Abstract

In essence, international climate negotiation is a serious and responsible global effort, despite various conflicts, to establish a rational international climate regime. In essence, tackling climate changes is leading the globe to actualize sustainable development of all humankind along the low-carbon, green, and cyclic-development path. Thus, climate negotiation should be driving all parties to achieve a global climate regime arrangement in a constructive way. Therefore, this paper suggests focusing on the following three major recommendations: early developed countries take the lead in committing positively to absolute emission reduction, the developing countries contribute according to their abilities and stages of development, the developed countries perform real deeds using their funds and technology. Based on substantial breakthrough that would be made, progressive supplement and improvement could be accomplished through the mechanism of review and adjustment under the Convention framework. This path represents a combination of bottom-up and top-down. The ultimate way out of international climate negotiation lies in win-win cooperation. Profound reasons for China to participate proactively and practically in international climate negotiation, based on its actual conditions, are the internal wants and needs of its scientific and sustainable development, as well as the undertaking of international responsibilities as a responsible, large, developing country.

Abstract

Based on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, the UNFCCC has different requirements on national GHG inventories submitted by Annex I and non-Annex I parties. Since 2007, the transparency of mitigation actions by developing countries, the submission frequency of national communications cored on national inventory and the relevant international consultation and analysis have become the key issues in climate negotiations. Relevant responsibilities of developing countries showed an increasing trend. Through the analysis of these different requirements, particularly on technical review system of national inventories on developed countries and of the current situation of China’s inventory development, the challenges faced by China are identified and the corresponding countermeasures are also put forward, including improving institutional arrangements and statistic system, building country-specific and comprehensive database and preparing for time-series inventory development. Zhu, S.-L., and W.-T. Wang, 2013: Development of national greenhouse gas emissions inventories in the context of international climate negotiations. Adv. Clim. Change Res., 4 (1), doi: 10.3724/SP.J.1248.2013.060.

Abstract

Consensus and disagreements between China and the U.S. are the key factors influencing the direction that global climate negotiation is heading for. By taking into account the uncertainties of temperature increment and its impact on GDP growth, together with the positive, negative and spillover effects of climate change investment on utility, a strategic simulation model including China and the U.S. is developed. Based on utility and game theory, a sensitivity analysis is conducted. The results show that the first-mover disadvantage exists in the game, and the scale of each country’s climate change investment under non-cooperative scenario is too small to ensure the 2°C target. To guarantee the stability and win-win basis for global cooperation, the simulation results also indicate that it makes sense to assist and compensate technology transfer and funding to China. Jin, Z.-G., W.-J. Cai, and C. Wang, 2014: Simulation of climate negotiation strategies between China and the U.S. based on game theory. Adv. Clim. Change Res., 5 (1), doi: 10.3724/SP.J.1248.2014.034.