastical subsystem, which during this period proved unable to regenerate its leadership through the ordinary electoral procedure. According to Niklas Luhmann's theory of social systems, every operationally closed system must possess mechanisms of autopoiesis, that is, internal capacities to reproduce its elements and operations without depending upon external inputs. For the purposes of this model, institutional self-reproduction is linked here to the continuity of pontifical leadership, insofar as the pope was not only the guarantor of canonical order but also the structural node around which the other ecclesiastical subsystems (juridical, doctrinal, and diplomatic) were organized. The failure of the election initiated at Viterbo in 1268 and its continuation for almost three years may be represented analytically as an interruption of this operational chain and as a crisis in the internal reproduction of leadership. Within this theoretical framework, the absence of a pontiff may be described as a phase of instability in the production of decisions and institutional legitimacy; the language of the binary code legitimate/illegitimate belongs here to the

Luhmannian model as applied by the author. At this point, the inability to elect a new pope paralyzed not only the functioning of the curia but also the symbolic flow that sustained its authority as the operational center of the Western religious field. From this perspective, the constitution *Ubi Periculum* (1274), promulgated by Gregory X, may be interpreted as a mechanism of normative self-correction: it established a coercive procedure designed to compel an election during future vacancies, introducing a juridical infrastructure of closure that would enable structural self-reproduction to resume under internally imposed rules. On this reading, the reform can be understood as a juridical adjustment to the electoral procedure intended to reduce the likelihood of future deadlock and stabilize the institutional production of papal succession.

The city of Viterbo, seat of the election begun after the death of Clement IV, became the stage for an unprecedented institutional crisis. The election lasted thirty-three months, while the composition of the college changed during the interregnum through deaths, illness, and absences, without the factions initially succeeding in reaching the consensus required to elect a new pontiff. The prolonged stalemate, reflecting the fragmentation of the College of Cardinals into national and clientelistic factions, soon exceeded the host city's threshold of political and social tolerance. In a gesture as extraordinary as it was eloquent, the citizens of Viterbo intervened directly in the process: they sealed the building, drastically reduced the cardinals' food rations, and (in an act charged with symbolic drama) removed the roof of the palace so as to expose the electors to the weather. This episode, recorded both in contemporary chronicles and in later historiography, had an unmistakably coercive dimension and may also be analyzed as collective action with political, ecclesial significance, indicative of the exhaustion produced by the prolonged vacancy of the see. The citizenry, as an urban political body with communal responsibilities, in practice exerted material and symbolic pressure upon the electoral college, exceeding the ordinary framework of the canonical process. In this way, curial collapse acquired a theatrical dimension: the staging of enforced confinement as an instrument of pressure may retrospectively be interpreted as the immediate precedent for the enclosure later given juridical form. From this episode onward, the compulsory seclusion of the College of Cardinals during a papal

election began to be institutionalized under the name “conclave” (cum clave). Although the formal juridical regulation of this practice would come only with the constitution *Ubi Periculum* in 1274, the Viterbo episode in practice prefigured a form of confinement that would subsequently be ritualized and normatively regulated, thereafter becoming a structural element of the papal electoral system. Following its juridical codification, the enclosed space would become a central component of the canonical setting of papal election.

This context cannot be treated merely as a historical curiosity or anecdotal dysfunction. The prolonged interregnum of 1268–1271 constitutes a critical episode in the history of ecclesiastical government and, within the framework adopted here, may be analyzed as evidence of the difficulties faced by the cardinalatial elites in producing a shared solution through the existing mechanisms for distributing power. Far from constituting a simple institutional stalemate, the phenomenon is interpreted here as a crisis of legitimation in the symbolic reproduction of the Roman religious field, in which a logic of operation had become consolidated that was more closely tied to relations of force than to the principle of spiritual service. From Pierre Bourdieu’s perspective, the religious field is configured as a structured space of positions and struggles in which agents endowed with specific capital, in this case, religious symbolic capital (grace, orthodoxy, proximity to pontifical power) compete for the monopoly of spiritual legitimacy. In the thirteenth century, this capital was distributed unequally and conflictually among the principal power blocs represented in the College of Cardinals: the French faction, aligned with the Capetian monarchy; the Italian faction, defending curial autonomy; and the Angevins, whose power was organized around the expansive figure of Charles of Anjou. Within this framework, resistance to agreeing upon a new pope may be read as a struggle to preserve dominant positions within the field rather than as a theological or canonical disagreement. What was at stake was not merely the election of an individual but the definition of who had the right to represent the legitimate form of exercising spiritual authority in the West. The election of Teobaldo Visconti—a figure external to the factional struggle and without internal alignments, became possible only once strategies of mutual obstruction had exhausted the field’s capacity for legitimate

reproduction and a symbolic gesture capable of minimally restoring structural unity had become necessary.

The eventual election of Teobaldo Visconti, a non-cardinal who came from the Holy Land and stood outside the college's immediate disputes, is interpreted here as a compromise solution arising from a condition of deadlock; this explanation is inferential and does not amount to a motive explicitly formulated by the electors. The sources establish that Visconti did not belong to the College of Cardinals and that his candidacy offered an external way out of the conflict between the opposing factions; to attribute his election exclusively to "strategic neutrality," however, would itself be an inference. He was external to the disputed field, without internal clientelistic networks or compromised bonds of loyalty, making him an acceptable option for all factions while fully satisfying none. Within the logic of the religious field as developed by Pierre Bourdieu, his election may be understood as the imposition of a figure of symbolic equilibrium capable of provisionally closing the crisis of legitimation. In functional terms, Visconti acted as a systemic *tertium datur*: a way out that restored the system's operability without structurally resolving its underlying tensions. His figure functioned as a vector of institutional recomposition, allowing canonical order to resume and temporarily stabilizing the capital of spiritual authority. In this sense, rather than an election in the fullest sense, his designation should be read as a symbolic neutralization of the curial conflict. He was a liminal figure, useful not because of what he represented but precisely because of what he did not represent: his absence of factional affiliation made him electable within a system temporarily blocked by an excess of intersecting interests.

The chapter analyzes the interregnum of 1268–1271 as a crisis of the mechanism of succession and establishes the hypothesis that will guide the remainder of the study: Gregory X responded to this conjuncture through normative, conciliar, and diplomatic instruments whose institutional coherence must be demonstrated through concrete decisions.

1.1.1 Methodological Foundation: Systems Theory, the Religious Field, and Christian Geopolitics

This study begins from a deliberately interdisciplinary methodological premise: the pontificate of Gregory X is to be understood not only as a sequence of historical decisions but as a nodal point within an institutional, symbolic, and geopolitical architecture undergoing transformation. To this end, it articulates a mixed model combining analytical tools from three contemporary traditions:

To preserve the distinction between documentation and interpretation, the study adopts an explicit epistemological hierarchy. Documented facts are understood as data directly supported by primary sources or by verifiable historiographical consensus; inferences are plausible causal reconstructions derived from the documentary sequence; the categories of “system,” “field,” “symbolic capital,” “rationalization,” and “institutional entrepreneur” are used as contemporary interpretive tools rather than as the vocabulary of thirteenth-century actors; and every comparison with conciliarism, constitutionalism, synodality, or modern models is formulated as a retrospective analogy unless explicit textual reception can be demonstrated. This gradation will be maintained throughout the book through formulations such as “the documentation shows,” “it may be inferred,” “it is interpreted here,” and “it may retrospectively be compared.”

1. Systemic-Functional Theory (Niklas Luhmann, Douglass North, Acemoglu-Robinson)

From this perspective, the papacy is conceived as a political-religious subsystem embedded within a broader system (medieval Latin Christendom), endowed with its own rules of reproduction and functional differentiation. Following Luhmann, the crisis of the interregnum (1268–1271) is interpreted as an autopoietic dysfunction, that is, an inability of the system to regenerate its own operative legitimacy. On this basis, Gregory X is analyzed, heuristically and not as a medieval category, as an “institutional entrepreneur” in North’s sense: an actor whose legislation introduced mechanisms of self-regulation—such as *Ubi Periculum*, designed to reduce internal failures through stable and reproducible rules.

2. Theory of the Religious Field (Pierre Bourdieu)

Second, the Bourdieusian model of the religious field is applied as a space of competition for the symbolic capital of grace and spiritual legitimacy. Within this framework, the College of Cardinals is analyzed as an arena of internal forces (nationalities, alliances, clientelistic networks), while the election of Teobaldo Visconti as an “outsider” is interpreted as a strategic solution of symbolic neutralization. The institutionalization of enclosure in the conclave is read here, within the Bourdieusian model, as a redefinition of the rules of the field. This formulation is analytical: the juridical text documents enclosure and restrictions on communication, whereas “closing the field” and “restoring authority from within” are interpretive categories.

3. Christian Geopolitics (Black, Pennington, Medieval Diplomacy)

The third methodological axis considers the pontificate of Gregory X in terms of the geopolitical reconfiguration that followed the crusading era. Through the Second Council of Lyon, an attempt was made to restore the universal hegemony of Latin Christianity in the face of three critical fronts: the growing autonomy of European monarchies, the expansionist power of Mamluk Islam, and the ecclesiological rupture with Byzantium. Gregory X is interpreted here as a global mediator who employed normative, diplomatic, and conciliar instruments to reconstruct (rather than simply impose) a common order.

This threefold model thus permits a multiscalar reading: from the microhistory of the conclave to the macrohistory of medieval Christendom, through the structure of the ecclesial field and the mechanisms of normative legitimation. By avoiding exclusively theological reductions or purely political narratives, the analysis seeks to capture the functioning of the papacy as a living historical institution, strained between tradition, reform, and survival.

1.1.2 State of the Historiographical Question and the Position of This Study

The historiography of Gregory X is not nonexistent, but it is uneven and strongly segmented by problem. General histories of the papacy and the medieval Church have tended to place his brief

pontificate within broader narratives of papal monarchy, conflict with secular powers, or the development of Latin Christendom. Against this general scale, Ludovico Gatto's monograph made the pontificate of 1271–1276 an autonomous object of study, while Philip B. Baldwin's work reconstructed Gregory's crusading policy in particular detail and demonstrated the extent to which the crusade occupied the center of his diplomatic activity. The historiographical problem, therefore, is not the absence of scholarship but the dispersal of its findings among subfields that are rarely integrated into a single interpretation of Gregory's government.

A second line of scholarship concentrates on Eastern policy, relations with Byzantium, and preparations for crusade. The works of Deno J. Geanakoplos and Jean Richard examined the negotiations with Michael VIII Palaiologos, the union proclaimed at Lyon, and the place of papal diplomacy in the eastern Mediterranean; Baldwin, writing from the history of the Crusades, added a specific reconstruction of Gregory's strategy of immediate aid for the Holy Land and preparation for a *passagium generale*. These studies make it possible to move beyond a purely rhetorical image of Gregory's crusading policy, yet their principal object remains Eastern diplomacy or the crusade rather than the relationship between these policies and the internal reform of papal government.

The Second Council of Lyon, in turn, possesses a historiography of its own. Antonino Franchi's edition and study of the *Ordinatio Concilii generalis Lugdunensis* made it possible to reconstruct the actual course of the assembly with greater precision; Stephan Kuttner studied the formation and transmission of the Lyonese constitutions, and Burkhard Roberg produced the most extensive monographic study of the council. From this perspective, Lyon II appears as a juridical, conciliar, and diplomatic event of the first order, while *Ubi Periculum* occupies a specific place within the history of canon law and papal elections. Yet the history of the council and the history of the electoral procedure are usually studied as specialized problems rather than as components of a single governmental response.

A fourth body of scholarship provides the broader framework for interpreting authority, law, and ecclesiastical government. Walter Ullmann, Brian Tierney, Kenneth Pennington, and Francis Oakley

have studied, from different perspectives, papal monarchy, the development of canon law, and the conciliar tradition. These works are indispensable for situating the thirteenth century, but they do not in themselves justify turning Gregory X into a proto-conciliarist or a constitutional theorist of the papacy. Recent historiography on papacy and empire has likewise tended to qualify overly linear schemes of apogee and decline, emphasizing continuities, negotiations, and forms of political cooperation alongside jurisdictional conflicts. This study adopts the same caution: it uses those traditions as comparative context, not as proof of a doctrinal genealogy that Gregory's sources do not formulate.

The subsequent reception of Gregory constitutes another distinct field. Simon Ditchfield's study of attempts at canonization in the early modern period showed that the pontiff's memory must also be analyzed through the categories and institutional needs of later periods rather than as the simple continuation of a stable medieval reputation. That warning is methodologically useful for the entire problem of reception: the survival of *Ubi Periculum*, the memory of Lyon II, and Gregory's cult each have distinct histories that must not be conflated.

On the basis of this state of the question, the contribution of the present study is deliberately defined in limited terms. It does not claim to discover an unknown pontificate or to open an unpublished documentary corpus. The originality sought is synthetic and interpretive: to bring together within a single analytical sequence the electoral crisis of Viterbo, *Ubi Periculum*, Lyon II, crusading policy, negotiations with Byzantium, and relations with secular powers, and to ask whether these areas reveal a common logic of institutional stabilization. The expression "architecture of durability" designates this interpretive hypothesis. Its validity depends upon its ability to explain together decisions that historiography has often studied separately, without converting that analytical integration into an explicit intention attributed to Gregory X himself.

Chapter 2. European Political-Ecclesiastical Context in the Thirteenth Century

The thirteenth century was a period of profound reconfiguration of the political and religious order of Western Christendom, marked by growing tensions among the spheres of secular power, ecclesiastical authority, and the military organization of Christianity. Within this setting, two simultaneous structural phenomena became consolidated: on the one hand, the progressive rise of European monarchies as sovereign territorial powers, equipped with autonomous administrative systems, differentiated political identities, and growing claims to control their respective national churches; on the other, the gradual weakening of the papacy's universalist ideal, which since the eleventh century had functioned as an ordering principle of Latin Christendom. This transformation (slow, complex, and not without contradictions) altered the conditions under which the ecclesiastical system operated, affecting both its doctrinal legitimacy and its organizational effectiveness. The model of a Christendom unified under Rome's spiritual direction began to show fractures in the face of mounting tensions between spiritual power and political sovereignty, expressed in recurrent conflicts between popes and kings, jurisdictional disputes over national clergy, and the assertion of a secularized political language that displaced papal mediation as a universal instance. The strengthening of the European kingdoms (France, England, Castile, Aragon, Sicily) was accompanied by an increasing territorialization of power, in which dynastic loyalty and political belonging began to prevail over ecclesial affiliation as principles of collective identity. This entailed a gradual erosion of papal authority in practice, even when it continued to be formally acknowledged. The pope retained his spiritual investiture but faced increasing difficulty in asserting his *auctoritas* over temporal powers, whose legitimacy was progressively constructed upon autonomous foundations. This transformation of the political-ecclesiastical field provides the indispensable background for understanding the conditions under which Gregory X acceded to the pontificate. His election, in a context of prolonged interregnum, and his subsequent reforming agenda must be interpreted in light of a system in transition: no longer fully universal, yet not yet secularized, caught in an

intermediate phase in which the balances between Church and Empire, papacy and monarchy, spiritual unity and political plurality were intensely contested.

1.2.1 The Legacy of Innocent III and the Crisis of Papal Universalism

During the pontificate of Innocent III (1198–1216), the papacy attained an unprecedented degree of doctrinal, jurisdictional, and symbolic centralization, consolidating Rome as the spiritual and political apex of Latin Christendom. Under his leadership, the theological and juridical notion of plenitudo potestatis (the plenitude of the pope's spiritual power) was developed not only in relation to the Church but to the Christian order as a whole, including temporal affairs when they affected the *salus animarum* (the salvation of souls). This conception enabled him to intervene actively in succession disputes, imperial appointments, the regulation of kings and prelates, and the convocation and supervision of crusades and internal reforms of the clergy. Within a widely used historiographical periodization, the papacy of Innocent III is often presented as one of the high points of the universalist project of the medieval papacy, which understood the pontiff as rector of the *Respublica Christiana*, guarantor of the spiritual order, and moderator of the European political equilibrium. He intervened in the imperial election (Otto IV and Frederick II), in the organization of the Fourth Crusade, and in the canonical reform of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215), and succeeded in asserting the superiority of the pontifical *auctoritas sacra* over the *imperium profanum*. By the middle of the thirteenth century, however, this model had begun to display signs of structural and symbolic erosion. The failure of the Seventh (1248) and Eighth Crusades (1270), both undertaken by Louis IX of France with papal support, marked a significant stage in the loss of papal legitimacy as the military and spiritual leader of militant Christianity. The project of recovering the Holy Places (the epicenter of the Church's eschatological and political imagination) was thwarted by the strategic superiority of the Mamluk sultanate and the internal division of the Latin front in the East. This was compounded by growing challenges to pontifical leadership from the Christian kingdoms of the West themselves, whose monarchies

had begun to assert themselves as autonomous political powers, endowed with their own ideologies of kingship and capable of openly challenging Roman authority in fiscal, jurisdictional, and liturgical matters. The pope's symbolic prestige as rector of a unified political (spiritual order was called into question not only by external powers) such as the Byzantine Empire, reconstituted after 1261 under Michael VIII Palaiologos, or the Islamic powers of Egypt and Syria, but also by the internal fragmentation of the Latin world, which no longer conformed to the logic of a single spiritual head.

1.2.2 The Conflict with the Holy Roman Empire

Another central axis was the conflict with the Holy Roman Empire, which since the eleventh century had constituted a constant source of tension. The struggle between Guelphs (pro-papal) and Ghibellines (pro-imperial) fragmented not only Italy but ecclesiastical politics more broadly. The excommunication and deposition of Frederick II by Innocent IV in 1245 during the First Council of Lyon constituted one of the most critical moments in this confrontation. Following Frederick's death, the prolonged imperial vacancy, combined with the Angevin dynasty's ambition to control southern Italy, left the papacy caught between two imperatives: the need to preserve its autonomy and its military dependence upon secular allies such as Charles of Anjou.

1.2.3 Internal Tensions within the Latin Church

Within the strictly ecclesiastical sphere, the situation was equally complex and in several respects paralleled the fragmentation of the political field. Far from being merely an instrument of the pontiff, the Roman Curia had evolved into a highly specialized bureaucratic structure, with functional departments, consolidated legal canons, and a logic of administration that increasingly resembled secular governmental apparatuses. This process of curial bureaucratization (developed particularly from the twelfth century and accelerated under thirteenth-century pontificates) generated an administrative elite composed of cardinals, notaries, and jurists with interests and margins

of action of their own, although the degree of their autonomy from the pope varied according to context. In this setting, the cardinalatial college began to assume functions extending beyond the spiritual sphere, consolidating itself as a political body of the first order, with its own agenda, transnational alliances, and the capacity either to block or advance pontifical decisions. The curia did not merely channel theological decisions; it also contested resources, appointments, benefices, and privileges, feeding internal rivalries among French, Italian, imperial, and Angevin cardinals. At the same time, the ecclesial sphere was traversed by doctrinal and political disputes among the principal religious orders, particularly Dominicans and Franciscans. These differences concerned not only approaches to evangelical poverty but also the role of the mendicant clergy, preaching, relations with secular power, and, in some cases, divergent positions on apocalyptic theology, notably the influence of Joachimism among certain Spiritual Franciscans. This tense doctrinal climate overlapped with struggles over ecclesiastical offices, university chairs, and regional jurisdictions, producing a Church that was intensely active yet only precariously cohesive. The canonical and structural reforms promoted by the popes of the eleventh and twelfth centuries (especially from Gregory VII onward) had consolidated a hierarchical and disciplined ecclesiastical model, but also one that was more centralized and vertical, with limited room for internal dissent. This structure could favor administrative continuity, yet the interregnum of 1268–1271 shows that it was not in itself sufficient to resolve a prolonged vacancy in the central leadership. At the same time, critical voices were emerging both within the Church and among external or semi-heretical movements, challenging the accumulation of wealth, simoniacal practices, curial nepotism, and the growing distance between the higher clergy and communities of the faithful. The Waldensian movement, founded in the twelfth century by Peter Waldo, remained vigorous in Alpine regions, while surviving elements of Catharism, although partially suppressed by the Albigensian Crusade and the Inquisition, continued to embody a radical critique of ecclesial power and sacramental legitimacy. Taken together, these elements allow us, with due caution, to speak of tensions concerning religious and moral legitimacy that affected different sectors of the Church unevenly. Pontifical authority remained doctrinally unquestioned, but its capacity effectively to embody evangelical ideals was increasingly eroded,

feeding internal tensions, peripheral resistance, and an ambivalent public perception of its spiritual role.

This can be observed, first, in the *Liber censuum Romanae ecclesiae* (c. 1192–1195), compiled by Cencio Camerario (the future Pope Honorius III) which offers a systematic view of papal administration, detailing ecclesiastical revenues, curial dependencies, and the functional hierarchies of the Roman apparatus. To this may be added the testimony of Matthew Paris's *Chronicon* (c. 1250), which documents the growing political weight of the cardinals and the internal tensions within the college, revealing a process of power consolidation within the Roman Curia.

With regard to doctrinal disputes among the mendicant orders, two key sources may be consulted: the *Regula Bullata* of Saint Francis of Assisi (1223), in which absolute poverty is enshrined as the core of the Franciscan evangelical ideal; and the *Summa contra hereticos* of Humbert of Romans (c. 1260), Master General of the Dominicans, which offers a systematic critique of the apocalyptic and spiritualist excesses found in certain sectors of Franciscanism.

Internal criticisms of the clergy (in particular of simony, nepotism, and the accumulation of wealth by the curia and the religious orders) found an early and articulated expression in William of Saint-Amour's *De periculis novissimorum temporum* (c. 1256), an emblematic text in the context of the University of Paris and one of the earliest direct challenges to the growing power of the mendicants in the Church's public and academic life.

