Abstract

Consensus and disagreements between China and the U.S. are the key factors influencing the direction that global climate negotiation is heading for. By taking into account the uncertainties of temperature increment and its impact on GDP growth, together with the positive, negative and spillover effects of climate change investment on utility, a strategic simulation model including China and the U.S. is developed. Based on utility and game theory, a sensitivity analysis is conducted. The results show that the first-mover disadvantage exists in the game, and the scale of each country’s climate change investment under non-cooperative scenario is too small to ensure the 2°C target. To guarantee the stability and win-win basis for global cooperation, the simulation results also indicate that it makes sense to assist and compensate technology transfer and funding to China. Jin, Z.-G., W.-J. Cai, and C. Wang, 2014: Simulation of climate negotiation strategies between China and the U.S. based on game theory. Adv. Clim. Change Res., 5 (1), doi: 10.3724/SP.J.1248.2014.034.