1.2.4 The International Dimension: The East and the Failure of the Crusading Project

In the external sphere, the definitive loss of Jerusalem in 1244 to the forces of the Ayyubid sultan al-Salih Ayyub, and the subsequent fall of the last Latin strongholds in Syria, most notably Tripoli in 1289 and Acre in 1291—were decisive military defeats and may be read, at the historiographical and symbolic levels, as signs of the weakening of the ideal of militant Christendom. The disappearance of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem marked the end of a political, eschatological project that for more than a century had bound spirituality, war, and

Western hegemony to control of the Holy Places. These events are described in detail in chronicles such as *Les Gestes des Chiprois*, composed around 1300, which narrates the political and military circumstances of the collapse of the Crusader kingdom and the seemingly unstoppable advance of Islam in the Holy Land. Meanwhile, the Byzantine Empire, restored in 1261 under Michael VIII Palaiologos after the expulsion of the Latins from Constantinople, maintained an ambiguous and strategically ambivalent relationship with Rome. Although there was a willingness to seek rapprochement (as may be inferred from the letter sent by Michael VIII to Gregory X in 1274 requesting the restoration of canonical communion) the formal schism between East and West persisted, reinforced by liturgical and ecclesiological differences and by the resistance of the Orthodox clergy to any subordination to Roman primacy. At the same time, the Mamluk sultanate, established after the seizure of power in Egypt in 1250, consolidated itself as the dominant force in the eastern Mediterranean. Under Baybars (al-Malik al-Zāhir), the Mamluks pursued a policy of territorial expansion and systematic pressure against Christian enclaves. Western perceptions of this threat, as well as growing distrust of the papacy's effectiveness as mediator and strategist, can be traced in testimony such as that of Matthew Paris, whose *Chronica Majora* depicts in somber terms the papacy's inability to mobilize a coherent military response. In this new geopolitical setting, Latin Christendom lost not only territory but strategic initiative: crusades became sporadic, poorly financed, and increasingly subordinated to the particular interests of European monarchies. The figure of the pope as convener of crusades and diplomatic mediator began to lose practical effectiveness, while forms of direct diplomacy developed between European and Eastern courts, particularly through commercial channels, bilateral alliances, and negotiations with Muslim powers, progressively marginalizing pontifical mediation. One of the most valuable testimonies concerning this critical phase of the crusading world is Marino Sanudo the Elder's *Liber Secretorum Fidelium Crucis*, written around 1321. Sanudo offers not only a detailed diagnosis of the logistical and political failures of preceding crusades but also alternative approaches based on the economic and maritime reconfiguration of access to the East. In his words, "non per viam armorum tantum, sed per prudentiam consilii et ordinatio

navium”: the Holy Land was to be recovered through rational and commercial policy rather than by military action alone.

Another key document for understanding Christian perceptions of the end of the Latin Kingdom is the collection of chronicles known as *Les Gestes des Chiprois*, compiled by authors such as Gérard de Montaigu and Philippe de Novare in the early fourteenth century. These sources, marked by nostalgia and pessimism, reveal how Cypriot crusaders understood the progressive loss of fortresses in Syria and Palestine as a sign of divine abandonment, but also as a direct consequence of disunity and internal corruption within the Frankish East. Gregory X acceded to the pontificate within this terminal setting, deeply conditioned by his direct experience at Acre, where he had arrived as a crusader and associated with the entourage of Prince Edward of England. The sequence of his decisions allows us to infer a more conditional conception of a renewed crusade: the Eastern enterprise became linked to ecclesiastical reunion with the Greek Church, to specific financing, and to coordination among Christian powers. From this perspective, the Second Council of Lyon may be read as articulating a form of crusade that was more carefully planned fiscally and more heavily conditioned diplomatically than some earlier projects. In sum, the Eastern policy of the pontificate may be interpreted as a shift from isolated military summons toward a combination of juridical, fiscal, and diplomatic instruments intended to construct a viable position in a setting dominated by the Mamluk sultanate, latent Byzantine hostility, and the growing indifference of Western monarchies.

Chapter 3. Tensions between the Papacy and the Holy Roman Empire

For much of the Middle Ages, the relationship between the papacy and the Holy Roman Empire constituted one of the central and conflictual structural axes of the political order of Western Christendom. From the Investiture Controversy in the eleventh century to the excommunication and deposition of Frederick II of Hohenstaufen in the thirteenth, the confrontation between the two institutions was not a mere doctrinal or juridical disagreement, but a fundamental dispute over hegemony in the representation of Christian

universalism. Rather than an episodic conflict, it was a prolonged competition over the definition of legitimate authority over Christian peoples: while the pope embodied *auctoritas sacra* as vicar of Christ, the emperor claimed the *imperium christianum*, that is, the consecrated temporal power charged with protecting and organizing the *civitas Dei* in its historical and political dimension. In this sense, the tension between Rome and the Empire reflected not only divergent interests and jurisdictions but competing models of universal sovereignty, each with its own theological, symbolic, and legal legitimacy. This chapter examines the development of that conflict in the thirteenth century, especially in the confrontation between the papacy and Frederick II, whose imperial ambitions, centralizing vision, and Eastern policies directly challenged the pontifical project of an autonomous, reforming Roman Church capable of articulating the Christian world from the spiritual summit. The outcome of this confrontation (with Frederick II's death in 1250 and the subsequent imperial interregnum) created a vacuum that shaped the conditions under which Gregory X would accede to the pontificate: a setting of imperial fragmentation, the emergence of local powers, and a redefinition of the balance between spiritual and secular authority.

1.3.1 From the Ideal of Unity to Dual Confrontation

In the high-medieval conception of Christian power, the prevailing idea (inherited from the Carolingian project of *renovatio imperii*) was one of functional complementarity between the two supreme dignities: the pope as spiritual guide of the *ordo fidelium* and the emperor as temporal protector of the *ordo christianus*. This vision, inspired in part by the Augustinian model of the two cities and consolidated in texts such as Louis the Pious's *Ordinatio imperii* (817), proposed a hierarchical equilibrium between sacrality and government, in which *imperium* and *sacerdotium* cooperated for the common good of Christendom. This initial symbiosis, however, progressively turned into structural rivalry, especially from the eleventh century onward with the Gregorian Reform, which sought to emancipate the papacy from every form of subordination to secular power and to assert its primacy over all orders, including emperors. The tension reached a critical point during the Investiture Controversy (1075–1122), when

Pope Gregory VII and Emperor Henry IV confronted one another over the power to invest bishops, that is, to confer ecclesiastical offices carrying both spiritual authority and temporal benefices. The conflict was not merely disciplinary but profoundly theological and political, as reflected in foundational reform texts such as the *Dictatus Papae* (1075), which states that “the pope may depose emperors” and that “his judgment may be judged by no one”. In response, Henry IV defended imperial sacrality in his letter to Gregory VII, accusing him of usurping powers and profaning the divine order. The confrontation culminated in emblematic episodes such as the humiliation at Canossa (1077) and continued until the Concordat of Worms (1122), where a compromise was reached without fully resolving the universal claims of the two powers. This cycle of confrontation inaugurated a new phase in the configuration of Western Christian power, in which the papacy no longer conceived itself merely as the Empire’s collaborator but as an authority superior in spiritual matters and, on occasion, in temporal ones. This conflictual legacy would be inherited and transformed in the thirteenth century, particularly in the tense relationship between the Roman Curia and Emperor Frederick II, to which the following sections return.

1.3.2 Frederick II and the Collapse of the Equilibrium

In the thirteenth century, tensions between the papacy and the Holy Roman Empire reached a critical point during the reign of Emperor Frederick II Hohenstaufen (r. 1212–1250). One of the most complex figures of the Middle Ages, Frederick advanced a model of autonomous and rationalized imperium centered on the Kingdom of Sicily, which collided directly with the papal conception of spiritual supremacy over all secular authorities. Cultivated, multilingual, legislative, and reform-minded, Frederick sought to centralize imperial power by reorganizing its administration through legal reforms such as the *Constitutiones Regni Siciliae* (1231) and by imposing direct control over the imperial clergy, taxation, and armies. His confrontation with the papacy was almost continuous. Frederick was first excommunicated by Gregory IX in 1227 for delaying his departure on crusade, although he departed in 1228 and succeeded in recovering Jerusalem through a diplomatic treaty. On his return, he was met with

distrust and hostility. In 1245, during the Council of Lyon convened by Innocent IV, he was formally deposed on charges of perjury, heresy, sacrilege, and attacks upon the liberty of the Church. The pope justified this action by appealing to the defense of *libertas ecclesiae* and portraying Frederick as a new and oppressive Pharaoh.

The bull of deposition, *Ad Apostolicae Dignitatis Apicem*, publicly pronounced at Lyon on 17 July 1245, declared Frederick unworthy of the imperial title and released his subjects from their oaths of allegiance. This decision, however, was not recognized throughout much of the Empire, producing an internal fracture within the Reich: some princes continued to support Frederick or his heir Conrad IV, while others aligned themselves with the papally promoted anti-king William of Holland, elected in 1247. The continuation of this conflict (fueled by civil wars, shifting alliances, and reciprocal delegitimation) culminated in Frederick's death in 1250, followed by those of his immediate successors, and gave rise to a period of effective vacancy of the imperial throne known as the Great Interregnum (1250–1273). During these years no emperor succeeded in exercising effective authority over the Empire as a whole, which fragmented into a constellation of principalities, free cities, and autonomous lordships, marking a transition toward a decentralized and weakened imperial form. This context of imperial disintegration is essential to understanding the rise of new forms of political legitimation, among them the reinforcement of papal authority at the normative and symbolic levels.

1.3.3 The Papacy in an Ambiguous Position: Charles of Anjou and Political Instrumentalization

Following the definitive fall of the Hohenstaufen dynasty, marked by the execution of Conradin at Naples in 1268, the papacy sought to consolidate its territorial control over southern Italy while preventing the re-emergence of a hostile imperial power from the south. To this end, Pope Clement IV promoted and legitimized the intervention of Charles of Anjou, brother of King Louis IX of France, who was invested as King of Sicily in 1265 and established himself militarily after the victory at Benevento (1266), where Manfred, the natural son of Frederick II and the last major stronghold of Ghibelline

resistance in the Mezzogiorno, was killed. Initially, Charles's presence provided the papacy with an effective instrument of political and military containment, capable of securing southern Italy against possible imperial restorations. This strategy rested upon the idea that the Sicilian throne should be occupied by a devout ruler loyal to Rome and free from imperial ambitions. This principle is expressed in the bull of investiture *Licet ex omni* (1265), in which the pope recognized Charles's right to rule Sicily as a papal fief under specified conditions of spiritual vassalage. The situation quickly changed, however. Far from confining himself to Sicily, Charles of Anjou expanded his influence across the Italian peninsula, intervening actively in the affairs of Florence, Rome, and the north and acting as an autonomous ruler with hegemonic ambitions. Chronicles such as those of Giovanni Villani accuse Charles of exerting sustained pressure upon the papacy, influencing appointments and decisions and even attempting to control papal elections during periods of vacancy. Thus, rather than eliminating the danger of hostile imperial power, papal policy generated a new structural dependency: the papacy came to rely militarily upon a secular power (the Angevin monarchy) that soon proved incompatible with the spiritual and institutional neutrality of the Roman Church. Angevin presence transformed the balance of power on the peninsula and endangered both papal autonomy and the papacy's arbitral role within the Christian order. Gregory X inherited this ambiguous situation when, on acceding to the pontificate in 1271, he encountered a curia under strong Angevin influence. His pontificate may be read as an attempt to recover a more functional equilibrium among European powers and to limit Charles of Anjou's capacity to condition papal policy. In this context, Gregory promoted and supported the election of a new King of the Romans, Rudolf of Habsburg, in 1273, whose moderate profile and lack of immediate Italian ambitions were compatible with Roman interests. Gregory's posture, although not neutral, was that of a mediating pontiff seeking to reconfigure the map of power without surrendering the institutional primacy of the papacy.

1.3.4 The Decline of Political Universalism

By the end of the thirteenth century, it had become evident that the medieval aspiration to a political, spiritual unity structured under the dual leadership of pope and emperor was irretrievably exhausted. The territorial fragmentation of the Holy Roman Empire, accelerated after the Great Interregnum, and the progressive rise of national monarchies (particularly France, England, and Castile) marked a structural reconfiguration of Western Christian power in which papal auctoritas had increasingly to be negotiated rather than unilaterally imposed.

Royal documents such as the letters of Saint Louis of France and the English parliaments under Henry III and Edward I make clear that kings were already acting as autonomous diplomatic agents, capable of deciding matters concerning crusades, tithes, and territorial conflicts without direct pontifical intervention. At the same time, the growing autonomy of national churches in fiscal, jurisdictional, and disciplinary matters weakened *de facto* Rome's claim to universal supremacy, even though that claim continued to be asserted doctrinally and canonically. In this new political landscape, the papacy was no longer the uncontested head of the Christian world, but an institution of immense moral and doctrinal authority compelled to negotiate alliances, arbitrate interests, and seek consensus among increasingly sovereign state powers. The figure of the pope was shifting from that of absolute arbiter toward that of institutional mediator, whose margins of action were defined by the geopolitical balances of the moment.

Gregory X, deeply marked by his direct experience in Acre and the Holy Land and by a more restrained understanding of the exercise of power, clearly grasped the limits of pontifical authority in this new setting. Unlike some of his predecessors, he did not attempt to revive an unsustainable model of papal empire; rather, he directed his efforts toward a program of internal Church reform centered upon curial discipline, the strengthening of the electoral process, and the rationalization of ecclesiastical government. At the same time, he pursued a balanced policy of external diplomacy, seeking to stabilize Christendom through strategic agreements rather than dogmatic confrontation. This approach is documented, for example, in his

letters to King Edward I of England, in which he appealed for moderation while requesting, rather than imposing, military cooperation, and in the bull *Ubi Periculum* (1274), which rigorously regulated the conclave procedure without resort to absolutism or autocracy. Gregory X thus represented the beginning of a new phase of the papacy: less imperial and more institutional; less theocratic and more diplomatic.

Chapter 4. Teobaldo Visconti and His Experience in the Holy Land

The election of Teobaldo Visconti as Pope Gregory X at the Viterbo election of 1271 has traditionally been interpreted as a compromise solution to the prolonged deadlock of the College of Cardinals, divided between French and Italian factions and subjected to external political pressures. Although this interpretation is partly valid, it is limited if considered solely from a curial perspective. Visconti's designation cannot be understood without taking into account his earlier diplomatic career in Europe, his mission in England alongside the papal legate Ottobono Fieschi, and finally his direct experience in Acre as a crusader associated with the entourage of Prince Edward of England. In a context in which pontifical authority had weakened and Christian kingdoms increasingly acted autonomously, Teobaldo embodied an unusual combination: diplomatic experience, distance from the factions of the election, and personal knowledge of conditions in the Latin East. This chapter examines that Eastern experience not as a formal papal legation but as a relevant biographical antecedent for understanding the reformist, moderate, and pragmatic orientation that would characterize his brief pontificate. The analysis will show that the future Gregory X was not a fortuitous choice but a figure whose previous career combined ecclesiastical administration, diplomacy, and experience at a frontier of Christendom.

1.4.1 Family Origins and Ecclesiastical Formation

Teobaldo Visconti was born in Piacenza in the early thirteenth century into a local Visconti family unrelated to the later Visconti dynasty of Milan. After beginning his clerical career in his native city, he entered the service of Cardinal Giacomo da Pecorara and accompanied him on a papal mission to France between 1239 and 1240. Through this connection he obtained a canonry at Lyon and the archdeaconry of Liège, offices that marked his entry into transalpine ecclesiastical networks. During the 1240s he worked in the milieu of the Council of Lyon of 1245 and later spent periods in Liège and Paris. Under Clement IV, he was sent to England in 1267–1268 to assist the papal legate Cardinal Ottobono Fieschi, the future Adrian V. He had taken the cross before that mission; after returning to the Continent he ultimately made his way to the Holy Land and reached Acre, where he joined Prince Edward of England. His presence in the East was therefore that of a cleric and crusader with diplomatic experience, not that of a papal legate endowed with regional jurisdiction.

1.4.2 Experience in the Holy Land: Between Crusade and Disillusionment

The context of his stay was precarious. The Kingdom of Jerusalem, reduced to a coastal strip centered on Acre, faced constant military pressure from the Mamluk sultanate, while internal rivalries among Crusader barons, military orders, and Italian merchant communities impeded coordinated action. Teobaldo had taken the cross before his English mission and, after the death of Louis IX in 1270, reached Acre to join the entourage of Prince Edward of England, who had come east to reinforce the Latin positions.

During his stay in Acre, Visconti came into contact with actors from the crusading world and with figures knowledgeable about the East, among them William of Tripoli; it was also there that his well-known encounter with the Polo brothers took place. The sources document his integration into Acre's political and religious milieu, but they do not justify attributing to him a formal papal legation or an independent program of inspections, administrative reports, or regional negotiations. His direct experience of the Latin East is

nevertheless relevant to understanding the central place that the question of the Holy Land would occupy from the beginning of his pontificate.

1.4.2.1 Islam in Teobaldo Visconti's Eastern Experience

Teobaldo Visconti's presence in the Holy Land occurred at a particularly critical moment for the Latin possessions in the East. The Kingdom of Jerusalem, which no longer controlled the holy city and whose principal political center was Acre, was undergoing territorial contraction and intense Mamluk military pressure. The military orders (Templars, Hospitallers, and Teutonic Knights) were central actors in Latin defense and retained substantial margins of political and military autonomy. Teobaldo entered this environment as a crusader and cleric with extensive ecclesiastical experience, not as a papal legate appointed by Clement IV.

In this context, the Mamluk sultanate of Egypt under Baybars (al-Malik al-Zāhir) had consolidated itself as the region's hegemonic power. After defeating the Mongols at Ayn Jalut (1260) and expelling the Crusaders from several strategic strongholds, Baybars inaugurated a systematic policy of dismantling the Latin East, combining military pressure, tactical alliances with Eastern Christian groups, and the use of Islamic propaganda as an instrument of legitimation. His figure was both feared and admired even in Europe, and the papacy recognized him as the principal obstacle to any effective crusading project.

Teobaldo's stay in Acre gave him direct knowledge of a setting in which Mamluk military superiority, the fragmentation of Latin powers, and dependence upon Western reinforcements were immediate realities. The surviving sources document his contacts within the crusading milieu but do not permit the reconstruction of a systematic administrative mission in which he inspected fortifications, studied Mamluk taxation, or sent official reports to Rome. The connection between that experience and his later policy must therefore be formulated cautiously: it is reasonable to consider that direct exposure to the fragility of the Latin East reinforced his concern with crusade, pacification among Christians, and political coordination,

questions that would occupy a central place at the Second Council of Lyon.

Latin Christian perceptions of Islam in the thirteenth century ranged among theological condemnation, political otherness, and increasingly practical forms of knowledge. Authors such as Peter the Venerable, in his *Summa totius haeresis Saracenorum*, had developed a polemical reading of Islam, while Jacques de Vitry, in his *Historia orientalis*, combined Christian apologetics with description of the Eastern world. Teobaldo Visconti left neither a doctrinal treatise on Islam nor a corpus of reports from which a precise personal theory of Muslim societies could be reconstructed. What can be stated is that he was in Acre when the Mamluk sultanate constituted the region's principal military power and that, as Gregory X, he made the recovery of the Holy Land one of the explicit objectives of his pontificate. His crusading policy at Lyon II combined systematic financing, the pursuit of peace among Christian powers, and the planning of a future expedition. This continuity permits a connection between his Eastern experience and his later program, but does not justify attributing to him a doctrine of "modern interreligious diplomacy" that the sources of the pontificate do not formulate.

1.4.2.2 Islam as a Limit to the Christian Universalist Project

Teobaldo Visconti's experience in the Holy Land provides a privileged vantage point from which to understand the distance between the Western crusading ideal and the actual situation of the Latin East. By the middle of the thirteenth century, the Mamluk sultanate had become a state and military power capable of sustaining continuous campaigns against Christian enclaves. For a European cleric present in Acre, Latin fragility was not a doctrinal abstraction but an immediate political reality.

The Mamluk sultanate of Egypt under Baybars was not merely a military power; it possessed a political structure capable of sustaining systematic campaigns and administering extensive territories. The experience of Acre gave Teobaldo direct knowledge of crusader precariousness, although the sources do not permit us to determine the extent to which that observation produced a specific intellectual

transformation. As Gregory X, at the Second Council of Lyon (1274), he vigorously promoted a new crusading project: the council imposed an ecclesiastical tenth for six years, promoted pacification among Christians, and sought to organize resources for a future expedition. In this sense, his program can safely be described as more institutionally planned than a mere spiritual exhortation, without attributing to him ideas not explicitly present in the documentation.

Gregory X's crusading policy was expressed above all through decisions, negotiations, taxation, and logistical preparation. His stay in Acre provides an important biographical antecedent for explaining the priority he assigned to the Holy Land, but the exact causal relationship between that experience and each of his reforms must remain a matter of interpretation rather than a documentarily demonstrated fact.

1.4.3 Political Profile: Neutrality, Knowledge, and the Absence of Personal Ambition

Paradoxically, it was Teobaldo Visconti's absence from the curial environment during much of the prolonged interregnum of 1268–1271 that favored his position as a candidate external to the opposing factions. When elected he was in Acre, outside the arenas of maneuver of the College of Cardinals, and he was not himself a member of the college. His earlier service to Cardinal Giacomo da Pecorara, his English mission alongside Ottobono Fieschi, and his presence in the Holy Land had given him an unusual ecclesiastical and diplomatic trajectory. The election was above all a compromise solution to an extreme deadlock: six cardinals were entrusted with the *tractatio* and chose Teobaldo on 1 September 1271. The sources present him as a figure valued for his rectitude and accumulated political, diplomatic experience, but they do not permit this decision to be transformed into an explicit programmatic selection of a new “model” of pope.

Chapter 5. Theological Thought and Canon Law in the Thirteenth Century

A full understanding of the pontificate of Gregory X requires situating it within the doctrinal, philosophical, and juridical framework that characterized the thirteenth century: an age of unprecedented intellectual synthesis in which Latin Christianity experienced one of its most remarkable phases of systematic consolidation. The period was marked by the convergence of three major structuring currents: political Augustinianism, which reformulated the relationship between spiritual and temporal power; Thomistic and Bonaventurian scholasticism, which supplied theological knowledge with a rational architecture; and codified canon law, which established the normative principles governing ecclesial life in all its dimensions. Although Gregory X was neither a speculative theologian nor an academically trained canonist, his government developed in constant dialogue with these currents. His decisions concerning curial organization, disciplinary reform, and conciliar convocation reflect a functional understanding of theological-juridical knowledge as an instrument of government and institutional legitimation. Moreover, the Second Council of Lyon, convened and presided over by Gregory in 1274–took place at a moment when the doctrinal authority of university masters, the influence of the new mendicant orders, and the juridification of the Latin Church had already become pillars of the ecclesiastical system. This chapter outlines the doctrinal horizon within which Gregory X's pontificate operated, with particular attention to the configuration of canon law after Gratian's *Decretum*, the impact of Thomas Aquinas's *Summa Theologiae* and the works of Bonaventure, and the transformations in the theory of papal power associated with authors such as Henry of Susa (Hostiensis). Rather than offering a simple doctrinal survey, it seeks to show how these currents constituted the language of legitimacy, authority, and reform in which the thirteenth-century Church operated, and without which neither the reforms nor the limits of Gregory X's pontificate can be understood.

1.5.1 Political Augustinianism and the Supremacy of the Spiritual Order

Since the time of Saint Augustine, Christian thought had articulated the celebrated notion of the two cities: the *civitas Dei* (City of God), oriented toward eternal life, and the *civitas terrena* (earthly city), centered on temporal ends and, in many cases, corrupted by disordered self-love (*amor sui usque ad contemptum Dei*). This doctrine, masterfully set forth in *De civitate Dei*, exerted an enduring influence upon conceptions of spiritual power, providing the papacy with a theological framework through which to justify its moral authority over the political world. At the transition from the thirteenth to the fourteenth century, this line of thought received a particularly forceful formulation in Giles of Rome (Aegidius Romanus), whose *De ecclesiastica potestate*, probably composed in 1302, argued that spiritual power should not merely guide but also correct temporal power insofar as the latter must remain subordinate to the ultimate end of salvation. In his formulation, the Church possessed full dominion in spiritual matters and a *dominium indirectum* in temporal matters *ratione peccati*, that is, in everything capable of endangering the health of the soul. The pope was therefore not only the visible head of the Church but also the supreme rector of the *ordo christianus*, with authority to intervene in secular affairs whenever sin or moral disorder justified such intervention. Although Gregory X did not directly participate in the preparation of new canonical collections, his government reflected a clear understanding of this normative framework. The bull *Ubi Periculum* (1274), which for the first time regulated the conclave procedure, is a notable example of structural legislative intervention inspired by principles of procedural economy and juridical coercion developed by canonists. Indeed, many of the principles established in *Ubi Periculum* would later be incorporated into canonical compilations such as the *Liber Sextus* and would remain in force (with reforms) down to the modern period.

The thirteenth century was also a period of consolidation and expansion of canon law, whose codification had begun with Gratian's *Decretum* (c. 1140), a work that systematically organized conflicting conciliar canons, papal decretals, patristic writings, and Roman legal norms and proposed solutions through principles of harmonization (*concordantia discordantium canonum*). From this foundation, the

development of the *ius novum* (canon law subsequent to Gratian) entailed an increasing production of norms by the Apostolic See, especially through papal decretals and official compilations authorized by successive pontiffs. In the thirteenth century, this process culminated in the promulgation of the Decretals of Gregory IX in 1234, also known as the *Liber Extra*, compiled by the jurist Raymond of Peñafort. Organized in five books, this collection was the first official compilation of Roman, pontifical canon law and acquired universal normative force within the Latin Church. Other important collections followed, including Boniface VIII's *Liber Sextus* (1298), but the *Liber Extra* was the body of law fully in force and in use during the pontificate of Gregory X. It provided the Church with a centralized juridical infrastructure, including detailed procedures for ecclesiastical government, the administration of justice, episcopal elections, religious life, and the management of jurisdictional conflicts. Canon law thus developed from a casuistic practice into an articulated system, with principles of legality, normative hierarchy, and the capacity to adapt to complex situations. Gregory also relied upon jurists trained in the new law, including figures associated with the schools of Bologna and Paris, who participated in drafting legal opinions and papal bulls and in structuring conciliar procedures. Thus, although he was not a professional canonist, his pontificate operated fully within the post-Gratian normative order, which conceived the Church as an organized, hierarchical, and rationalized *corpus iuris*.

1.5.2 Scholasticism and the Rationalization of Ecclesial Government

The thirteenth century was also the golden age of Latin scholasticism, a current that consolidated the ideal of rationalizing theological knowledge through the disputational method, systematic synthesis, and the integration of classical (especially Aristotelian) sources into Christian thought. This period was represented by figures such as Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventure of Bagnoregio, and William of Auxerre, who from their respective chairs in Paris sought rationally to ground the faith, hierarchically to structure sacred knowledge, and to articulate the function of ecclesial power within an ordered and teleologically directed cosmos. In particular, Thomas Aquinas

developed in his *Summa Theologiae* a theology of law that carefully distinguished eternal, natural, human, and positive divine law, emphasizing that human law must be rationally derived from natural law in order to retain moral legitimacy (*Summa Theologiae*, I, II, qq. 91–97). He also addressed papal authority explicitly, recognizing the pope as supreme in spiritual jurisdiction, though not unlimited, always subordinated to the common good of the Church and the right use of practical reason. He likewise examined the relationship among grace, virtue, and political action, elaborating an ethics of Christian government that, while not a manual of power, offered criteria of discernment and theological limits to institutional authority. Although it cannot be asserted that the works of Thomas Aquinas exercised a direct and textual influence upon the decrees or decisions of Gregory X, the pontiff's logic of government undeniably shares structural elements with the Thomistic vision of order. Gregory X's policy was characterized by a reformist methodology oriented toward deliberative consensus, the codification of clear procedures (as in *Ubi Periculum*), and respect for a rational hierarchy of functions within the ecclesial body. Moreover, the selection of Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure as intellectual reference points for the Second Council of Lyon (1274) both participating directly or indirectly in the doctrinal preparation of the event, demonstrates that scholasticism was not merely academic knowledge but an operative theological-political language at the highest levels of ecclesiastical government. In this sense, Gregory X's pontificate belongs fully within a scholastic horizon, although more as a practical expression of its rational premises than as a theoretical development of its speculative theses.

1.5.3 Canon Law: From Gratian's *Decretum* to the *Corpus Iuris*

The development of canon law constituted one of the most profound intellectual transformations of the medieval West between the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The turning point was Gratian's *Decretum* (c. 1140), an ambitious compilation of ecclesiastical norms (conciliar canons, papal decretals, patristic judgments, and Roman norms) assembled and harmonized by a master of the Bologna school known as Gratian. His work, also called the *Concordia discordantium*

canonum, not only ordered a dispersed body of legal knowledge but gave rise to the *ius canonici scientia*, that is, an autonomous juridical discipline endowed with method, internal logic, and academic authority. From this foundation, canon law developed as a dynamic system, nourished by papal decretals that successively expanded, corrected, and reinterpreted the material collected by Gratian. Official codification was consolidated with Gregory IX's *Liber Extra* (1234) and continued in later collections. This process was accompanied by the production of commentaries, *summae*, and glosses in which canonists (in dialogue with theologians and political thinkers) defined the limits, foundations, and scope of pontifical power. Among these canonists, Henry of Susa, known as Hostiensis, stands out as the author of the influential *Summa aurea* and numerous commentaries on the *Liber Extra*. In his works, Hostiensis not only reaffirms the pope's *auctoritas plena* as supreme legislator of the Church but also insists upon the need to regulate the exercise of that authority through precise, predictable, and effective rules so as to avoid arbitrariness capable of undermining the legitimacy of the ecclesial legal system. Gregory X acted fully within this normative and epistemological horizon. His bull *Ubi Periculum*, promulgated during the Second Council of Lyon in 1274, was not merely a procedural norm concerning papal election but a clear expression of the new juridical-institutional paradigm. By establishing strict conditions for the conclave (seclusion, progressively reduced food provisions, and the prohibition of external influence) Gregory translated into positive law a critique of the corrupt, clientelistic, and protracted practices that had characterized many earlier papal elections. In this sense, *Ubi Periculum* represents the use of law as an instrument of institutional legitimation, the expression of a Church beginning to govern itself through formal rules rather than solely through informal consensus or *de facto* precedents.

1.5.4 Theological Consequences of the Council and the Logic of Normativity

The Second Council of Lyon, convened by Gregory X in 1274, belongs to the long tradition of ecumenical councils that understood the synod as a visible and rational manifestation of the divine will

through the deliberative consensus of the episcopate. This conception, already adumbrated in Carolingian thought and developed in scholastic terms during the thirteenth century, was defended by authors such as William of Auxerre, who maintained that the government of the Church should be exercised communally, deliberatively, and harmoniously, since ecclesial unity rested not on isolated command but upon the *concordia ordinata* of all the members of the mystical body. Within this framework, papal authority did not disappear, but had to be institutionally articulated with the episcopate and religious communities, respecting procedures, hearing the multiple voices of the Christian world, and acting in the name of a common rationality ordered toward the spiritual good. Gregory X did not formulate this vision in theoretical terms, but it was fully exercised in conciliar practice. During the council Gregory allowed broad deliberation, heard the mendicant orders, accepted the participation of Byzantine legates sent by Michael VIII Palaiologos (an unprecedented act since the schism) and proposed structured juridical reforms such as *Ubi Periculum* and the constitutions concerning religious and episcopal life.

The council brought together several hundred participants, including bishops, abbots, representatives of religious orders, and envoys of secular powers. Estimates vary according to the repertories and categories employed: a common reconstruction places attendance at approximately three hundred bishops and around sixty abbots, in addition to other clerics and representatives. The conciliar agenda addressed union with the Greek Church, preparations for a new crusade, ecclesiastical reform, and various juridical and disciplinary matters. Gregory X presided over the sessions and directed the council's general program. From this perspective, his conduct may be interpreted as a form of practical rationalization of ecclesial government: not as a doctrinal treatise, but as the articulation of deliberation, procedure, and normative decision.

1.5.5 Ecclesiological Thought in the Service of Stability

In sum, Gregory X produced no distinctive doctrine of his own, but his government operated within an already mature intellectual framework-political theology, scholasticism, and canon law-that

supplied the languages and instruments through which pontifical action could be legitimated and the Church institutionally ordered.

The figure of Gregory X can be understood in light of three major doctrinal pillars that structured his pontificate and reflected thirteenth-century ecclesiological thought. First, the Augustinian idea of the spiritual order as rector of the temporal, already expressed in Saint Augustine's *De civitate Dei*, remained active in the scholastic political doctrine of the period, particularly through the principle of *auctoritas spiritualis* as an instance of moral guidance for civil power. At the transition to the fourteenth century, this conception would be carried to a more extreme formulation by authors such as Giles of Rome in his *De ecclesiastica potestate*, which argues that the pope, as *vicarius Christi*, must safeguard the common good even in temporal affairs whenever the divine order and the salvation of souls are at stake. Although Gregory X did not explicitly theorize this doctrine, he acted in accordance with it when he intervened in the reorganization of the Holy Roman Empire through his support for the election of Rudolf of Habsburg, or when he arbitrated conflicts among Christian kingdoms from the position of *rector fidei*. Second, scholastic rationality applied to government as the art of ordering defined Gregory's conciliar and reforming practice. Influenced by the analytical and hierarchical method of scholasticism (represented by Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventure, and William of Auxerre) the pope privileged structured deliberation, prudential discernment, and the integration of diverse forms of knowledge in decision-making. His direction of the Second Council of Lyon may be read as an act governed by *ratio fidei*: doctrinal integration, diplomacy between Churches, and organized legislation. As Bonaventure observes in the *Breviloquium*, ecclesial order is not hierarchy alone but rational harmony placed at the service of the ultimate end.

Finally, canonistic juridification as a means of consolidating legitimate authority constituted the normative axis of his pontificate. Influenced by the legal system developed from the *Decretum Gratiani* and the Decretals of Gregory IX and articulated by canonists such as Hostiensis, Gregory understood that ecclesial stability required formal and codified juridical structures rather than precedents or customs

alone. By precisely regulating conclave procedure, the bull *Ubi Periculum* (1274) offers an eloquent example of how ecclesiastical law could function simultaneously as limit, guarantee, and expression of institutional order.

Gregory X was not a theological innovator in the strict sense, but his figure represents an operative synthesis of the major doctrinal currents of his time. His pontificate demonstrates that thirteenth-century Christian thought was not merely academic speculation but also an institutional grammar capable of shaping enduring structures, rationalizing procedures of government, and preserving the equilibrium of a Church confronted by its own plurality.

Chapter 6. The Viterbo Conclave and the Institutionalization of Papal Electoral Confinement

The Viterbo conclave, held between 1268 and 1271, constitutes one of the most prolonged and revealing institutional crises in the history of the medieval papacy. Lasting an exceptional period of thirty-three months, this vacancy exposed not only the internal divisions of the College of Cardinals but also the practical limits of the existing system of succession. The alignments cannot be reduced in any stable way to purely “national” blocs: family, clientelistic, curial, and political affinities all played a role, including positions for and against Angevin expansion. The Church already possessed important electoral rules, above all, the two-thirds majority established by the Third Lateran Council in 1179—but lacked a coercive regime of enclosure, deadlines, and material conditions capable of preventing extreme delay. In the face of public scandal and the electors’ inaction, Viterbo’s civil authorities intervened through measures of pressure, including sealing the electoral enclosure and imposing material restrictions. Tradition also associates the episode with the removal of part of the palace roof. This experience provided the immediate precedent for Gregory X’s later regulation: *Ubi Periculum* transformed enclosure and material pressure into precise juridical norms for future elections. From a functional perspective, the episode may be interpreted as a crisis that revealed the need to supplement existing electoral law with

mechanisms intended to guarantee the operational continuity of the papacy.

This chapter examines in detail the course of the Viterbo conclave, the contemporary sources that document it, the intervention of civil powers, the factional logic of the cardinals, and the process of normative development that led to the consolidation of the modern system of papal election. Far from being a mere historical accident, the conclave of 1268–1271 represents a complex institutional response to a crisis of succession legitimacy and marks the beginning of a new era in papal ecclesiastical governance.

2.1.1 The Vacant See: The Structure of Paralysis

Following the death of Clement IV in November 1268, the College of Cardinals became deeply divided. The alignments of the prolonged interregnum cannot safely be reduced to three stable national blocs: family ties, curial networks, regional affinities, and positions for or against the influence of Charles of Anjou overlapped. The documentation permits us to speak of factions and conflicting interests, but their composition shifted during the thirty-three months of the vacant see.

The composition of the electoral college changed during the thirty-three months of the vacant see as a result of deaths, illness, and absences; at the end of the deadlock, the remaining cardinals resorted to the procedure of compromise and entrusted the *tractatio* to six members of the college. The problem was not the absence of all electoral regulation. Since the Third Lateran Council of 1179, under Alexander III, the constitution *Licet de vitanda discordia* had established that, if unanimity could not be achieved, papal election required a two-thirds majority of the cardinals. What that legislation did not provide was a permanent regime of enclosure, control of communications, and material pressure capable of preventing an indefinite vacancy. In practice, the prolonged process at Viterbo remained exposed to factional negotiations and strong external political pressures. The consequences of the power vacuum reinforced the perception that papal election required additional procedural

mechanisms to ensure institutional continuity. Gregory X would address that problem through *Ubi Periculum*.

2.1.2 Civil Intervention at Viterbo

In an event without precedent in the history of the medieval papacy, the citizens of Viterbo, exasperated by the prolonged inaction of the College of Cardinals, decided actively to intervene in the process of succession. Popular pressure escalated in intensity: first they sealed the episcopal palace in which the cardinals were deliberating, preventing their free movement; then they reduced their food rations to bread and water; and finally, in a symbolically devastating gesture, they removed the roof of the building, exposing the electors to sun, rain, and the cold of the central Italian winter. This act was not merely an expression of collective desperation but a political gesture with substantial institutional significance. The communal authorities of Viterbo were conscious of the economic, juridical, and diplomatic impact of a prolonged vacancy upon the city: administrative flows were suspended, pontifical revenues were interrupted, and the presence of ambassadors who received no response damaged the city's reputation. By intervening, they asserted the public and communal dimension of the papacy, whose vacancy had concrete consequences for communal order, legal certainty, and local economic stability.

This enforced confinement, born of practical necessity, established a decisive precedent for the later regulation of the electoral process. From this experience the term "conclave" (*cum clave*), associated with the isolation of the electors, would become consolidated. After the prolonged deadlock, the cardinals delegated the *tractatio* of the election to a group of six members of the college, who on 1 September 1271 selected Teobaldo Visconti. The man elected was not a cardinal, then possessed only minor orders, and was in Acre in the Holy Land. The election was therefore a compromise solution produced outside the cardinalatial candidacies that had sustained the stalemate.

2.1.3 An Institutional Innovation with Long-Term Consequences

The Viterbo episode (1268–1271) left an indelible mark on the constitutional history of the papacy, and within a few years its impact was translated into one of the most important reforms of the papal electoral system. Gregory X codified that experience in the constitution *Ubi Periculum*, approved by the Second Council of Lyon at its fifth session on 16 July 1274.

This constitution established precise and coercive juridical requirements for the papal electoral process. Following the death of a pontiff, the cardinals present were required to wait ten days for those absent and, once that period had elapsed, to assemble in the palace where the pope had resided. There they were to remain enclosed in a common space, with external communications severely restricted. If after three days of conclave no election had taken place, only one dish at each meal was to be permitted during the following five days; if that period also elapsed without an election, the diet was thereafter to be reduced to bread, wine, and water until a pope was chosen. The constitution prohibited messages or secret communications with the electors and provided automatic excommunication for anyone who violated the prohibition. During the vacancy, it also suspended the cardinals' receipt of income from the treasury and revenues of the Church. Taken together, these measures sought to limit delay and reduce interference with the electoral college.

From a broader perspective, *Ubi Periculum* sought not only to prevent further prolonged vacancies but also to reinforce the papacy's internal legitimacy through a procedure that was transparent, predictable, and self-imposed. By incorporating the norm into an ecumenical council, Gregory X endowed it with full theological, juridical, and canonical force, securing its continuity beyond his own pontificate.

2.1.4 From Case to Norm: The Institutionalization of the Exception

From a theoretical perspective, the Viterbo conclave may be interpreted as a transformative exception that generates a norm, that

is, as a liminal moment in which a factual rupture of the existing order triggers the formation of a new normative structure. In this sense, Giorgio Agamben's thesis may be applied to the case: the state of exception is not merely the suspension of law but also the site at which law itself is reconstituted as an ordering force. In *Homo Sacer*, Agamben argues that the exception is a paradoxical space in which "the juridical order includes its own anomie within itself" in order to reorganize more effectively.

In the Viterbo case, the enclosure imposed by the lay community, initially external to the canonical normative apparatus, may be interpreted as a decisive antecedent: the experience of confinement, material deprivation, and the public exposure of the College of Cardinals preceded its later juridification. Through the intervention of Gregory X, this exceptional situation was elevated to the status of universal juridical norm through codification in the constitution *Ubi Periculum* (1274). The experience of civil coercion at Viterbo and subsequent papal legislation share recourse to enclosure, but they should not be confused as a direct juridical transposition: *Ubi Periculum* transformed seclusion and other restrictions into binding canonical norms. Interpretively, this continuity between experience and norm may be studied as a process of juridifying mechanisms designed to accelerate electoral decision-making. *Ubi Periculum* articulated several normative mechanisms central to understanding the procedure of 1274: enclosure, restrictions on communication, and progressive material pressure. Its historical duration was discontinuous, for the constitution was suspended, revoked, and later restored. First, the norm established the physical confinement of the cardinals; it is reasonable to interpret that enclosure as a mechanism for concentrating deliberation, but attributing to it an aim of "full assumption of responsibility" should not be presented as the literal formulation of the text. Second, it established a principle of progressive deprivation (through dietary austerity and informational enclosure) as a form of regulated pressure aimed at overcoming decisional stalemate, without recourse to external coercion but while making explicit the institutional urgency of reaching agreement. Finally, the norm restricted access and communication with the outside. It may be inferred that these provisions reduced opportunities for external pressure, but that functional consequence should not be

transformed into an explicit theory of electoral autonomy not formulated by the constitution. *Ubi Periculum* thus established a more regulated electoral procedure. To describe it as a “procedural paradigm of succession legitimacy” is an interpretive synthesis advanced by this work. Taken together, these elements did not eliminate freedom of election but channeled it within a self-regulated institutional framework designed to limit procedural indeterminacy and reduce incentives for factional obstruction. In this reading, the conclave may be described as a normatively regulated space in which papal election became subject to a specific regime of physical and juridical restriction.

Chapter 7. The Constitution *Ubi Periculum* and the Transformation of Papal Electoral Law

Approved by the Second Council of Lyon on 16 July 1274 and subsequently included by Gregory X in the collection of conciliar constitutions promulgated on 1 November of that year, *Ubi Periculum* represents a decisive institutional reform in the history of papal electoral law. More than a simple disciplinary norm, it responded directly to the experience of the prolonged interregnum of 1268–1271 and established an obligatory regime of enclosure, austerity, and control of communications for the cardinal electors. Its importance lies in having transformed into universal law a series of mechanisms intended to prevent indefinite delays and to reduce external pressure upon the election. This chapter examines its context, content, reception, and enduring impact upon the institutionalization of the conclave.

2.2.1 Content of the Constitution: Austerity, Seclusion, and Coercion

The constitution *Ubi Periculum*, approved at Lyon on 16 July 1274 and subsequently incorporated into the normative collection promulgated by Gregory X, introduced a strict architecture for papal election. Its central elements may be grouped under physical seclusion,

material austerity, restrictions on communication, and normative coercion.

Among its provisions, the cardinals were required to assemble in a single enclosure after waiting ten days for those absent and to remain there until an election had been completed. The conclave was to remain closed, without ordinary access by persons from outside the college. If three days elapsed without an election, food was limited during the following five days to a single dish at each meal; if no pope had been elected at the end of that period, only bread, wine, and water were thereafter permitted. Austerity thus functioned as a form of progressive institutional pressure against delay.

The constitution also prohibited the transmission of written messages or secret communications to the cardinals, save for the appearance of persons summoned by common consent for matters related to the election; violation of that prohibition was punished by automatic excommunication. A cardinal could leave the conclave because of evident illness; if he withdrew without such cause, the remaining cardinals could continue the election without readmitting him, although absent cardinals who arrived before the election, or an ill cardinal who recovered, could join the procedure. *Ubi Periculum* did not formulate a general clause of “absolute autonomy” from all lay power, but its regime of enclosure and restricted communication substantially reduced the possibility of external pressure.

These provisions, far from being limited to accelerating the process, corresponded to a sacramental conception of the elective act as a form of collegial spiritual discernment to be conducted under conditions of moral freedom, interior concentration, and purity of intention. In this sense, the normative framework of *Ubi Periculum* operated not only on the juridical-administrative level but also in the symbolic realm: enclosure and austerity were conceived as external forms of penitence and disposition toward the Holy Spirit, whose divine assistance was to guide the final decision.

The constitution *Ubi Periculum* itself frames the election in explicitly religious terms: it exhorts the cardinals to set aside private pacts and interests, to seek the common good, and to trust in the prayers of the whole Church for as long as the see remains vacant. Thus, enclosure and austerity appear in the text not solely as

techniques of pressure but as disciplinary conditions intended to protect freedom of election and to order an act conceived as a spiritual responsibility of universal scope.

2.2.2 Juridical Analysis: From Custom to Codified Norm

Before *Ubi Periculum*, papal election was already regulated by important canonical norms. Among the principal milestones were *In Nomine Domini* (1059), which strengthened the role of the cardinals in the election, and *Licet de vitanda discordia*, promulgated by Alexander III at the Third Lateran Council in 1179, which established a two-thirds majority when unanimity could not be achieved. Those norms, however, did not yet constitute a permanent regime of compulsory seclusion with material and communications controls designed to prevent prolonged delay. The constitution *Ubi Periculum*, approved by Gregory X at Lyon in 1274, innovated precisely at this procedural level: it fixed a waiting period for absent electors, assembled the electors within a closed enclosure, limited contacts with the outside, and graded dietary restrictions if the election was prolonged. Institutionally, the change was significant because it did not alter the essential rule of the two-thirds majority, which already existed, but rather the conditions under which the college was required to exercise the electoral act. *Ubi Periculum* thus transformed an experience of extraordinary pressure such as that of Viterbo into a generalizable juridical procedure. Its conciliar approval and subsequent incorporation into canonical collections contributed to the consolidation of the conclave as a distinct form of papal election.

2.2.3 Theological-Political Foundations: Divine Election under Human Coercion

The text of *Ubi Periculum* justifies its novel juridical regime through a fundamental doctrine of medieval ecclesiology: although the election of a pope is guided by the Holy Spirit, this divine assistance does not operate automatically or irresistibly, but may be obstructed by corruption, ambition, and human disorder. Accordingly,

preservation of the purity of the elective act requires a strict disciplinary framework that channels spiritual freedom without abolishing it. This formulation reflects a constitutive tension of medieval canon law, which may be described as a dialectic between grace and norm, or between providence and procedure. The primacy of divine action in the life of the Church is not denied, that would be theologically inadmissible, but the need is recognized to codify the structure within which that action may authentically manifest itself. As Thomas Aquinas had already stated in the *Summa Theologiae*, grace does not destroy nature but presupposes and perfects it (*gratia non tollit naturam, sed perficit eam*, ST I, q. 1, a. 8), an analogy that may be extended to the relationship between grace and law. From this perspective, *Ubi Periculum* is not an act of distrust in the Holy Spirit but a means of preparing conditions for the Spirit's manifestation free from human obstruction. The enclosed conclave, with its rules of confinement, austerity, and coercion, is thus configured as a juridical liturgy of institutional purification whose ultimate purpose is to ensure that human deliberation is contaminated as little as possible by private interests or secular pressures.

Gregory X, trained in diplomatic practice and a direct witness to the institutional disorder preceding his election, understood prolonged inaction and the absence of clear rules to be as dangerous as active corruption. In his view, authority had to be protected not only from external enemies but also from the internal dysfunctions of the ecclesiastical apparatus itself. *Ubi Periculum* thus appears as a mature expression of the equilibrium between divine inspiration and normative rationality, in which grace is mediated through a carefully designed juridical order. This step reflects a crucial institutional development: the recognition that spiritual legitimacy requires a stable legal structure guaranteeing both the validity of the result and the integrity of the procedure. In this sense, *Ubi Periculum* was not a restriction upon the sacred but its operational framing within a Church increasingly understood as a juridical, sacramental body in which spirituality and law were not opposed spheres but complementary and mutually legitimating ones.

2.2.4 Reception, Resistance, and Legacy

Despite its innovative character, *Ubi Periculum* was not applied in a linear manner after Gregory X's death. It was used in the election of Innocent V in January 1276. Later that same year Adrian V suspended its application with the intention of revising it, and John XXI subsequently revoked it. The Gregorian regime was restored by Celestine V in 1294, and its provisions later passed into Boniface VIII's *Liber Sextus*, promulgated in 1298. The immediate history of the constitution therefore shows that its consolidation was gradual and contested, although the model of an enclosed conclave ultimately became an enduring element of papal electoral law.

2.2.5 The Minimalist Objection: *Ubi Periculum* as Circumstantial Reaction

The interpretation advanced in this book must be tested against the strongest objection available to it, and that objection is not external to the evidence already presented. It arises from it. If *Ubi Periculum* was the juridical core of an architecture of durability, the record of its immediate afterlife is difficult to reconcile with the claim. The constitution governed exactly one election. Within months of Gregory's death the cardinals who had endured its regime petitioned against it, Adrian V suspended it, and John XXI revoked it outright while promising a replacement he did not live to draft. For the following eighteen years the Church elected its pontiffs under no conclave law at all.

The minimalist reading builds on this sequence. On that account, *Ubi Periculum* was not the expression of a governing philosophy but the reflex of a man who had been personally humiliated by the mechanism that produced him: elected in absentia after thirty-three months, at Acre, without being a cardinal, by six colleagues to whom the remaining electors had surrendered a decision they could not make themselves. A pontiff so produced had every private reason to legislate against the conditions of his own elevation, and none of that requires a theory of institutional stabilization. The objection gains further force from the character of the resistance. What the cardinals contested was not an ecclesiology but a set of physical impositions: a single unpartitioned chamber, one attendant apiece, the ration reduced to one dish and then to bread, wine, and water. Old men, several of

whom had watched colleagues die during the Viterbo deadlock, refused a regime that legislated hunger as a procedural instrument. Read this way, *Ubi Periculum* belongs to the history of one pontiff's grievance and of the Curia's successful defense of its own comfort, not to the history of institutional design.

This reading deserves the concession it has earned. It corrects any account that would present Gregory as the author of a settled constitutional order, and it explains something the institutionalist thesis alone does not: why the norm failed at once. Legislation that ignores the bodies subject to it invites repeal, and this legislation was repealed. To that extent the minimalist objection is not refuted but absorbed: the architecture of durability, if it existed, was built without provision for the endurance of the men who had to inhabit it.

What the objection cannot account for is what happened next. The eighteen years without a conclave law were not a return to some prior equilibrium; they were a return to paralysis. The elections of 1277, 1280–1281, 1287–1288, and 1292–1294 ran to seven, six, eleven, and twenty-seven months. The last of these reproduced almost exactly the crisis that had produced Gregory himself, and it ended in the same manner: with the elevation of an outsider who was not a cardinal. That pontiff, Celestine V, did not commission a new electoral regime. In *Quia in futurum*, of 28 September 1294, he restored the Gregorian text. Four years later its provisions entered the *Liber Sextus*, and the enclosed conclave has governed every subsequent papal election.

The significance of that restoration lies in what was not done. A grievance-driven measure discredited by its own failure is not the document a successor reaches for two decades later; it is the document he replaces. Celestine reinstated Gregory's constitution because the intervening vacancies had demonstrated that the diagnosis embedded in it was correct even where its severity was not tolerable. On the evidence, then, neither reading suffices alone. The minimalist objection accurately describes the constitution's reception; it cannot explain its return. What may be inferred from the full sequence is narrower than a governing philosophy and more than a reflex: Gregory identified a structural failure with sufficient precision that the norm he wrote outlived the resistance to it, was recovered unaltered by a pontiff with no stake in his memory, and became canon law. Whether he

understood his own legislation in those terms is not documented, and this study does not claim it.

Chapter 8. Preparing the Second Council of Lyon: Diplomacy, Reform, and Christian Unity

The Second Council of Lyon, convened by Gregory X and held between May and July 1274, concentrated the principal problems of his pontificate. Its agenda articulated three documented fronts: negotiations for union with the Greek Church, reform of the Latin Church, and preparations for a new crusade. By virtue of its scale and the diversity of the actors summoned, Lyon II was also a diplomatic operation intended to reinforce the papacy's capacity for coordination.

Internally, the council addressed questions of ecclesiastical discipline and government, including regulation of papal election. Reform did not amount to a complete reorganization of the curia, but it did produce juridical decisions intended to correct specific problems of administration and succession.

On the crusading front, Gregory sought to transform an ideal weakened by military failures and Western rivalries into a program supported by ecclesiastical financing and diplomatic coordination. The viability of that project, however, depended upon political commitments that the papacy could not impose unilaterally.

Taken together, Lyon II may be analyzed as a platform for coordinating reform, unity, and crusade. The expression "systemic reconfiguration" belongs to the interpretive model of this book; the sources document a convergent agenda, not an explicit theory formulated by Gregory X.

2.3.1 A Long-Deferred Council

Since the close of the First Council of Lyon in 1245, convened by Innocent IV with the explicit objective of deposing Emperor Frederick II, no other ecumenical council had been able to meet. The

attempt to reactivate universal conciliar government had been frustrated for more than a quarter of a century by a combination of structural factors: internal divisions within the College of Cardinals, the political fragmentation of the Christian West, tensions between the papacy and European kingdoms, and the logistical difficulty of assembling representative episcopal delegations in a single place. Against this background of paralysis, Gregory X, from the very beginning of his pontificate in 1271, conceived the project of convening a new general council that would address not only doctrinal and disciplinary questions but would function as an integrating device capable of recomposing the political-religious fabric of the *res publica christiana*. In the pontiff's conception, the council was to assemble not only the Latin episcopate but also Eastern legates, representatives of European monarchs, members of the mendicant orders, and canon lawyers in a broad, plural, and symbolically representative assembly of a lost unity. The objective was ambitious: to restore an effective image of Christian cohesion that would allow the papacy once again to perform its role as coordinating center of the Latin world and mediator between East and West. The idea of a universal Church assembled in council, endowed with the capacity to legislate, pacify, and summon crusades, not only recovered the reforming legacy of the eleventh century but also responded to the new conditions of institutional governance demanded by the complexity of the thirteenth. The choice of Lyon as the conciliar venue was neither accidental nor merely geographical. Situated at the crossroads of routes connecting Italy, France, the Empire, and the ports of the western Mediterranean, Lyon offered a strategic location accessible to Byzantine embassies, northern European prelates, and representatives of the Mediterranean world. Moreover, Lyon was not yet part of the kingdom of France in 1274: juridically it lay within the former Kingdom of Arles, while local temporal authority was linked to the archbishopric, although French influence in and around the city was growing. This position afforded a degree of distance from the immediate political pressures of the Roman environment.

Lyon thus combined favorable conditions: relative neutrality, logistical centrality, and adequate urban infrastructure. During the preparation of the council between 1272 and 1274, Byzantine emissaries, royal delegations, representatives of the mendicant orders,

and cardinals endowed with plenipotentiary powers began to arrive in the city, as documented by numerous letters preserved in the *Registra Vaticana* and by contemporary episcopal chronicles. The council was not the product of theological improvisation but of a rigorously constructed diplomatic operation aimed at restoring the ideal of Christian unity through an act of conciliar centralization unprecedented since the twelfth century.

2.3.2 The Prior Diplomatic Network

The convocation of Lyon II required an extensive diplomatic network intended to secure attendance, negotiate the Byzantine question, and prepare the crusading enterprise. Papal correspondence shows the papacy acting simultaneously toward Western courts, Byzantium, and ecclesiastical actors.

Between 1272 and 1273, Gregory X used legates and emissaries to explore reunion with the Greek Church, communicate the convocation of the council, and coordinate crusading objectives. Negotiation with Constantinople combined doctrinal questions with an immediate political problem: the security of Michael VIII's empire in the face of Charles of Anjou's projects.

In the West, these initiatives sought to secure commitments from the principal monarchies to the assembly and to a possible crusade, while also ensuring the participation of bishops, religious orders, and political representatives.

The diplomatic network had to produce concrete results: a profession of unity acceptable to Rome and Constantinople, sufficient adherence to the crusading project, and broad representation at Lyon. The combination of these objectives explains the intensity of the preceding negotiations.

Among these initiatives, the negotiations with the Byzantine emperor Michael VIII Palaiologos were particularly prominent. Threatened by Charles of Anjou's projects against Constantinople, Michael VIII perceived reconciliation with Rome as an instrument of political protection. Michael VIII sent an imperial delegation to Lyon that arrived in June 1274 and included, among others, Germanos,

former patriarch of Constantinople, Theophanes of Nicaea, and the megas logothetes George Akropolites. At the fourth session, held on 6 July, Akropolites declared in the emperor's name his adherence to union with Rome. John Bekkos was not a member of that delegation and was not yet patriarch; he would occupy the patriarchate of Constantinople from 1275 onward.

2.3.3 Curial Coordination and Programmatic Structure

Gregory X prepared the Second Council of Lyon through papal correspondence, legations, consultations, and the reception of reports and proposals from different parts of Christendom. The surviving documentation allows a broad and coordinated preparation to be reconstructed, but does not require us to posit a stable structure of four permanent commissions with formally delimited competences. The program took shape around the major problems that the pontiff himself had identified from the beginning of his government.

Conciliar preparation articulated three particularly visible clusters: relations with the Byzantine Church and the conditions of a possible union; the material and fiscal organization of a new crusading enterprise; and reform of the Latin Church. These were accompanied by specific juridical questions that would ultimately be reflected in the conciliar constitutions. Legates, procurators, prelates, and specialists participated in consultations and negotiations, but the available evidence counsels describing this work as a preparatory network of exchanges and commissions rather than as a bureaucratic system of committees comparable to those of modern councils.

Within that process, the question of papal election acquired singular importance because of the experience of Viterbo. *Ubi Periculum* was promulgated during the council itself, at the fifth session of 16 July 1274, and transformed into conciliar law a regime of enclosure, isolation, and material pressure intended to prevent further prolonged vacancies. Its elaboration must be situated within the context of electoral legislation and the experience of the interregnum, without attributing it to a specific technical commission whose existence and composition are not sufficiently documented.

The preparatory documents preserved in the *Registra Vaticana* show that Gregory did not intend to address isolated problems but to articulate a program connecting ecclesial unity, crusade, and reform. First, restoration of communion with the Byzantine Church was set forth as a primary objective. From the Roman perspective, the negotiations required a profession of faith compatible with Latin doctrine, including the question of the *Filioque*, and recognition of papal primacy. The union proclaimed at Lyon did not, however, imply an obligation to abandon Greek liturgical rites wholesale, nor can it be reduced to an imposition of unleavened bread. The formal adherence of Emperor Michael VIII, expressed by his representatives, constituted one of the council's principal symbolic achievements, although the effective reception of the agreement in the Byzantine world was far more limited.

Second, reform of the Latin Church formed an explicit part of Gregory X's program, although the normative results of Lyon II were more selective than a general reform of ecclesiastical administration. The constitutions addressed specific matters of discipline and government, including the procedure for papal election and certain problems concerning benefices, religious orders, and jurisdiction. The limited scope of these measures itself requires a distinction between the breadth of the announced reforming program and what the council actually legislated. Finally, Lyon reaffirmed the crusading project and established an ecclesiastical tenth for six years to finance it, integrating this military and penitential objective into the general program of Christian unity.

Within the interpretive framework of this study, this thematic design may be described as a coherent articulation of several problems of government; to call it a "systemic logic" is a contemporary reading. Papal documentation shows an authority acting simultaneously at juridical, doctrinal, diplomatic, and political levels; converting that diversity of functions into the notion of an "operational center" belongs to the author's analytical model. In this interpretation, conciliar organization may be read as a means of coordinating those functions under pontifical direction, as well as of deliberating and legislating.

2.3.4 A Pope as Manager of a New Order

Gregory X's role in preparing the Second Council of Lyon may be characterized less as that of a doctrinal legislator than as that of a skilled manager of fragile equilibria, conscious of the multiplicity of interests at stake and of the tensions traversing the Christian field between East and West, spiritual and political power, reformist aspiration and pragmatism. Rather than imposing a unilateral program, he chose to articulate a logic of convergence capable of sustaining, even provisionally, a new form of Christian consensus. On the one hand, Gregory had to contain the ambitions of Charles of Anjou, who sought to use the council as a platform of legitimation for his political hegemony in the eastern Mediterranean. Charles, who had seized the Sicilian throne in 1266 and would receive the title King of Jerusalem in 1277 (after the council but as part of the same geopolitical process), represented a real threat to the papacy's institutional stability, which risked being absorbed by a secular power with theocratic pretensions. Although politically moderate in his response to Angevin power, Gregory carefully prevented the council from becoming an instrument of Neapolitan expansionism and worked to neutralize Charles's use of curial structures, especially in relation to the Eastern question and the crusade.

On the other hand, the pontiff faced a European Christendom increasingly reluctant to embrace the universalist ideal. The kings of England, Castile, Aragon, and the Empire viewed calls for unity skeptically, especially when these implied surrendering sovereignty or financing military campaigns without tangible benefit. The papacy's moral prestige had been eroded by the recent memory of the vacant see, accusations of curial corruption, and the failures of earlier crusades. In this context, Gregory did not resort to juridical authoritarianism or theological pressure, but proposed a more diplomatic model of leadership: Rome as a center of multilateral deliberation and functional coordination rather than as a theocratic imperium.

From an institutional perspective, Lyon II may be interpreted as a particularly articulated attempt to coordinate doctrinal, juridical, and political problems under pontifical authority. The assembly did not eliminate resistance or produce a stable integration of Christendom,

but it transformed a dispersed agenda into formalized decisions and commitments. The notion of “systemic coordination” is here an analytical category, not an explicit intention attributed to Gregory X.

Chapter 9. The First Acts of Gregory X’s Government: Between Reform and Political Prudence

The election of Teobaldo Visconti in 1271 brought an exceptional vacancy to an end and inaugurated a pontificate conditioned from the outset by the need to restore authority and decision-making capacity. His career outside the immediate curial environment and his experience in the East favored a mode of government attentive to diplomatic mediation and to the limits of coercion.

In the interpretation advanced here, Gregory combined pontifical authority with instruments of regulation and negotiation. His government sought to reactivate cooperation among Christian powers, order ecclesiastical procedures, and contain secular projects capable of reducing Rome’s room for action.

A second axis was the juridification of specific institutional problems. The experience of Viterbo and the preparation of Lyon II favored recourse to norms and procedures as instruments of stability, the most enduring example of which would be *Ubi Periculum*.

In foreign policy, Gregory sought to contain Angevin ambitions without breaking with Charles of Anjou and pursued a diplomacy of equilibrium among the Empire, the Western monarchies, and Byzantium. This margin of maneuver explains much of his earliest governmental action.

This chapter analyzes the first acts of Gregory X’s government after his return to Italy, addressing the recomposition of the curia and key appointments, initial administrative measures, and his first diplomatic initiatives. Across these spheres, a structural coherence is observable: the pontiff acted less as a charismatic leader than as an institutional engineer, capable of operating through a logic of systems

rather than exceptionalism. This mode of leadership (austere, rational, and gradual) was one of the pontificate's principal commitments and constitutes one of its most enduring legacies.

3.1.1 Return from the East: Symbols and the Timing of Consecration

The election of Teobaldo Visconti as Gregory X on 1 September 1271 took place under highly unusual circumstances: the man elected was not a cardinal and was in Acre in the Holy Land. After receiving the news, he traveled to Jerusalem, where he paused in prayer, and then began the journey back to the West. He landed at Brindisi on 1 January 1272 and, while crossing the Kingdom of Sicily, was escorted by Charles I of Anjou. At Ceprano he was received by representatives of the College of Cardinals and reached Viterbo on 10 February. The journey from Acre to the seat of the cardinalatial college therefore took several months. This transition brought the pope, elect into successive contact with the problem of the Holy Land, Angevin power in Italy, and the college that had presided over the prolonged interregnum.

Upon arriving at Viterbo, Teobaldo addressed the cardinals concerning conditions in the Holy Land, a priority that would be visible from the beginning of his pontificate. Because he had been elected while possessing only minor orders, he subsequently received priestly ordination and episcopal consecration. He was crowned in Rome at Saint Peter's on 27 March 1272. Four days later, on 31 March, he convoked a general council, although he had not yet designated the city in which it would meet. This sequence (return from Acre, ordination, coronation, and conciliar convocation) shows the speed with which the new pope transformed priorities accumulated during the interregnum into a program of government.

The gesture may be given a political and symbolic reading associated with moderation and prudence, but that interpretation alone does not permit the reconstruction of a general governmental intention. In the overall interpretation advanced by this work, the episode is compatible with a style combining pontifical authority, negotiation, and juridical regulation; the category of "institutional manager" is analytical and retrospective.

3.1.2 Composition of the Curia and the Balance of Forces

One of the challenges of Gregory X's pontificate was to govern a curia marked by the divisions exposed during the long interregnum. The clearest evidence of his personnel policy is the consistory of 3 June 1273, at which he created five cardinals: Pedro Juliani, the future John XXI; Vicedomino de Vicedominis; Bonaventure of Bagnoregio; Peter of Tarentaise, the future Innocent V; and Bertrand de Saint-Martin. This group brought together ecclesiastical, intellectual, and diplomatic figures of high standing. There is insufficient basis for presenting Pedro Juliani as a "chancellor of the Church" appointed by Gregory X or for attributing to him control of the curia's documentary apparatus.

The promotion of these five cardinals permits us to speak of the selective incorporation of collaborators with diverse experience, but not of a planned proportional distribution among Italians, Frenchmen, and Germans. Simon de Brion, the future Martin IV, was not made a cardinal by Gregory X; he had received the purple under Urban IV. Accordingly, the curial reorganization of the pontificate must be described on the basis of appointments actually documented, rather than as an integral administrative reform whose architecture is absent from the sources.

3.1.3 Administration, Taxation, and Canon Law

The documentation of the pontificate does not permit the first years of Gregory X to be described as an integral administrative reform of the curia in the modern sense. The pope inherited the financial, beneficial, and judicial structures developed by his predecessors and governed through them while preparing the general council. His best, documented innovations are concentrated in specific areas: regulation of papal election, fiscal preparation for the crusade, particular disciplinary provisions, and normative production associated with the Second Council of Lyon.

In fiscal matters, the best, documented extraordinary instrument of his pontificate was the ecclesiastical tenth approved at Lyon for six years to finance the recovery of the Holy Land. There is insufficient basis for attributing to him, before the council, a general centralization of all censuses, tithes, and episcopal levies or a complete reorganization of curial finance. Crusading taxation was important, but it must be distinguished from a structural reform of all papal finances.

With respect to ecclesiastical benefices, Gregory X continued to exercise the ordinary powers of provision, confirmation, and discipline proper to the Roman see. The sources used here permit the study of specific decisions but do not support the existence of a general campaign to eliminate expectative prebends, systematically prohibit pluralism in benefices, or universally impose episcopal residence as a specific administrative program of Gregory X. The verifiable provisions of Lyon II were more limited and must be analyzed on their own terms.

The same applies to indulgences. Preaching and indulgences continued to form part of the papacy's crusading policy, and Lyon II linked spiritual benefits to the enterprise in the Holy Land. Without specific normative documentation, however, it cannot be asserted that Gregory X had established before the council a general policy restricting indulgences or a new universal system for authorizing preachers.

In the juridical sphere, Gregory X operated within an already profoundly systematized canonical order. Gregory IX's *Liber Extra*, promulgated in 1234, was the principal official collection then in force,

while the activity of decretalists and ecclesiastical courts continued to develop upon that foundation. Gregory X's pontificate did not produce a new general codification comparable to the *Liber Extra*.

His most visible normative contribution was more specific: *Ubi Periculum* transformed into general law the regime of enclosure for papal electors, while the constitutions of Lyon II regulated particular matters of ecclesiastical government and discipline. The juridical significance of the pontificate thus lies in those interventions and in their place within the thirteenth-century canonical tradition, not in a supposed comprehensive revision of all earlier decretals.

There is likewise insufficient basis for attributing to Gregory X an autonomous program of systematically collecting canonical jurisprudence for a future general compilation. What can be established is that the council's constitutions were revised and promulgated by the pope as a collection in November 1274 and that a substantial portion of this material was later incorporated into Boniface VIII's *Liber Sextus* in 1298.

For the same reason, his pontificate should not be presented as the author of a uniform codification of procedures concerning heresy, benefices, jurisdictional disputes, and ecclesiastical discipline. These fields had already been regulated by earlier canon law and continued to evolve after Gregory. His specific contribution must be measured on the basis of the norms he actually promulgated and the documented decisions of his government.

This approach reveals an intensive use of canon law as an instrument of government, reform, and conflict resolution. Gregory X was not a professional jurist, but his pontificate operated within a curia in which canonists, notaries, and clerics trained in the legal traditions of Europe's principal schools performed essential functions. Pedro Juliani, whom Gregory X created cardinal in 1273, formed part of the conciliar environment, but the sources do not permit the specific attribution to him of responsibility for directing the juridical implementation of the reform program.

The result was a juridically active pontificate, but one of more precise scope than suggested by an interpretation of total reform. Regulation of the conclave, the legislation of Lyon II, and taxation for the crusade reveal a preference for stable normative instruments,

without any need to attribute to Gregory X a program of general codification that the sources do not document.

3.1.4 Foreign Relations: A Diplomacy of Containment

In an international context marked by the strengthening of territorial monarchies, imperial uncertainty, and the effects of the prolonged papal interregnum, Gregory X practiced a diplomacy oriented toward negotiation and equilibrium among powers. This style may be compared with the more confrontational strategies of certain earlier pontificates, such as that of Innocent IV, and also with later developments, such as those under Boniface VIII; the latter, of course, was not Gregory X's predecessor.

Gregory X's foreign policy can be reconstructed across several simultaneous fronts: the German imperial question, relations with Charles of Anjou, negotiations with Michael VIII Palaiologos, relations with the Western monarchies, and preparations for a new crusade. Rather than a formal diplomatic doctrine expressed through three principles, his actions reveal a recurrent search for agreements capable of pacifying Christian powers and placing them at the service of conciliar objectives. His intervention in the German question and his policy toward Byzantium are the clearest examples of this practice.

Gregory maintained relations with the English monarchy during the transition from Henry III to Edward I: Henry III died in November 1272, so most English diplomacy during the pontificate took place under Edward. With Alfonso X of Castile he addressed the question of the latter's imperial claims; above all, he intervened in resolving the German problem that culminated in the election of Rudolf of Habsburg as King of the Romans in 1273. Gregory supported this outcome and formally confirmed Rudolf's election in 1274, without this implying an immediate imperial coronation. The election politically closed the period known as the Great Interregnum and provided the papacy with an interlocutor distinct from the Angevin alternative or the Castilian candidacy.

This gesture was crucial: Gregory thereby preserved the papal prerogative of consecrating the emperor while at the same time legitimating the restoration of imperial authority in functional terms,

without subjecting it to humiliating subordination or allowing it to impose itself as a rival to the papacy. In this case, relations between Rome and the Empire may be analyzed as cautious cooperation between two distinct authorities, without denying papal hierarchical claims. The policy suggests a more negotiated and operative practice of pontifical power. The practice observable in this episode privileged negotiation and mediation, but it does not authorize a general redefinition of the papal function or a denial of the potential use of hierarchical and juridical instruments. Within the interpretive model of this work, the episode may be described as an exercise of regulatory and diplomatic authority; this does not mean that the papacy had abandoned its claims to supremacy or doctrinally conceived itself as a merely coordinating instance. Comparison with later notions of more regulated authority must remain retrospective: the documentation permits us to speak of a negotiated practice, not of an explicit systemic or constitutional theory.

3.1.5 Toward a Programmatic Pontificate

Taken together, Gregory X's first acts of government reveal the rapid definition of priorities that would culminate in the Second Council of Lyon: resolving the question of imperial succession, containing Angevin influence, pursuing union with Byzantium, preparing a crusade, and reforming specific aspects of ecclesiastical life. *Ubi Periculum* and the conciliar constitutions reveal an inclination toward normative and procedural solutions. From these facts, an institutional interpretation of his pontificate may be proposed, provided that this analytical reading is kept distinct from any explicit self-definition by Gregory himself, who left no systematic treatise on his conception of government.

From this analytical perspective, Gregory X's pontificate may be described as adaptive because of its combination of juridical reform, diplomatic negotiation, and conciliar convocation. It is not argued that he consciously inaugurated a new "model" of papacy or formulated a logic of systemic legitimacy. What is at stake is not only Rome's authority, but its capacity to articulate, organize, and preserve the equilibrium of a Christendom in transformation.

Chapter 10. Charles of Anjou: A Parallel Power at the Heart of Christendom

The figure of Charles of Anjou (1226–1285), Count of Provence, younger brother of Louis IX of France, and King of Sicily by papal investiture, is central to understanding thirteenth-century Italian and Mediterranean politics. Charles was crowned king in Rome in January 1266, before the battle of Benevento; his victory over Manfred on 26 February militarily consolidated Angevin control of the kingdom. The alliance with the Holy See, promoted under Urban IV and Clement IV, eliminated the Hohenstaufen as the dominant power in southern Italy, but at the same time created a new problem of equilibrium for the papacy: the extraordinary concentration of power in the hands of its own ally.

His influence was particularly visible in the Viterbo election (1268–1271), where the deadlock among cardinalatial factions was directly connected to loyalties for or against the Angevin. The prolongation of the interregnum resulted in part from the cardinals' inability to elect a pontiff who would not be conditioned by the interests either of Charles or of his imperial adversaries. The eventual election of Teobaldo Visconti as Gregory X, a figure external to Roman power struggles, may be understood as an institutional response to the exhaustion of this model of secular interference.

During his pontificate, Gregory X adopted a strategy of diplomatic containment and systemic equilibrium, avoiding direct confrontation with Charles of Anjou (whose position remained important for the defense of southern Italy and for the balance with the Empire) while carefully limiting his capacity to influence the curia and conciliar debates. This posture of strategic balance and pontifical autonomy appeared in several key decisions of Gregory X's pontificate. First, the pope actively resisted pressure from Charles of Anjou, who sought to legitimize a crusade against Constantinople with the aim of restoring the Latin Empire under his dominion. Gregory refused to endorse such ambitions because he considered them incompatible both with the diplomatic course he was pursuing and with the ecclesial union sought with Byzantium. Second, he promoted the election of Rudolf of Habsburg as King of the Romans in 1273, an alternative that restored imperial continuity without reopening conflict

with the heirs of Frederick II and at the same time limited Angevin expansion. Finally, he sustained careful negotiations with Emperor Michael VIII Palaiologos, whose act of submission to the Roman Church Gregory interpreted as an opportunity for ecclesial reunion, thereby frustrating Charles's pretext for military intervention in the East. These decisions reveal the pontiff's determination to remove the papacy from dynamics of political instrumentalization and to affirm its role as universal mediator and guarantor of Christian peace.

From an institutional perspective, Charles of Anjou operated as a "parallel power" within Latin Christendom, capable of conditioning ecclesiastical decisions and altering the balance among poles of authority. Without an equivalent military base or a dominant cardinalatial faction, Gregory X adopted a strategy of systemic neutralization, relying upon canonical norms, diplomatic balances, and the symbolic legitimacy of the papacy as universal mediator.

This intermediate chapter examines in depth the relationship between Charles of Anjou and the Holy See, his projects of Mediterranean expansion, his role in post-Gregorian ecclesiastical politics, and the response of Gregory X's pontificate, which succeeded in reconfiguring the papal role without renouncing its authority but without resorting to direct confrontation.

CI.1. Charles, Heir to Angevin Universalism

Charles of Anjou (1226–1285), younger son of Louis VIII of France and Blanche of Castile, was the brother of the celebrated Louis IX (Saint Louis), King of France. Educated within the ethos of Capetian kingship, Charles combined courtly formation with acute dynastic ambition and a political, military vocation that led him to construct one of the thirteenth century's most aggressive expansionist projects, sustained by crusading ideology, curial politics, and the dissolution of the imperial equilibrium.

Charles's accession to the Kingdom of Sicily resulted from a long negotiation with the Holy See begun under Urban IV and continued by Clement IV. Charles received papal investiture and was crowned king in Rome at the beginning of January 1266. Only afterward did he march south and defeat Manfred at Benevento on 26

February 1266. The battle did not precede his coronation; it militarily secured a royal dignity he had already received and opened the way to effective occupation of the kingdom.

Charles's Mediterranean expansion did not begin in 1270. Through the Viterbo agreements of 1267 with the exiled Latin emperor Baldwin II and other allies, the Angevin assumed commitments directed toward a future restoration of the Latin Empire of Constantinople. This project made Michael VIII Palaiologos his principal Eastern adversary and conditioned all subsequent diplomacy with Rome. Charles could present the enterprise in crusading and Latin terms, but its objectives were also clearly dynastic and territorial.

Gregory X's policy toward Byzantium collided with these prior commitments. The pope made reconciliation with Michael VIII a central element in preparation for the council, while the Byzantine emperor saw union with Rome as a means of neutralizing the Angevin threat. Charles reluctantly accepted delays to his Eastern plans while Gregory lived and union negotiations advanced. The tension was therefore real, but should not be described as though Charles had been able unilaterally to impose a policy of conquest during Gregory X's pontificate.

In sum, Charles of Anjou represented the prototype of the ambitious crusader, king, capable of invoking spiritual legitimacy in order to construct a secular power with hegemonic ambitions that exceeded the traditional frameworks of feudal vassalage. His project was simultaneously an instrument against the Empire and an obstacle to papal autonomy, and Gregory X had to confront it through a subtle strategy of institutional resistance, diplomatic equilibrium, and juridical obstruction without falling into an open confrontation that would have compromised the stability of the Church and the western Mediterranean.

CI.2. Interference in the Conclave and Initial Tensions

The prolonged Viterbo electoral process (1268–1271) was traversed by political divisions in which the Angevin question occupied an important place. Historiography has connected part of the deadlock with positions favorable or hostile to Charles of Anjou. There is,

however, no conclusive evidence that Charles directly controlled the deliberations or financed a particular candidacy; his influence must be described as a political condition of the surrounding environment rather than as a demonstrated intervention in every decision of the college.

The College of Cardinals cannot safely be reduced to three stable national parties, French, Italian, and German. Alliances varied and combined origin, family ties, positions toward Charles of Anjou, and differing conceptions of the Italian balance of power. Angevin power encouraged certain affinities and forms of resistance, but the factional structure of the election was more complex than a simple division by nationality.

The decisive and well-documented intervention was that of the authorities and inhabitants of Viterbo, who, frustrated by the duration of the vacant see, resorted to the confinement of the cardinals, material restrictions, and other forms of pressure. Contemporary and later accounts also contain accusations and rumors of external influence, but these testimonies must be distinguished from direct evidence of bribery or coercion by Charles of Anjou.

The election of Teobaldo Visconti offered a way out of the deadlock precisely because the man chosen did not belong to the College of Cardinals and was in Acre. His previous career, his distance from the rival candidacies, and his ecclesiastical reputation favored his position as a compromise candidate. Charles of Anjou recognized the new pope and accompanied him during part of his return through the Kingdom of Sicily, but this reception did not make Gregory an Angevin candidate and does not demonstrate that his election was explicitly conceived as a declaration against Charles.

During the pontificate, Gregory X sought to limit Angevin predominance without openly breaking with Charles. The policy of union with Michael VIII reduced the legitimacy of an Angevin expedition against Constantinople; the resolution of the German question through Rudolf of Habsburg introduced another pole of power into the European balance; and the pope used his authority as feudal lord of the Kingdom of Sicily and head of the Church to contain initiatives incompatible with his program. These elements permit us to speak of diplomatic containment, but do not justify attributing to him

a documented campaign to recover territory in Spoleto and the March of Ancona specifically designed as an anti-Angevin operation.

Cl.3. The Lyon-Byzantium Axis: Two Incompatible Projects

One of the greatest points of tension between Charles of Anjou and Gregory X concerned Byzantium. Charles had been connected since 1267 to projects for restoring the Latin Empire, while Michael VIII Palaiologos sought to prevent an expedition against Constantinople. For the Byzantine emperor, negotiations for ecclesiastical union with Rome also functioned as an instrument of international security. Michael VIII sent emissaries and agreed to negotiate the Filioque and papal primacy, among other points under discussion with Rome.

Gregory X had not exercised a papal legation in the East before his election, but he did possess direct knowledge of Acre and the condition of the Latin East. As pope, he valued Michael VIII's offer both for its ecclesiological dimension and for its political consequences. Charles of Anjou maintained his Eastern ambitions and regarded unionist policy with reservations; during 1273 he accepted an extension of the deadline foreseen for an offensive while negotiations between Rome and Constantinople progressed. It is therefore more accurate to speak of a strategic incompatibility contained by papal authority than of a systematic and demonstrated sabotage of all negotiations.

Against Angevin ambitions in the East, Gregory X made union with Byzantium an element of his Mediterranean policy. On 6 July 1274 the Byzantine imperial delegation, through George Akropolites, declared at Lyon the emperor's adherence to union with Rome. So long as that union was recognized by the papacy, a campaign by Charles against Constantinople was incompatible with pontifical policy and lacked the ecclesiastical support the Angevin required. In parallel, the election and subsequent recognition of Rudolf of Habsburg contributed to restoring the imperial balance. These measures limited Charles's room for action without producing an open rupture between the King of Sicily and the Holy See.

These decisions reveal an intensive use of negotiation and diplomatic coordination. To interpret them as the expression of a theory according to which papal power consisted above all in “articulating consensus” would go beyond the available documentation. Gregory’s policy toward Byzantium may be interpreted as an attempt to integrate ecclesial union with diplomatic calculation in response to the Angevin threat; the expression “rational center of Christian integration” belongs to the analytical language of this work. The later failure of union with Constantinople does not erase the diplomatic importance of the agreement reached at Lyon. It is nevertheless advisable to avoid the strong counterfactual claim that war would have “irreparably” delegitimized Rome: what can be documented is that Gregory’s unionist policy limited the scope for an Angevin offensive against Byzantium during his pontificate. Interpretively, Gregory’s policy may be described as an attempt to reconcile doctrinal objectives, ecclesial union, and diplomatic containment of competing military projects.

CI.4. Secular Power and Spiritual Authority: A Contested Boundary

In the interpretation proposed here, the career of Charles of Anjou provides a particularly useful case through which to observe transformations in the political equilibrium of Christendom toward the end of the thirteenth century. He was not merely an ambitious monarch or a papal protector turned threat: he may be read as the expression of a dynastic sovereignty increasingly sustained by military capacity, territorial accumulation, and an independent diplomacy, while still operating within frameworks of Christian legitimacy and feudal relations with the papacy. His rise may be situated within a process of strengthening dynastic and territorial powers. To present it as an “inevitable” displacement of the center of power from papacy to monarchy would introduce a teleology unsupported by the sources. In this setting, Gregory X chiefly employed diplomatic, juridical, and conciliar instruments to limit Angevin expansion; the expression “one of the last pontiffs” would impose too strong an interpretive periodization and is avoided here. His response to the Angevin challenge was not direct confrontation but a strategy of containment

through diplomacy, norms, and institutional architecture. He resorted to law, to equilibrium among powers, and to a vision of the papacy as an organ of structural mediation rather than as a universal dominator. Charles may be used, as an analytical device, to observe the practical limits of pontifical capacity in the face of a secular ally with interests of its own; “epistemological mirror” is a historiographical metaphor, not a documentary fact. The very existence of a monarchy legitimated through crusade, sustained by the curia, and capable of acting independently on the international stage redefined the boundary between spiritual and secular spheres, weakening classical postulates of plenitudo potestatis. Gregory’s conduct may be interpreted as a practical adaptation to a plural and negotiated political order in which spiritual authority had to coexist with secular sovereignties endowed with their own political legitimacy. There is no basis for attributing to Gregory a doctrinally formulated “horizontal reconfiguration” as an alternative to the Gregorian model. What can be verified is that he combined primatial claims with negotiation and mediation in concrete situations. From the perspective of this work, the tension between Charles and Gregory may be read as a case of the adjustments the papacy had to make in response to dynastic powers with greater autonomous capacity for action. Categories such as “systemic change,” “multilateral,” or “secularized” are retrospective tools that require caution when applied to the thirteenth century. Gregory’s response-based on norms, council, and diplomacy, admits contemporary comparisons with forms of coordinating authority but should not be presented as a conscious anticipation of a modern vision of ecclesial power. The later failure of this strategy (after his death and the return of conflict) does not diminish the value of the attempt: the expression “institutional engineer of equilibrium” summarizes this work’s interpretation; Angevin pressure may be regarded as one contextual factor helping to explain Gregory’s policy of balance, without turning it into the sole cause. Within this tension one may observe problems associated with the transformation of papal universalism and the growing complexity of the political-ecclesiastical order of the late thirteenth century.

Chapter 11. The Second Council of Lyon: Proceedings, Participants, and Key Decisions

The Second Council of Lyon, held from 7 May to 17 July 1274, concentrated the public program of Gregory X's pontificate. The assembly brought together bishops, religious superiors, and political representatives to address union with the Greek Church, the crusade, ecclesiastical reform, and juridical questions. Its importance lies less in any supposed uniformity of outcome than in having transformed these fronts into a common conciliar agenda. The union proclaimed with the envoys of Michael VIII possessed great diplomatic value but received a fragile reception in Byzantium; the crusading project acquired fiscal mechanisms without securing the expected military mobilization; and reform produced specific constitutions, among them *Ubi Periculum*. Lyon II should therefore be understood as a space of pontifical coordination of exceptional scope, with significant normative achievements and visible political limits.

Analysis of these decisions will make it possible to assess the extent to which the papacy's capacity for coordination could be translated into durable results.

3.2.1 Composition and Opening: An Assembly of the Christian World

The Second Council of Lyon was solemnly opened on 7 May 1274 at Lyon and held six general sessions through 17 July. Participation was broad: estimates vary by source, but the conciliar documentation permits us to speak of several hundred bishops, around sixty abbots, and numerous clerics, theologians, and procurators. James I of Aragon was present, and delegates attended on behalf of the rulers of France, Germany, England, and Sicily. The English representation belonged to the reign of Edward I, since Henry III had died in November 1272. Tatar representatives also arrived, as did the delegation sent by Michael VIII Palaiologos on 24 June. The geographical and political breadth of the assembly corresponded to Gregory X's program: union with the Greeks, crusade, and ecclesiastical reform.

The Byzantine delegation was not led by John Bekkos. Its members included Germanos, former patriarch of Constantinople, Theophanes of Nicaea, and the megas logothetes George Akropolites. At the council's fourth session, on 6 July 1274, Akropolites accepted the conditions of union with Rome in the emperor's name while the assembly formally proclaimed the reconciliation of the Churches. The agreement acknowledged doctrinal and jurisdictional points required by Rome, including the Filioque and papal primacy, although its implementation in the Byzantine Empire encountered considerable opposition. John Bekkos would become patriarch in 1275 and would then emerge as one of the principal defenders of union.

Ecclesial reunion, attempted on various occasions before 1274, appeared momentarily to have been achieved. The proclamation at Lyon carried considerable spiritual and political significance: it projected the image of a reconciled Christendom under formal communion between Rome and Constantinople. The implementation of the agreement, however, encountered strong resistance among broad sectors of the Byzantine clergy and society. Even at the moment of proclamation, therefore, the union was more fragile than the solemnity of the ceremony suggested.

3.2.2 Thematic Axes: Unity, Reform, and Crusade

The Second Council of Lyon (1274) was conceived as a multidimensional response to the structural crisis affecting Latin Christendom. Far from being confined to dogmatic proclamations, the assembly was organized with a high degree of curial planning and thematic rationalization, reflected in the division of conciliar work into three principal axes: reunion with the Greek Church, reform of the Latin Church, and reactivation of the crusading project. Each of these blocks was discussed in plenary sessions presided over by the pope, in specialized commissions composed of bishops, theologians, and legates, and in restricted diplomatic settings where sensitive matters were negotiated with lay and Eastern ambassadors.

1. Union with the Greek Church constituted the axis of greatest symbolic weight. Gregory X, marked by his personal experience in the Holy Land, articulated a policy of rapprochement with Emperor

Michael VIII Palaiologos, who saw union with Rome as protection against the Angevin threat. The Byzantine delegation arrived at Lyon on 24 June 1274 and was composed of high-ranking imperial and ecclesiastical representatives, among them Germanos, former patriarch of Constantinople, Theophanes of Nicaea, and George Akropolites. On 6 July, during the fourth session, Akropolites declared the emperor's acceptance of union. John Bekkos did not participate at Lyon; he would be appointed patriarch in 1275. The agreement recognized the principal Roman demands, including the Filioque and papal primacy, while permitting the Greeks to retain their rites. The union formally survived throughout the reign of Michael VIII and was repudiated by Andronikos II after his father's death in 1282.

2. Reform of the Latin Church constituted one of the council's declared objectives, although its normative results were more limited than is sometimes claimed. At the final session Gregory X acknowledged that discussion of reform had not made it possible to approve a general program. Even so, the council sanctioned several constitutions concerning ecclesiastical institutions and discipline. Among the most important were *Ubi Periculum*, on papal election; provisions regulating relations between the secular clergy and religious; norms against usury; and other measures addressing particular questions of ecclesiastical government and morality. The collection of constitutions promulgated by Gregory X on 1 November 1274 was later incorporated into Boniface VIII's *Liber Sextus* in 1298, not into the *Clementinae*.

3. The crusading project was explicitly reactivated. At the second session, the council approved a tenth on ecclesiastical revenues for six years to finance the recovery of the Holy Land. Gregory X linked this financing to the need to pacify Christian powers and organize a future expedition. Louis IX could not have been proposed as leader in 1274, since he had died at Tunis in August 1270. Among the participants in the council, James I of Aragon advocated immediate military action, while Gregory continued preparing an enterprise projected for 1276 that was frustrated by his death.

In sum, the three thematic axes reveal a reforming agenda that articulated doctrinal unity, ecclesiastical discipline, and preparation for crusade. In the interpretation advanced here, this combination may be

analyzed as an attempt to strengthen the coordinating capacity of the papacy within the *res publica christiana*. Gregory X did not impose a model; rather, through canonical reason and multilateral diplomacy, he articulated a roadmap for the survival of the Christian order at the threshold of its transformation.

3.2.2.1 Union with the Greek Church

The first issue addressed was ecclesiastical reunion with Byzantium, promoted by Michael VIII Palaiologos in a context of Angevin threat and adopted by Gregory X as part of his project of Christian unity. The Greek delegation that reached Lyon in June 1274 was not led by John Bekkos, who was not yet patriarch. At the fourth session on 6 July, George Akropolites spoke in the emperor's name and expressed acceptance of union with Rome, including the Filioque and papal primacy.

The union proclaimed at Lyon encountered considerable opposition in the Byzantine world from the outset, but Michael VIII did not abandon it after Gregory X's death. The emperor officially maintained the unionist policy and in 1275 installed John Bekkos as patriarch, who became one of its principal advocates. The definitive rupture came after Michael VIII's death in December 1282, when his son Andronikos II repudiated the union and restored the anti-unionist position. The agreement of Lyon was therefore fragile and politically conditioned, but it did not disappear in 1276.

3.2.2.2 Reform of the Latin Church

The council's second axis was the internal reform of the Latin clergy and of the ecclesiastical structures that sustained it, with particular emphasis on discipline, the administration of benefices, and regulation of religious life. This reforming dimension, directly promoted by Gregory X, responded to concerns shared by numerous bishops and religious orders: the deterioration of clerical morals, corruption in the allocation of offices, and inadequate theological preparation among ministers. Following the normative legacy of the Fourth Lateran Council and the thirteenth-century canonical

movement, the council acted through specific decrees that codified these concerns.

First, the fifth session of 16 July approved *Ubi Periculum*, which regulated papal election through enclosure, restrictions on communication, and progressive austerity. Alongside this constitution, Lyon II approved a set of norms on specific matters: relations between secular clergy and religious, ecclesiastical procedures, usury, and other disciplinary questions. The definitive collection of thirty-one constitutions, subjected to curial revision and promulgated by Gregory X on 1 November 1274, does not amount to a general program of clerical reform. Indeed, at the final session the pontiff himself acknowledged that discussion of reform had been insufficient to produce general decrees on several of the problems raised.

These measures were not radical, but they were significant: they expressed a papal determination to recover normative control over the ecclesial apparatus in a context of growing local autonomy, secular pressures, and internal criticism of financial abuses and pastoral negligence.

Reform of the Church was one of the three explicit objectives announced by Gregory X when he convoked the council. Criticism of clerical abuses, disciplinary problems, and conflicts among different ecclesiastical sectors formed part of the assembly's context. The surviving constitutions of Lyon II, however, do not support the claim that the council approved a declaration entitled *Si quis episcopus notorie criminosus* intended to produce a systematic purge of unworthy bishops. The demonstrable normative scope of reform must be located in the constitutions actually transmitted and in the particular measures Gregory adopted after the council.

Gregory continued to exercise his ordinary powers of government and discipline after Lyon. Local cases of deposition, visitation, or correction may be used as evidence of a general policy only when linked to precise pontifical records. In the absence of such demonstration, particular actions should not be presented as the implementation of a systematic conciliar campaign of episcopal "purging".

The factual balance is therefore more limited: Lyon II did possess a reforming agenda, but it did not produce an exhaustive code

of clerical reform. Its legislation was selective and coexisted with subsequent curial decisions. This precision does not diminish the council's institutional importance, but it prevents the attribution to it of decrees or disciplinary campaigns absent from the surviving normative corpus.

3.2.2.3 The Crusading Project

The third major theme was the relaunching of the crusading ideal, deeply weakened after the loss of Jerusalem (1244), the failure of the Seventh Crusade, and increasing Mamluk pressure upon the Latin enclaves. The council approved an ecclesiastical tenth for six years to finance the future expedition, and Gregory X linked the project with pacification among Christian powers, the availability of ships, and the coordination of resources. The pope continued preparing the enterprise after Lyon and even projected his own participation in an expedition planned for 1276. His death in January of that year prevented the plan from reaching the implementation phase.

Taken together, the matters addressed at the council permit the assembly to be interpreted as part of a process of institutional adaptation combining discipline, negotiation, and political coordination. The expression “systemic adaptation” is an analytical category of this work. Gregory X directed the process from the position of pontifical authority and left institutional results of uneven importance, some enduring and others partially reversed after his death.

3.2.3 Internal Dynamics and Underlying Tensions

The Second Council of Lyon brought together diverse political and ecclesiastical interests, but not all of the tensions surrounding the assembly can be reconstructed as formal debates conducted within its sessions. The clearest contradiction was external and geopolitical: union with Michael VIII Palaiologos conflicted with Angevin projects for a Latin restoration in Constantinople, while the Byzantine court regarded the agreement with Rome as protection against Charles of Anjou.

The available documentation likewise does not permit us safely to assert that a bloc of Dominican theologians attempted formally to postpone proclamation of the union during the council. There were real doctrinal problems in relations between Latins and Greeks, and Byzantine reception of the agreement was profoundly conflictual, but these difficulties must be distinguished from an organized Dominican opposition in the sessions of Lyon that is not sufficiently demonstrated by the sources used here.

With regard to internal reform, the course of the council itself reveals important limits. Gregory had previously requested information and proposals for reform, but at the final session he acknowledged that it had not been possible to produce a general body of reforming decrees. Accordingly, in the absence of additional evidence, one should not reconstruct a coordinated episcopal resistance against a supposed program of fiscal centralization, episcopal residence, and curial reform broader than the constitutions actually promulgated.

The reforms approved at Lyon II were more concrete and delimited than a reading of general reform of the ecclesiastical apparatus would suggest. Among the documented measures was regulation of religious orders: the council renewed the prohibition against founding new forms of religious life without authorization and ordered the suppression or restriction of certain mendicant orders not confirmed by the Apostolic See, while expressly exempting Dominicans and Franciscans and retaining, under specific conditions, Carmelites and Augustinian Hermits. Provisions were also established concerning the fitness and residence of parish rectors, ordinations, ecclesiastical goods and immunities, and usury. These norms reveal a genuine disciplinary intention, but without additional documentation they do not permit the reconstruction of a coordinated opposition by bishops from particular regions, formalized protests by Spiritual Franciscans, or a general program of episcopal residence such as certain formulations of the manuscript had attributed to the council.

The assessment must therefore be formulated on the basis of the legislation actually preserved and of the council's political results. Lyon II produced significant norms (among them *Ubi Periculum*) approved crusading taxation, and proclaimed union with Byzantium,

but it did not resolve every reform problem Gregory had raised. The assembly was necessarily a space of negotiation among multiple actors; nevertheless, it is unnecessary to attribute to it specific protests, dispensations, or accommodations that are not documented in order to recognize the negotiated and limited character of its results.

3.2.4 Results: A Symbolic Victory, an Incomplete Reform

In immediate terms, the Second Council of Lyon may be regarded as an indisputable symbolic success. The proclamation of unity with the Greek Church, the formal ratification of *Ubi Periculum*, and initial support for the crusading tax reinforced the image of an active, reforming, and diplomatically skilled papacy capable of articulating integrative initiatives in a fragmented political setting. Under Gregory X's leadership, the Church once again appeared as an organizing body of the Christian world, not only theologically but institutionally.

A long-term evaluation of the Second Council of Lyon, however, reveals that several of its results were fragile. Union with the Greek Church was solemnly proclaimed on 6 July 1274 through the adherence presented by the delegation of Michael VIII Palaiologos; John Bekkos did not participate in that ceremony, since he became patriarch only in 1275. The union encountered significant resistance among Byzantine clergy and monks, but Michael VIII officially maintained the unionist policy until his death in December 1282. It was then that Andronikos II repudiated it and restored the anti-unionist orientation; subsequent controversies culminated, among other episodes, in the synod of 1285.

Similarly, the council established an ecclesiastical tenth for six years to finance the new crusade. Its implementation depended upon collection structures distributed across different territories and encountered varying difficulties according to region and the powers involved. The projected expedition was not carried out during Gregory X's pontificate and lost momentum after his death. The documentation establishes problems of implementation but does not justify the general claim that the tenth was not collected systematically or that most of the funds were diverted to ordinary expenditure without a specific regional analysis.

The ecclesiastical reforms of Lyon II had uneven scope because the council did not approve a general program addressing all of the problems that had been raised. The constitutions actually promulgated regulated specific matters, while other questions were left for later treatment by the curia. The assessment of the council must therefore distinguish between the breadth of the reforming agenda and the more limited content of the legislation ultimately preserved.

From the perspective of this study, one of the council's most important legacies lies in its form of ecclesial coordination, in addition to its concrete results. Lyon II shows Gregory X using conciliar convocation, negotiation, and legislation to articulate agreements among diverse actors. To describe this praxis as a "model of deliberation" is a historiographical synthesis and does not imply that the council was free of hierarchy, juridical coercion, or asymmetries of power. Interpreting this praxis as articulating authority permits retrospective comparison with later conciliar debates, but does not demonstrate that Lyon II doctrinally anticipated conciliarism or constituted a transition toward modern forms of ecclesial government. In this sense, Lyon II may be studied as a case in which pontifical direction was exercised through a great assembly, diplomatic negotiation, and legislation; the category of a "coordinating papacy" is analytical. Thus, despite the fragility of several of its immediate effects, the Second Council of Lyon may be read as an institutional landmark of Gregory X's pontificate both for its decisions and for the procedures of coordination it brought into operation. The assessment of this aspect as a "legacy" belongs to the interpretation advanced by this work.

Chapter 12. The Final Months of Gregory X and the Consolidation of His Legacy

The final phase of Gregory X's pontificate, from the close of the Second Council of Lyon in July 1274 to his death at Arezzo on 10 January 1276, was marked by the continuation of three major concerns: implementation of conciliar legislation, preparation for a future crusade, and maintenance of the diplomatic equilibria achieved with Byzantium and with the new King of the Romans. Union with

Michael VIII encountered strong opposition within the Byzantine Empire, but it did not formally collapse during Gregory's lifetime: the emperor maintained the unionist policy and from 1275 had in John Bekkos a patriarch favorable to the agreement. In the West, Gregory continued to promote the crusade and pacification among Christian powers while negotiating with Rudolf of Habsburg and containing Charles of Anjou's Eastern ambitions. His extended departure from Lyon and journey back through Alpine and Italian territories formed part of the ordinary activity of an itinerant curia and an intense diplomatic agenda. The pope died before the expedition to the Holy Land that he planned for the immediate future could be undertaken.

3.3.1 Return to Italy and Continuity of Government

After remaining in the Lyon region for several months following the council, Gregory X began the return journey to Italy. His itinerary passed through Vienne and Lausanne, where in October 1275 he met Rudolf of Habsburg, and then continued through Milan and other Italian cities to Arezzo. Along the way he continued to address the imperial question, preparations for the crusade, and implementation of conciliar decisions. *Ubi Periculum* was to apply specifically to future elections of the Roman pontiff: it regulated the assembly and enclosure of the cardinals after the pope's death, not episcopal elections generally. The revised collection of the constitutions of Lyon was promulgated by Gregory on 1 November 1274 and disseminated as conciliar legislation.

The composition of the College of Cardinals during Gregory X's final years was conditioned, among other factors, by the only documented consistory for the creation of cardinals during his pontificate, held on 3 June 1273 before the council. At that consistory Pedro Juliani, Vicedomino de Vicedominis, Bonaventure, Peter of Tarentaise, and Bertrand de Saint-Martin were created cardinals. Several of them subsequently participated in Lyon II. There is insufficient basis for asserting that after the council Gregory embarked upon a new meritocratic reorganization of the curia or created another cardinalatial body specifically intended to guarantee continuity of a reform program. What can be established is that he governed with a

college partly renewed by those five promotions and continued to use cardinals and legates in his political and ecclesiastical negotiations.

3.3.2 Difficulties of Implementation: Resistance and Reversal

As the process of implementing the conciliar resolutions began, obstacles became increasingly evident, undermining the effectiveness of the program promoted by Gregory X. The tensions were not new, but acquired renewed intensity after Lyon, when the pope attempted to translate theological and political consensus into normative structures and concrete decisions.

In the Byzantine world, the union proclaimed at Lyon (accepted by Michael VIII Palaiologos and defended from 1275 by Patriarch John Bekkos) encountered considerable opposition among sectors of the clergy, monasticism, and imperial society. The emperor nevertheless officially maintained the unionist policy throughout the remainder of his reign. Gregory X continued to support the agreement while he lived. At the same time, preparations for crusade remained active: the council had approved an ecclesiastical tenth for six years, and Gregory sought to pacify Christian rulers and gather support for a future expedition. Political and logistical difficulties were considerable, but it is inaccurate to present the project as already abandoned in 1275. Charles of Anjou retained his ambitions regarding Constantinople, although during Gregory's pontificate he remained constrained by the papal policy of union with Michael VIII.

Relations with Charles of Anjou remained delicate. Gregory X avoided an open rupture with the King of Sicily, but used negotiations with Byzantium and the restoration of imperial authority under Rudolf of Habsburg to prevent Angevin policy from wholly dominating the Italian and Mediterranean balance. This containment did not eliminate tensions, but it made it possible simultaneously to maintain formal union with Michael VIII, the feudal relationship with Charles, and rapprochement with the new King of the Romans until the pontiff's death.

3.3.3 Death at Arezzo and an Uncertain Succession

Gregory X died at Arezzo on 10 January 1276 while returning toward Rome. His death interrupted an agenda that remained open: the crusade had not departed, union with Byzantium depended to a great extent upon the political will of Michael VIII, and the question of Rudolf's future imperial coronation remained unresolved. The year 1276 then witnessed a rapid succession of pontiffs: Innocent V was elected on 21 January and died in June; Adrian V was elected in July and died in August; John XXI was elected in September and lived until May 1277. The election of Innocent V was the first conducted under the regime of *Ubi Periculum* and was resolved rapidly. Normative continuity, however, was not immediate: Adrian V suspended the constitution and John XXI revoked it, so its definitive consolidation would come later.

Adrian V suspended *Ubi Periculum* in 1276 with the intention of revising it and died before promulgating a replacement regime. John XXI subsequently revoked it later that same year. Its decisive restoration came under Celestine V in 1294, and Boniface VIII incorporated its provisions into the *Liber Sextus* in 1298. From that point onward, the logic of the enclosed conclave became established as one of the enduring elements of papal electoral law, although it continued to undergo later modifications.

3.3.4 Gregory X's Legacy: A Critical Assessment

Gregory X did not personally lead military campaigns, nor did he leave a systematic theological production comparable to that of the great scholastic authors. The distinctiveness of his pontificate lies above all in the combination of electoral reform, diplomacy, a crusading program, and conciliar convocation. His figure may be interpreted as that of a ruler oriented toward institutional stability: *Ubi Periculum* provided a juridical response to the succession crisis; Lyon II simultaneously articulated union with Byzantium, crusade, and questions of reform; and policy toward the Empire sought to restore recognizable royal authority after the interregnum. This institutional reading is an interpretation of his government as a whole and should not be presented as a literal characterization formulated by

contemporaries. The juridical reception of *Ubi Periculum* became enduring after its restoration at the end of the thirteenth century; other connections with later conciliarism, by contrast, require specific textual demonstration.

Chapter 13. Memory, Reception, and Confirmation of Gregory X's Cult: Between Conciliar Politics and Curial Historiography

Across the centuries, the figure of Gregory X has undergone a historiographical trajectory marked by oscillation between relatively discreet reception and institutional reclamation. His pontificate was brief and did not generate a universal hagiography comparable to that of other saintly pontiffs, but an early local cultic memory did exist, especially at Arezzo and also in environments connected with Piacenza, Lyon, and Liège. His normative legacy and style of government further allowed his figure to be reread and reassessed in later ecclesiological and juridical contexts.

This chapter explores the forms of reception, memory, and recovery of Gregory X from his death in 1276 to Clement XI's confirmation in 1713 of his cult *ab immemorabili*. The documentation requires a distinction between juridical, historiographical reception and a local cult that arose early, especially in cities connected with his life such as Piacenza, Lyon, Liège, and Arezzo.

First, an immediate and medieval phase of reception (thirteenth to fourteenth centuries), in which two memories coexisted: on the one hand, a local cult that developed early in several cities associated with Gregory X; on the other, an institutional memory associated with *Ubi Periculum*, the Second Council of Lyon, and his diplomatic activity.

Second, the juridical-institutional memory of Gregory X remained linked above all to *Ubi Periculum* and Lyon II. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, conciliarist debates developed theories concerning the relationship among pope, council, and ecclesial community in a different historical context, especially during and after the Western Schism. This tradition permits retrospective comparisons with certain features of Gregory X's government, but

without explicit documentary passages it should not be asserted that authors such as Jean Gerson or Pierre d'Ailly directly used him as a model of a pope subordinated to the council.

Third, a more intensive hagiographical and disciplinary recovery occurred in the modern period. Piacenza and Arezzo promoted his memory and submitted requests for canonization, while the Roman Curia examined a cult regarded as being of long duration. In 1713 Clement XI confirmed this cult *ab immemorabili*, a procedure equivalent to equipollent beatification and distinct from a modern process begun *de novo*. The episode must be situated within the post-Tridentine ecclesiastical context of the early eighteenth century.

4.1.1 Early Cult and Continuity of Memory

Gregory X's memory acquired a cultic dimension relatively soon after his death, especially in Piacenza, Lyon, Liège, and Arezzo. His body remained associated with the cathedral of Arezzo, where a marble mausoleum was later installed, while both Arezzo and Piacenza promoted initiatives connected with his canonization. This local cult never attained a universal diffusion comparable to that of other saintly pontiffs, but it precludes speaking of a total absence of veneration or of a memory exclusively juridical in nature. In parallel, Gregory was remembered for his electoral legislation and Lyon II, so devotional and institutional memory coexisted from an early stage. The rapid succession of pontiffs after 1276 and the partial reversal of some of his measures limited the political continuity of his program, but did not erase this dual reception.

4.1.2 Immediate Reception of the Pontificate (1276–1300)

Despite the brevity of his pontificate, Gregory X's reception was multiple. In 1276 Innocent V, Adrian V, and John XXI succeeded one another. *Ubi Periculum* was applied in the election of Innocent V; Adrian V suspended the constitution and John XXI revoked it, before Celestine V restored it in 1294 and Boniface VIII incorporated it into the *Liber Sextus* in 1298. At the same time, Gregory's personal

memory was not reduced to law: a local cult developed in cities associated with his career. Politically, the pope's death weakened projects such as the crusade and altered the equilibrium with Byzantium and Charles of Anjou. His medieval reception therefore combined a memory of sanctity, moral recognition, and the persistence of some of his institutional innovations.

4.1.3 Confirmation of the Cult in 1713

In 1713, during the pontificate of Clement XI, the Holy See confirmed Gregory X's cult *ab immemorabili*. This was not the late creation of a previously nonexistent devotion, but papal recognition of a long-standing local veneration, particularly associated with Arezzo and Piacenza. Gregory's tomb in the cathedral of Arezzo and the memory preserved in cities connected with his life had sustained that tradition. The confirmation of 1713 gave liturgical consolidation to a pre-existing cult and explains why Gregory X is commonly numbered among the blessed pontiffs.

4.1.4 Modern Historiographical Representations

Modern representations of Gregory X have changed as research has shifted from grand narratives of the papacy toward monographic studies. In general historiography of the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century, his pontificate often appeared as a brief episode between larger conflicts of papal monarchy. Ludovico Gatto's research altered that scale by treating the Gregorian quinquennium as a political unit in its own right. Since then, specialization has made it possible to reconstruct his diplomatic networks, crusading objectives, and the functioning of Lyon II with much greater precision, although it has also produced a bibliography fragmented by topic.

The diplomatic and crusading line of research has as its central points of reference the works of Deno J. Geanakoplos, Jean Richard, and, more recently, Philip B. Baldwin. Geanakoplos situated the union of Lyon within the politics of Michael VIII and Byzantine-Latin relations; Richard placed papal action within the history of Eastern missions and crusades; Baldwin reconstructed Gregory's crusading

program as a sustained policy from the beginning of the pontificate. Taken together, this tradition requires union with Byzantium and crusade to be treated as concrete and documentable policies, rather than as mere expressions of an abstract papal universalism.

Conciliar and juridical history constitutes a second specialized core. Franchi, Kuttner, and Roberg make it possible to study Lyon II through its documentation, its constitutions, and its actual development; the historiography of canon law, for its part, situates *Ubi Periculum* within the evolution of papal electoral legislation. This body of scholarship supports the institutional importance of Gregory's measures, but does not in itself demonstrate the existence of a unitary program of "constitutionalizing" the papacy. Such unity is a synthetic hypothesis that must, if appropriate, be inferred from the convergence of legislation, governmental practice, and diplomacy.

Studies of papal monarchy, law, and conciliarism (from Ullmann and Tierney to Pennington and Oakley) provide the conceptual framework for comparing Gregorian praxis with broader debates over regulated authority, representation, and juridical limits. They must, however, be used as context rather than as evidence that Gregory X was directly adopted by later conciliarism. More recent research on papacy and Empire has also reinforced a less linear reading of the thirteenth century, attentive to negotiation and cooperation as well as to conflict. Together with Ditchfield's work on the pontiff's modern memory, this historiographical development makes it possible to locate the present book at a precise intersection: its novelty does not lie in rescuing an unknown pope, but in integrating fields that usually remain separate and subjecting that integration to an explicit institutional hypothesis.

4.1.5 A Pontiff for Times of Structural Reform

As an exercise in contemporary reception, not as a description of medieval self-understanding-Gregory X may be used to think through the role of norm, deliberation, and diplomacy in contexts of crisis. His pontificate did not completely transform the Church or guarantee the success of the crusade or union with Byzantium, but it left an electoral reform with a long juridical reception and a conciliar

experience of substantial scope. The category of “institutional leadership” summarizes this combination of procedure, negotiation, and continuity; it is a tool of the historian, not a Gregorian doctrine. Its comparative usefulness lies precisely in showing that medieval authority could be exercised through juridical structures and political coordination while remaining hierarchical and primatial.

Chapter 14. Gregory X and His Place in the Theory of Pontifical Power

Gregory X’s pontificate may be read as a singular case within the historical development of the medieval papacy. It stands out neither for its duration (barely five years) nor for a leading role in the great theological or political conflicts of the thirteenth century. The specificity emphasized in this work lies in the way Gregory articulated authority, law, and diplomacy. To interpret this combination as a model oriented toward institutional stabilization is the author’s analytical construction, not an explicit formula of the sources. Gregory X was not a doctrinaire pope, nor an advocate of plenitudo potestatis in maximalist form. Neither was he a conciliarist *avant la lettre*. His position belongs rather to a historical and doctrinal interstice: he governed during a period of political fragmentation, redefinition of the papal role, and crisis of institutional legitimacy. In response to that setting, he chose not so much to impose as to structure, not so much to confront as to coordinate. His governmental program was not a closed doctrinal corpus but a series of normative, logistical, and deliberative devices aimed at reconfiguring the functioning of the Church as an organized system of power. This chapter reads his pontificate through the principal medieval currents of thought concerning pontifical power, with particular attention to the tension between the monarchical (theocratic model) which identifies the pope as vicarius Christi endowed with full and unrestricted power, and the conciliar, collegial model, which subordinates pontifical authority to broader deliberative structures such as councils or the College of Cardinals. From this perspective, the analysis considers Gregory’s normative acts (such as *Ubi Periculum*), his multilateral diplomatic style, and later readings of his figure by canonists, conciliarists, and

ecclesiologists. The underlying question is whether Gregory X embodied an “intermediate” form of exercising pontifical power (neither absolutist nor deliberative in a strict sense) or whether, instead, his style anticipated a systemic and rational form of papacy that renounced performative sacrality in favor of legitimacy derived from effective and collegial governance. This approach also makes it possible to reconsider his place in the political historiography of the papacy, where different doctrinal traditions have recovered his figure, sometimes as a symbol of moderation, elsewhere as a precedent for canonical institutionalism, and in certain cases as the lost model of a functional papacy in times of pluralism.

4.2.1 The Pontiff as Moderator: Beyond Plenitudo Potestatis

During the thirteenth century, papal theory reached one of its highest levels of conceptual elaboration with the consolidation of the principle of plenitudo potestatis, which attributed to the pope the plenitude of spiritual power (*plenitudo potestatis spiritualis*) and, by derivation, an indirect authority over temporal realities (*auctoritas indirecta in temporalibus*). This model, articulated theologically by Innocent III (1198–1216) and systematized juridically by Innocent IV (1243–1254), rested upon the idea that the pope, as *vicarius Christi*, exercised hierarchical supremacy over the entire Christian world, not only over the Church but also, under certain conditions, over secular sovereigns.

This theocratic scheme had a twofold foundation: on the one hand, the authority attributed to the pope as successor of Peter and representative of Christ; on the other, the development of canon law and pontifical claims to intervene in the Christian order. The thirteenth century reinforced this centralization, especially after the Decretals of Gregory IX (1234). Gregory X did not formulate a doctrinal critique of plenitudo potestatis, nor did he renounce intervention in temporal affairs: he acted directly in the imperial question, in conflicts among Italian powers, and in relations with Charles of Anjou, as well as negotiating with monarchs and Michael VIII Palaiologos. What distinguished his pontificate was the combination of this authority with juridical, conciliar, and diplomatic instruments. The promotion of a

solution to the imperial interregnum, recognition of Rudolf of Habsburg, negotiation with Byzantium, convocation of Lyon II, and regulation of papal election reveal an active government, not a withdrawal from politics. The interpretation advanced in this book therefore does not rest upon any supposed abstention by Gregory X, but upon the weight he accorded to procedures, negotiation, and normative regulation within the effective exercise of papal authority.

4.2.2 The Council as an Exercise of Shared Power

Gregory X's convocation, organization, and direction of the Second Council of Lyon (1274) may be read as an operation of functional reconfiguration of pontifical power. Rather than conceiving the council as an instrument for the unidirectional ratification of papal will, as Innocent III had done at Lateran IV (1215) or Innocent IV at Lyon I (1245) Gregory X employed the event as a device of collegial articulation in which authority was not merely imposed but negotiated, distributed, and shared.

The choice of Lyon as venue offered logistical and diplomatic advantages for an assembly intended to bring together Western and Eastern participants. The council demonstrably addressed union with the Greek Church, preparation for crusade, ecclesiastical reform, and several juridical questions; its results included the profession of union presented by the envoys of Michael VIII and the constitutions promulgated by Gregory X, including *Ubi Periculum*. The breadth of the convocation and the presence of representatives of different powers permit Lyon II to be analyzed as an exercise of multilateral coordination, although this neither made the council an authority superior to the pope nor demonstrates that Gregory defended a conciliarist doctrine. The pontiff presided over and directed the assembly within the primatial conception of his time. Any comparison with the conciliarism of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries must therefore be formulated as a retrospective historiographical analogy, not as a direct doctrinal genealogy. Likewise, without specific textual passages, it is inappropriate to assert that Jean Gerson or Pierre d'Ailly cited Lyon II or Gregory X as an explicit precedent for their conciliar theories.

4.2.3 The Conclave and the Limitation of Succession Power

Gregory X's greatest institutional contribution to ecclesiological thought was the creation, through *Ubi Periculum*, of a closed, normatively regulated, and coercive procedure for the election of the pope. Although formally restrictive of the College of Cardinals, this measure implied an indirect limitation upon the power of succession: by structuring the process, it restricted the influence of external factions, political interests, and internal manipulation. In doctrinal terms, the measure reinforces a juridified vision of pontifical charisma: the Holy Spirit guides the election, but within a strict normative framework designed by institutional reason. It therefore represents a synthesis between divine providence and canonical rationality, in which law becomes a guarantor of legitimacy.

4.2.4 Modern Reception and Historiographical Reinterpretations

In the ultramontane narratives of the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century, pontiffs associated with doctrinal definitions, centralization, or political confrontation, among them Pius IX-occupied a much more visible place than Gregory X. His juridical and diplomatic profile, together with the absence of a major doctrinal corpus of his own, favored a more discreet presence in general histories of the papacy. Specialized research of recent decades has altered that image by reconstructing with greater precision the crusading policy, Lyon II, electoral legislation, and diplomatic networks of his pontificate.

This rereading permits the proposal, as an analytical category, of an "institutionalist" Gregory X: a pontiff whose historiographical interest lies particularly in procedures, negotiation, and continuity of government. The category is retrospective and does not amount to attributing to him modern concepts of governance or collegiality. His documentable legacy remains in concrete institutions and decisions; contemporary resonances belong to the comparative level.

4.2.6 The Comparative Test: Innocent IV and the Same Crisis without the Same Response

4.2.5 A Boundary Figure: Between the Gregorian Tradition and Later Conciliar Readings

Gregory X occupies a position at the historical boundary between two major phases of the medieval papacy. On the one hand, he inherited the Gregorian legacy, marked by institutional centralization, the rise of canon law as a language of ecclesiastical power, and a universalist vision of Christendom organized around the pope as moral rector of the Christian world. On the other, his praxis permits retrospective comparison with the conciliar and constitutional debates of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, when an ecclesiology of collegial equilibrium, shared authority between pope and council, and an incipient intra-ecclesial multilateralism in decision-making began to take shape.

Gregory X does not fit easily into typologies constructed around great theologians, charismatic pontiffs, or popes of confrontation. This study uses the expression “structuring pope” as a heuristic category to highlight the weight of electoral legislation, conciliar convocation, and diplomatic negotiation in his government. It does not argue that he formulated a constitutional doctrine or that his authority lacked the sacral and hierarchical components proper to the pontifical office. What can be documented is a pattern of juridical, conciliar, and diplomatic responses to concrete problems; to interpret that pattern as a form of institutional adaptation belongs to historiographical analysis.

4.2.6 The Comparative Test: Innocent IV and the Same Crisis without the Same Response

A category such as “structuring pope” or “institutionalist leadership” means nothing in isolation. If it is to carry analytical weight rather than function as praise, it must distinguish Gregory X from pontiffs who faced comparable problems and did something else. The thirteenth century supplies the control case, and it is a close one.

Innocent IV was elected on 25 June 1243, after a vacancy of eighteen months and six days. Nine cardinals remained; two had been imprisoned by Frederick II; the college was divided over how to treat the emperor and took some five weeks of deliberation at Anagni to

settle on a candidate. The structural failure was therefore not unknown to him. He had experienced, as Gregory later would, an interregnum long enough to expose the absence of any mechanism compelling the electors to decide. He responded to it with no electoral legislation whatever. No constitution, no deadline, no enclosure, no procedural remedy of any kind issued from a pontificate that lasted more than eleven years, and the vacancy of 1268–1271 became possible in part because nothing had been done after 1243.

The comparison extends to the councils. Both pontiffs convoked a general council at Lyon within a few years of a succession crisis; the resemblance ends there. Innocent IV summoned Lyon I in 1245 having fled an emperor who had seized papal territory, and he used the assembly to depose Frederick II at the session of 17 July, an act the fathers themselves regarded as unprecedented. Its twenty-two constitutions were of a strictly legal character concerning the judicial system; the council approved no canons on the reform of the Church or the discipline of the clergy. For the first time in the conciliar history of the medieval West, political business displaced spiritual and reforming business altogether. Lyon II, by contrast, was convoked without an emperor to depose, in a period of imperial vacancy that Gregory himself worked to close through the recognition of Rudolf of Habsburg, and its agenda placed union with the Greek Church, ecclesiastical reform, crusading finance, and electoral procedure on the same programmatic footing.

The difference is not one of ability or of intelligence. Innocent IV was among the most accomplished canonists ever to hold the office, incomparably better trained in law than Teobaldo Visconti. That is precisely what makes the comparison useful. Superior juridical learning did not produce institutional legislation, because Innocent's emergency was an adversary, and an adversary is answered by sentence, alliance, and deposition. Gregory's emergency was a procedure that had ceased to function, and a broken procedure is answered by a rule. What separates the two pontificates is not doctrine or competence but the identification of where the danger lay: in a person, or in a mechanism.

On this basis the category employed in this study can be stated with more precision, and with narrower claims. "Institutionalist" here

does not designate a theory of government that Gregory held, nor a superiority over his predecessors. It designates an observable difference of response under comparable stress: confronted with the collapse of pontifical succession, one pontiff legislated the procedure and the other did not. That difference is documented in the acts of both reigns. What may be inferred from it is that Gregory located the failure of 1268–1271 in the structure rather than in the men, and legislated accordingly. Whether he would have described his own conduct in those terms is not recorded, and the sources do not permit the attribution.

Chapter 15. Gregory X in Medieval Political Theory and the Conciliar Tradition

Gregory X's most secure legacy for the history of ecclesiastical government lies in the juridical continuity of *Ubi Periculum* and the memory of Lyon II. After its restoration by Celestine V and incorporation into the *Liber Sextus*, Gregorian electoral legislation became a stable component of the canonical tradition. It is a different matter to assert that the conciliarists of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries explicitly adopted Gregory X as a model: such reception must be demonstrated author by author and passage by passage. This chapter therefore retains a *longue durée* comparison among election, council, law, and authority, while separating demonstrable juridical continuity from retrospective doctrinal analogies.

4.3.1 Lyon II and Conciliarist Debates: A Retrospective Comparison

During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and especially during the Western Schism (1378–1417), theologians and jurists developed arguments intended to explain how the unity of the Church might be restored when papal authority was divided. Pierre d'Ailly, Jean Gerson, and other leading figures at Constance defended, with differing nuances, an extraordinary role for the general council in situations of crisis. The experience of Lyon II may retrospectively be compared with those debates because Gregory X governed through a

great council and because *Ubi Periculum* juridified papal election. It is not argued here, however, that d'Ailly, Gerson, or Jacques Almain expressly presented Gregory X as an embodiment of *potestas ordinata* without a primary citation demonstrating the claim. The relevant similarity is analytical: a strong pope who made use of conciliar and juridical procedures may be read historiographically alongside later discussions of regulated authority.

It is therefore more precise to speak of Gregory X as a comparative antecedent than as a figure “adopted” by conciliarism. His praxis offers material for thinking about the relationship among authority, norm, and deliberation; the existence of a direct conciliarist reception must be established separately through textual evidence.

4.3.2 *Ubi Periculum* as a Device for Limiting Power

Ubi Periculum occupied an enduring place in papal electoral law after its incorporation into the *Liber Sextus*. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the Church therefore inherited a legally regulated system of papal election that had in Gregory X's constitution one of its historical foundations. During the Western Schism and the councils of Constance and Basel, questions of election, representation, and authority acquired new centrality. The mere coexistence of these phenomena, however, does not prove that particular authors such as Johannes of Segovia, Panormitanus, or Nicholas of Cusa cited *Ubi Periculum* as evidence of conciliar superiority; such a claim requires verifiable passages.

From an interpretive perspective, *Ubi Periculum* may be read as an example of the juridification of a power of the highest importance: even the election of the pontiff became subject to prior rules, deadlines, enclosure, and sanctions. This characteristic permits comparison with later theories concerning Church government and the force of law. But the conclusion that the constitution established a “law over the pope,” or that it was used to justify conciliar reforms without papal ratification, does not automatically follow from the text of 1274 and should not be attributed to the conciliarists without specific documentation. The secure historical significance of *Ubi Periculum* is more concrete: it regulated the electoral college, survived

through canonical reception, and became one of the historical foundations of the conclave.

4.3.3 Gregory's Example in Treatises on Ecclesial Monarchy

Gregory X was not an author of political theory and left no doctrinal corpus that later thinkers were compelled to comment upon. Comparison with Marsilius of Padua or William of Ockham must therefore be formulated with caution. Both developed profound critiques of certain papal claims and reflected upon law, community, and authority; these categories permit their theories to be contrasted with Gregory X's institutional praxis. This work does not attribute to Marsilius a demonstrable indirect allusion to Gregory or to Ockham a classification of the pontiff among supposed "legal popes" without a precise textual reference.

The same applies to the conciliarist literature of the fifteenth century. It can be maintained that Gregory X's experience is compatible, in certain respects, with a later reading favorable to regulated authority and conciliar deliberation. The manuscript does not, however, present as fact the claim that the *Tractatus de potestate ecclesiastica* attributed to Gerson, or other treatises from his milieu, used Gregory X as an explicit counterexample to Boniface VIII or John XXII. Gregory's function in this chapter is therefore comparative and historiographical: a medieval case of institutional regulation that permits discussion, without conflation, of problems that conciliarism would later formulate in its own doctrinal terms.

4.3.4 Between Pontifical Monarchism and Constitutionalism

Gregory X occupies a position that cannot easily be reduced to an opposition between papal monarchism and conciliarism. He exercised papal authority fully, yet made conspicuous use of legislation, council, and negotiation. To speak of "pontifical constitutionalism" is therefore legitimate only as a historiographical analogy: the documentation does not demonstrate a conscious doctrine of papal

self-limitation. His usefulness for the political history of the Church lies in showing how primacy and juridical procedure could coexist within a single practice of government. As a contemporary term of comparison, the case permits discussion of the relationship among authority, norm, and deliberation without attributing to Gregory concepts such as synodality or constitutionalism that he did not formulate.

General Conclusion

Gregory X: Rationality, Reform, and Legitimacy in the High Middle Ages

This study has proposed an integrated reinterpretation of the pontificate of Gregory X (1271–1276). In light of the historiographical state of the question set out at the beginning, its claim to originality lies not in presenting an unknown pontiff or displacing well-established specialized scholarship, but in bringing those studies into relation. The research brings together problems that the literature has frequently treated sectorally (the Viterbo election, electoral legislation, Lyon II, the crusade, Byzantium, and relations with secular powers) and asks whether they can be understood as components of a single logic of institutional stabilization. Within this framework, Gregory is presented not as a mere interval between more influential papacies, but as a case of institutionalist leadership, a heuristic category used to emphasize the weight of regulation, negotiation, and institutional continuity in his government.

From his election during the longest papal election in history (the preeminent symbol of the collapse of the mechanism of pontifical succession) to the promulgation of the constitution *Ubi Periculum*, Gregory X may be characterized, in the interpretive terms of this work, as a reformer who was primarily institutional rather than doctrinal. The sequence of his principal decisions suggests a priority placed upon restoring the operability of ecclesiastical government through more stable normative procedures; the scope of that intention is inferred from legislation and practice, not from a systematic theory formulated by the pontiff.

The Second Council of Lyon (1274) constitutes the visible and programmatic core of his pontificate. The agenda and operation of Lyon II make it possible to analyze the council as a device of multilateral coordination under pontifical presidency, capable of integrating diplomacy with Byzantium, preparation for crusade, questions of reform, and normative production. In the interpretation advanced here, Gregory's government combined pontifical direction, normative structuring, conciliar deliberation, and diplomatic articulation; these elements coexisted and should not be placed in absolute opposition. At this point, his praxis admits retrospective comparison with problems that later conciliarism would formulate in different terms, without implying a doctrinal genealogy. Gregory acted within the primatial tradition of the papacy while simultaneously using juridical and conciliar procedures as instruments of government.

Throughout this work, we have argued that Gregory X offered a strategic and normative response to a threefold crisis:

1. the paralysis of the curial and electoral apparatus after the death of Clement IV,
2. the fragmentation of the ideal of universal Christendom, and
3. the geopolitical pressure of secular powers, particularly the hegemony of Charles of Anjou.

Although his pontificate did not fully resolve these challenges, it left concrete instruments for containing and reordering them, with uneven results according to each problem. He did so without messianic gestures or doctrinal ruptures, but through the durable architecture of norms, institutions, and consensus.

Gregory X's verifiable legacy survives directly in the juridical history of the conclave and, more broadly, in the memory of Lyon II, his crusading policy, and his Eastern diplomacy. Other connections with modern forms of deliberation, constitutionalism, or legitimacy belong to the comparative plane and must remain distinct from strict documentary continuity. This study therefore proposes moving beyond a purely transitional reading of his pontificate and employs the expression "architect of durability" as an interpretive synthesis of his emphasis on procedures and institutions, not as a category found in the sources. The book's historiographical contribution should

consequently be judged by the explanatory capacity of this integration: whether it makes it possible to understand together the reform of succession, the use of council, diplomacy, and crusading preparation without erasing the differences among these spheres. The result is not a demonstration of a theoretical system formulated by Gregory, but the proposal of a practical coherence reconstructed by the historian and subjected to the limits of the available evidence.

Appendix I – The Constitution Ubi Periculum (1274)

Latin Text, Annotated Translation, and Notes

Source: *Conciliorum Oecumenicorum Decreta*, ed. J. Alberigo, Bologna: EDB, 1973, pp. 279–284.

Introduction

The constitution Ubi Periculum was approved by the Second Council of Lyon on 16 July 1274, during its fifth session, and subsequently included by Gregory X in the collection of constitutions promulgated on 1 November. Its purpose was to put an end to the delays and irregularities that had characterized previous elections, especially the interregnum of 1268–1271, through strict regulation of the papal electoral procedure.

This text gave juridical form to a model of the enclosed conclave that, after subsequent suspensions, restorations, and modifications, became one of the fundamental antecedents of the modern papal electoral procedure. The official text, an English translation, and critical annotations are provided below.

Original Latin Text (Essential Extract)

Ubi periculum maius intenditur, ibi proculdubio est plenius consulendum...

...omnes convenient in palatio, in quo idem pontifex habitabat... conclave undique claudatur...

...nullus ad eosdem cardinales habeat accessum vel cum eis secrete loquendi facultatem...

...si infra tres dies... ecclesia provisa non fuerit... per quinque dies... uno solo ferculo sint contenti... quibus transactis, panis, vinum et aqua...

...si quis cardinalium conclave non intraverit, vel ingressus absque manifesta causa infirmitatis exierit, alii ad electionem libere procedant...

Annotated English Translation

“Where the danger is greater, there greater provision must undoubtedly be made...

[Interpretive reading: the text opens with a pastoral justification. Within the systemic framework used in this work, the prolonged interregnum may be analyzed as a threat to the continuity of ecclesial government.]

...all the cardinals shall assemble in the palace in which the pontiff resided... and the conclave shall be closed on all sides...

[Juridical datum and interpretation: a physical and juridical enclosure of the electoral college is codified here; describing it as the “birth” of the conclave is a historiographical synthesis.]

...no one shall have access to the cardinals or be permitted to speak secretly with them, except those summoned by the consent of all for matters concerning the election...

[The norm severely restricts access and external communication during the election; the effective extent of that isolation depended upon its implementation.]

...if a pope has not been elected within three days, for the following five days they shall be limited to a single dish at each meal; once that period has elapsed, only bread, wine, and water...

[The penalty for delay becomes juridical rule: dietary austerity as a mechanism of institutional pressure.]

...if a cardinal does not enter the conclave, or leaves it without manifest cause of illness, the others may proceed freely with the election...

[The norm does not establish an automatic excommunication here for leaving the conclave; it

regulates the continuity of the electoral process and the conditions for readmission.]

Critical Notes

The constitution *Ubi Periculum*, promulgated by Gregory X during the Second Council of Lyon (1274), must be understood within its immediate historical context: it was drafted as a direct response to the prolonged and ineffective Viterbo election (1268–1271), whose stalemate of almost three years constitutes the documented immediate antecedent of the reform and may, in analytical terms, be read as evidence of a functional crisis in the system of papal succession. In this sense, its scope exceeded immediate discipline: the norm established a procedure designed to reduce electoral delays and prevent further prolonged vacancies. To characterize this intervention as “structural” belongs to the interpretive level of this work.

From a juridical perspective, *Ubi Periculum* had binding force for papal election. After being applied in January 1276, it was suspended by Adrian V and revoked by John XXI; Celestine V restored it in 1294, and Boniface VIII incorporated its provisions into the *Liber Sextus* in 1298. Its conciliar approval and subsequent canonical reception explain its long-term importance.

With regard to its internal logic, the constitution may be interpreted as an institutional strategy imposing procedural discipline upon the College of Cardinals and reducing certain channels of communication and external interference. By physically enclosing the electors, limiting their communications, and conditioning their material environment, *Ubi Periculum* sought to restrict channels of influence during the election; the text does not by itself permit the inference of an explicit theory of “freedom of conscience” in the modern sense. This tension between formal coercion and spiritual freedom is one of the most characteristic elements of medieval juridical thought.

Finally, the historical impact of *Ubi Periculum* was profound but not linear. The constitution provided the core of the enclosed, conclave model, although it was suspended and revoked soon afterward and, following its restoration at the end of the thirteenth century, the electoral procedure continued to undergo numerous modifications. The modern conclave preserves the principle of secluding the electoral body, but it cannot without qualification be identified with the exact regime of 1274.

Appendix II – Profession of Faith and Proclamation of Union with the Greek Church (1274)

Documentary Synthesis and Historical Notes

Documentary basis: documentation of the Second Council of Lyon and the profession of faith presented on behalf of Emperor Michael VIII Palaiologos.

Introduction

The union between Rome and Constantinople proclaimed at the Second Council of Lyon was the result of prolonged negotiations between Gregory X and the Byzantine emperor Michael VIII Palaiologos. The imperial delegation that arrived in Lyon in June 1274 presented letters and a profession of faith compatible with Roman demands. The union was solemnly proclaimed at the fourth session, on 6 July, but it did not amount to a general synodal reception by the Byzantine Church, where opposition remained considerable.

The agreement had a strong political dimension: Michael VIII sought to neutralize the threat posed by Charles of Anjou to Constantinople, while Gregory X regarded ecclesiastical reunification as a prerequisite for a common Christian policy and for the preparation of a new crusade.

Principal Content of the Agreement

The Byzantine delegation presented at Lyon the imperial adherence to a profession of faith that accepted the principal doctrinal demands formulated by Rome.

Among these was the Latin doctrine concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son, a question associated with the Filioque.

The profession likewise acknowledged the supreme and full primacy of the Roman Church within the universal Church, in the terms required by the Latin side.

The documentation associated with the imperial profession also included formulations concerning purgatory and the sacraments that were consistent with Roman doctrine.

Scope of the Proclamation

On 6 July 1274, during the fourth session of the council, George Akropolites declared, on behalf of Michael VIII, acceptance of the union. The Greek delegation took part in the liturgical ceremonies, and Rome presented the agreement as the restoration of ecclesiastical communion.

The union did not entail the general abolition of Byzantine liturgical rites. The core of the Roman demand centered on the doctrinal profession and the recognition of papal primacy.

The imperial adherence, however, did not represent the consensus of the entire Byzantine episcopate or monastic establishment.

Anti-unionist opposition continued after the council and compelled Michael VIII actively to sustain the policy of union within the Empire.

John Bekkos, who did not participate at Lyon as patriarch, was elevated to the patriarchate of Constantinople in 1275 and subsequently became one of the principal theological defenders of the union.

The union remained officially tied to the policy of Michael VIII for the rest of his reign, although its effective implementation was limited and contentious.

After the emperor's death in December 1282, Andronikos II abandoned the unionist policy and restored the anti-unionist line.

The Union of Lyon was therefore real on the diplomatic and juridical plane agreed upon by its protagonists, but fragile in its ecclesial reception and dependent on political conditions that did not survive Michael VIII.

Critical Notes

The proclamation at Lyon should not be described as a simple “submission” of the entire Greek Church, nor as a reconciliation fully received by Byzantine communities. It was an agreement promoted by the emperor and accepted by his envoys in the face of broad internal opposition. This distinction is necessary in order to separate the juridical, diplomatic act from its effective reception.

Nor did the union end in 1276 with the death of Gregory X. Michael VIII officially maintained the unionist policy until 1282; the decisive rupture occurred under Andronikos II. Its subsequent trajectory confirms that Lyon’s ceremonial success did not translate into stable ecclesial reunification.

Appendix III – Gregory X and Rudolf of Habsburg (1273–1274)

Documentary Synthesis, Political Context, and Diplomatic Notes

Documentary basis: papal correspondence and regesta relating to Rudolf of Habsburg and the prince, electors.

Introduction

The election of Rudolf I of Habsburg as King of the Romans in 1273 brought the prolonged imperial interregnum to an end. Gregory X had pressed the prince, electors to resolve the vacancy and favored a solution that would restore effective royal authority without reproducing the confrontation between papacy and Empire that had marked the Hohenstaufen period.

The relationship between Gregory X and Rudolf developed through a sequence of messages, commitments, and negotiations. It should not be reduced to a single letter of investiture: the election fell within the competence of the prince, electors, and papal recognition was subsequently formalized during the Council of Lyon in 1274. The projected imperial coronation did not take place during Gregory X's lifetime.

Synthesis of the Documentary Evidence

The correspondence records papal satisfaction at the ending of the imperial vacancy and the expectation that the new king would contribute to restoring peace within the Empire.

Gregory linked his recognition of Rudolf to the protection of the rights of the Church and to the stabilization of relations between royal power and the Apostolic See.

The negotiations included commitments concerning territories and rights claimed by the Church, as well as the role Rudolf was expected to play in the broader project of pacifying Christendom.

Preparation for a new crusade was likewise a central element of the relationship. Rudolf expressed his willingness to take the cross, in keeping with the international program promoted by Gregory X.

During the Council of Lyon in 1274, the pontiff formally recognized Rudolf as King of the Romans, reinforcing the institutional normalization of the Empire after the interregnum.

The project envisaged a future imperial coronation, but the negotiations were not concluded before Gregory X's death in January 1276.

The relationship between the two should therefore be understood as a progressive political and juridical negotiation, rather than as an imperial investiture conferred by a single papal missive.

Critical Notes

The documentation concerning Rudolf reveals a papal policy of conditional recognition, territorial negotiation, and the pursuit of peace. Gregory X intervened actively in resolving the imperial question, but Rudolf was elected by the prince, electors and crowned King of the Romans at Aachen; he never received the imperial coronation. The episode illustrates the papacy's capacity to influence imperial politics without turning royal election into an act of papal designation.

Appendix IV – Chronology of the Pontificate of Gregory X (1271–1276)

Source: chronological synthesis of the documentation and references used in the main body of the book.

(Date Event Comment)

- 29 November 1268 Death of Pope Clement IV
The longest interregnum in papal history begins.
- 1 September 1271 Election of Teobaldo Visconti as pope by a commission of six cardinals entrusted with the tractatio
The pope, elect was not a cardinal, held minor orders, and was in Acre.
- 27 March 1272 Coronation of Gregory X at St Peter's, Rome
Teobaldo had previously received the requisite orders and episcopal consecration.
- 31 March 1272 Convocation of a general council
Gregory initiates the process that would culminate in the Second Council of Lyon.
- 3 June 1273 Creation of five cardinals by Gregory X
Among them Pedro Juliani (the future John XXI), Bonaventure, and Peter of Tarentaise (the future Innocent V).
- 1273 Election and royal coronation of Rudolf of Habsburg
The election ends the imperial interregnum; Gregory had urged the electors to reach a settlement.
- 7 May 1274 Opening of the Second Council of Lyon
An assembly of exceptionally broad participation begins; the Byzantine delegation would arrive in Lyon on 24 June.
- 6 July 1274 Proclamation of union with the Greek Church
The envoys of Michael VIII formally accept the terms agreed with Rome, including Roman primacy.
- 16 July 1274 Conciliar approval of *Ubi Periculum*
The fifth session sanctions the electoral regime that would be included in the collection promulgated by Gregory X on 1 November.
- September 1274 Papal recognition of Rudolf of Habsburg
Within the Lyon framework, Gregory

formalizes his acceptance of the new King of the Romans and continues negotiations for a future imperial coronation.

- 10 January 1276 Death of Gregory X at Arezzo
 His body is buried in the local cathedral.
- 1713 Clement XI confirms Gregory X's cult ab
 immemorabili Papal recognition of a long-standing local
 veneration.

Appendix V – Tomb, Iconography, and Visual Memory of Gregory X

1. The Tomb of Gregory X at Arezzo

Gregory X died on 10 January 1276 at Arezzo and was buried in the city. His memory became closely associated with the cathedral of Arezzo, whose construction began shortly thereafter and which received a substantial testamentary bequest from the pontiff. The Gothic funerary monument now preserved in the Duomo postdates his death and is generally dated to the late thirteenth or early fourteenth century. The remains of the blessed pontiff are currently preserved in the cathedral, displayed in an urn in the apsidal chapel that bears his name.

Current location: Cattedrale dei Santi Pietro e Donato, Arezzo, Tuscany, Italy.

Dating and conservation:

- The funerary monument preserved in the right nave should not simply be identified with the original burial of 1276: it was produced later, in the context of the new cathedral.
- Its artistic chronology is generally placed between the final decades of the thirteenth century and the beginning of the fourteenth.
- The material history of the tomb includes transfers and modifications; no specific sequence of restorations is attributed here without particular documentary evidence.

2. Funerary Iconography: Formal Description

The monument presents a recumbent effigy of the pontiff beneath a Gothic baldachin-like structure. The sculptural program of the sarcophagus incorporates Christological and apostolic motifs, including the Agnus Dei and figures of the Evangelists. These elements situate the memory of Gregory X within the conventional language of ecclesiastical funerary sculpture of the late Duecento and early Trecento.

Decoration and Identification

The monument visually identifies the deceased as a pontiff through the papal effigy and the Christian iconographic context.

This appendix does not reproduce a Latin inscription as a literal quotation without first establishing its epigraphic reading and date.

Verifiable iconographic elements:

- Recumbent effigy of the pontiff upon the sarcophagus.
- Reliefs depicting the Agnus Dei and the Evangelists on the front of the monument.
- Baldachin and Gothic ornamentation characteristic of the monumental configuration subsequent to the death of Gregory X.

3. Representations and Later Visual Memory

In addition to the funerary monument, the cathedral of Arezzo preserves other visual references to Gregory X associated with the pontiff's local memory.

- Within the cathedral complex, he is represented together with Bishop Donatus in a Marian image known as the Madonna del Latte.
- The funerary monument itself constitutes the principal surviving medieval representation of Gregory X at Arezzo.
- No specific miniatures are attributed here to particular codices without verifiable catalog identification.

The visual memory of Gregory X at Arezzo became especially associated with his death in the city, his burial, and his relationship to the construction of the new cathedral.

4. Local Cult and Liturgical Memory

The confirmation of the cult ab immemorabili by Clement XI in 1713 consolidated a veneration already established in Arezzo, Piacenza, and other cities associated with Gregory X. His body is preserved in the cathedral of Arezzo, and his liturgical memory remained principally associated with local settings. The cult never attained a universal diffusion comparable to that of other saintly pontiffs, but neither did it arise ex novo in the eighteenth century.

5. Historical and Heritage Significance

The funerary monument and the preservation of Gregory X's remains constitute significant evidence of the pontiff's local memory and of papal funerary culture between the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. His presence at Arezzo also documents the close relationship that developed among the figure of the pope, the new cathedral, and the local cult that emerged after his death.

Appendix VI – Glossary of Medieval Terms

Auctoritas: From the Latin *auctoritas*. Authority understood not simply in terms of power (*potestas*), but as recognized legitimacy. In the medieval ecclesiastical context, it refers to the moral and symbolic authority of the pope or of conciliar decisions.

Conclave: From the Latin *cum clave*, “under lock and key.” The system of enclosing the College of Cardinals for the election of the pope, institutionalized by Gregory X in *Ubi Periculum* (1274) after the crisis of the interregnum. It entails physical seclusion and normative restrictions intended to safeguard the independence of the election.

Roman Curia: The ensemble of central institutions governing the Church. It includes judicial, diplomatic, and administrative bodies. In the thirteenth century, the Curia played a decisive political role but faced accusations of bureaucratization, simony, and nepotism.

Decretals: Papal letters possessing normative force, compiled from the twelfth century onward as a juridical source of canon law. The Decretals supplement and update Gratian’s *Decretum* and constitute a foundation of the *Corpus Iuris Canonici*.

Episcopate: The body of bishops of the Church. In councils, it represents the collegial dimension of ecclesiastical government. Its relationship with the papacy was central to debates concerning conciliarism and primacy.

Filioque: Latin expression (“and from the Son”) added to the *Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed* by the Latin Church. Its inclusion was one of the theological causes of the schism with the Eastern Orthodox Church. Gregory X sought to restore communion despite this difference at the Second Council of Lyon.

Grace: In medieval Christian thought, the divine gift that legitimizes and sanctifies. Within the religious field (in Bourdieu’s terms), the “symbolic distribution of grace” structures hierarchies and conflicts within the Church.

Interregnum: A period in which there is no reigning pope. The interregnum of 1268–1271 was the longest in medieval history and demonstrated the need for structural reform of the succession process.

Legatus: A papal envoy entrusted with diplomatic or judicial functions. Teobaldo Visconti collaborated in papal missions in Europe (including the English mission alongside the legate Ottobono Fieschi) but should not be described as a papal legate in the Holy Land. His presence in Acre was that of a cleric and crusader with diplomatic experience.

Ordo: A multivalent term that may signify ecclesiastical order, social order, or the hierarchical structure of the Christian universe. It is central to understanding the medieval vision of the world as a harmonious ensemble of hierarchies.

Plenitudo potestatis: “Fullness of power.” A doctrine developed by Innocent III, holding that the pope possesses supreme authority in spiritual matters and, derivatively, indirect power over temporal affairs.

Roman primacy: The doctrine affirming the primacy of the bishop of Rome within the universal Church. It was one of the central points of controversy between Rome and Constantinople. Gregory X did not renounce primacy, and the agreement of Lyon in 1274 included its formal recognition by the Byzantine imperial representatives.

Simony: The purchase or sale of spiritual goods or ecclesiastical offices, condemned as a grave abuse and canonical offense. It was among the problems repeatedly addressed by medieval ecclesiastical legislation and discipline.

Ubi Periculum: Constitution promulgated by Gregory X in 1274 during the Second Council of Lyon. It regulated papal election through enclosure, restrictions on communication, and progressive austerity measures. The principle of enclosure and the formal regulation of the conclave enjoyed lasting continuity, although the specific material provisions (including dietary restrictions) were modified or abandoned in later legislation.

Appendix VII – Documentary Synthesis of the Correspondence of Gregory X (1272–1275)

The following entries summarize documentary clusters within papal correspondence relating to Rudolf of Habsburg, Michael VIII Palaiologos, Charles of Anjou, and the application of *Ubi Periculum*. They are not presented as transcriptions or literal translations: they provide a synthetic account of the historical content that can be established with confidence from the documentation cited in the book.

1. Gregory X and Rudolf of Habsburg (1273–1274)

Documentary basis: papal correspondence and regesta relating to Rudolf of Habsburg and the prince, electors.

Gregory X intervened actively to induce the prince, electors to bring the imperial interregnum to an end. Following Rudolf's election in 1273, the relationship between the two was structured through negotiations concerning the rights of the Church, the pacification of the Empire, and papal recognition.

Gregory X's formal recognition of Rudolf took place in 1274, in the context of the Council of Lyon. The negotiations included commitments concerning papal rights and the future imperial coronation.

Rudolf also expressed his willingness to participate in the crusading project. The imperial coronation, however, did not take place during the pontificate of Gregory X.

2. Gregory X and Michael VIII Palaiologos after Lyon (1274–1275)

Documentary basis: papal correspondence relating to ecclesiastical union with Byzantium.

After the proclamation of union at Lyon, Gregory X maintained diplomatic pressure on Michael VIII to give practical effect to the communion agreed with

Rome and to consolidate within the Empire acceptance of the negotiated terms.

The unionist policy met strong opposition among sectors of the Byzantine clergy and society. Papal correspondence therefore reflects concern over the practical implementation of the agreement and the continuity of the union, which remained officially linked to the government of Michael VIII until his death in 1282.

3. Gregory X and Charles of Anjou concerning Byzantium (1274–1275)

Documentary basis: regesta and papal correspondence relating to Charles of Anjou and the Byzantine Empire.

The union proclaimed at Lyon altered the political framework of Angevin projects against Constantinople. As long as Michael VIII remained in communion with Rome, Gregory X sought to prevent an offensive by Charles of Anjou from destroying the agreement reached with Byzantium.

The relationship between the pope and Charles was therefore one of simultaneous cooperation and tension: Gregory did not break with the King of Sicily, but subordinated his eastern plans to the papal policy of union and pacification.

4. Promulgation and First Application of Ubi Periculum

Documentary basis: constitutions of the Second Council of Lyon and documentation concerning the papal elections of 1276.

Ubi Periculum was approved during the fifth session at Lyon, on 16 July 1274, and included in the collection of constitutions promulgated by Gregory X on 1 November of that year.

The norm regulated future papal elections through the enclosure of the cardinals, restrictions on contact with the outside world, and progressive austerity in the event of delay.

Its first application took place after the death of Gregory X, in January 1276, and led to the rapid election of Peter of Tarentaise as Innocent V.

Appendix VIII – Ubi Periculum and the Electoral Tradition at the Councils of Constance (1414–1418) and Basel (1431–1449)

This appendix examines the relationship between Gregory X's electoral reform and the ecclesiological debates of the fifteenth century. The historical continuity of the conclave is beyond dispute, but it should not be confused with a direct textual reception of *Ubi Periculum* in every conciliar debate. Accordingly, a distinction is drawn here between the electoral tradition derived from Gregorian legislation and the later controversies concerning the authority of the council.

1. The Council of Constance and the Exceptional Election of 1417

Contextual source: decrees and acts of the Council of Constance relating to reform and the election of Martin V.

The Council of Constance resolved the Western Schism through an exceptional electoral procedure. The election of 1417 was not limited to the College of Cardinals: the twenty-three cardinals were joined by thirty delegates of the council, six from each of the five represented nations.

Election of Martin V:

The body of fifty-three electors chose Oddone Colonna, Martin V, on 11 November 1417. The procedure retained the logic of a closed election but extraordinarily altered the customary composition of the electorate.

Constance therefore cannot simply be described as a literal and complete reaffirmation of *Ubi Periculum*. Rather, the episode shows that the conclave tradition remained the frame of reference while the council adapted the rules to an exceptional ecclesial crisis.

2. The Council of Basel and the Debate over Conciliar Authority (1431–1449)

Contextual source: acts and decrees of the Council of Basel concerning conciliar continuity and the conflict with Eugene IV.

Basel resumed and radicalized questions raised at Constance concerning the authority of the general council vis-à-vis the pope. At the center of the controversy was the relationship among papal primacy, ecclesiastical reform, and the authority of the conciliar assembly.

No textual quotation of *Ubi Periculum* is attributed here to Basel without secure documentary identification.

Relationship to the Reform of Gregory X:

Gregory X's legislation may be retrospectively compared with these debates because it transformed papal election into a juridically regulated procedure. That comparison, however, does not in itself demonstrate a doctrinal lineage from Lyon II to fifteenth-century conciliarism.

Likewise, it should not be asserted that Jean Gerson, Pierre d'Ailly, or other conciliarists used Gregory X as an explicit precedent without adducing the specific passage that proves it.

3. Canonical Legacy of Ubi Periculum

After its first application in 1276, *Ubi Periculum* was suspended by Adrian V and revoked by John XXI. Celestine V restored its provisions in 1294, and Boniface VIII incorporated them into the *Liber Sextus* in 1298.

Following that canonical reception, the principle of enclosing the electoral body became a lasting element of papal election, although its specific rules were repeatedly modified.


The election of 1417 precisely confirms this capacity for adaptation: the council preserved the closed form of election but exceptionally expanded the electoral body.

Basel belongs to another dimension of the problem: the dispute over the authority of council and pope. Its importance should not be used as automatic evidence of an explicit reception of *Ubi Periculum*.

Ubi Periculum occupies a central place in the history of papal electoral law. Its juridical continuity makes it possible to study the progressive institutionalization of the conclave, but a direct connection with fifteenth-century conciliar constitutionalism requires specific textual evidence and cannot be assumed.

Appendix IX – Institutional and Geopolitical Map (ca. 1270)

Latin Christendom and International Relations in the Age of Gregory X



This conceptual map synthesizes the political and ecclesiastical context of the Mediterranean during the pontificate of Gregory X (1271–1276). It highlights the principal centers of Christian power (Rome, Lyon, Acre, Constantinople), the areas of conflict and diplomacy (Byzantium, the Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia, the Mamluk Sultanate), and the routes of communication between East and West.

This resource is intended to provide the reader with a panoramic and integrated view of the geopolitical and normative setting within

which Gregory X articulated his papal policy, and serves as a visual aid to the historical analysis developed in the central chapters of this work.

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CCSL Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina. Turnhout: Brepols.

CIC Corpus Iuris Canonici, ed. Emil Friedberg, 2 vols. Leipzig, 1879–1881.

Liber Sextus Liber Sextus Decretalium of Boniface VIII (1298), in CIC, vol. II.

Mansi Sacrorum Conciliorum Nova et Amplissima Collectio, ed. Giovanni Domenico Mansi. Venice, 1780.

MGH Monumenta Germaniae Historica.

MGH Epp. saec. XIII MGH, Epistolae saeculi XIII e regestis pontificum Romanorum.

MGH LL MGH, Leges (Legum sectio).

MGH Libelli MGH, Libelli de lite imperatorum et pontificum.

MGH SS MGH, Scriptores.

Reg. Clem. IV Les registres de Clément IV (1265–1268), ed. Édouard Jordan. Paris, 1893–1945.

Reg. Greg. X Les registres de Grégoire X (1272–1276) et de Jean XXI (1276–1277), ed. Jean Guiraud and E. Cadier. Paris, 1892–1960.

RS Rolls Series (Rerum Britannicarum Medii Aevi Scriptores). London: HMSO.

ST Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Editio Leonina. Rome, 1891–1906.

X Decretales Gregorii IX (Liber Extra), in CIC, vol. II.

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