Abstract

Analyses were performed using MELCOR and RADTRAD to investigate main steam isolation valve (MSIV) leakage behavior under design basis accident (DBA) loss-of-coolant (LOCA) conditions that are presumed to have led to a significant core melt accident. Dose to the control room, site boundary and LPZ are examined using both approaches described in current regulatory guidelines as well as analyses based on best estimate source term and system response. At issue is the current practice of using containment airborne aerosol concentrations as a surrogate for the in-vessel aerosol concentration that exists in the near vicinity of the MSIVs. This study finds current practice using the AST-based containment aerosol concentrations for assessing MSIV leakage is non-conservative and conceptually in error. A methodology is proposed that scales the containment aerosol concentration to the expected vessel concentration in order to preserve the simplified use of the AST in assessing containment performance under assumed DBA conditions. This correction is required during the first two hours of the accident while the gap and early in-vessel source terms are present. It is general practice to assume that at {approx}2hrs, recovery actions to reflood the core will have been successful and that further core damage can be avoided. more » The analyses performed in this study determine that, after two hours, assuming vessel reflooding has taken place, the containment aerosol concentration can then conservatively be used as the effective source to the leaking MSIV's. Recommendations are provided concerning typical aerosol removal coefficients that can be used in the RADTRAD code to predict source attenuation in the steam lines, and on robust methods of predicting MSIV leakage flows based on measured MSIV leakage performance. « le Document type: Report

Abstract

The stress analysis performed on the 1''-PCC-76-A piping system inside containment penetration S-1A is described. Deadweight, thermal expansion, and seismic loads were considered. Results of this analysis show that the subject piping system will meet ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Class 2 requirements provided that supports S8 and S9 are installed as recommended. Document type: Report

Abstract

Due to the need of maintaining and providing high purity argon for the D0 experiment. it is necessary to have a purity verifying device readUy aVailable. The testing eqUipment used by the D0 cryo group is called the Argon Test Cell (ATC). It operates by taking a sample of the argon to be tested and running it through a test cell for purity determination. LiqUid nitrogen cooling loops are used to to keep the argon cold during the testing. The initial placement of the ATC was outside of the D0 Cryo Control Room. This was not a favorable place. mainly because of exposure to the elements on the operators and the device. A plan was made to move the ATe from outside to inside the control room. This would allow security. favorable environment conditions. and general overall improved access and operability. Havtng the ATC inside causes some concern over some issues. It is true that the ATC employs cryogenic piping components. so there is an ODH possibility ifthose components were to faU and leak. However. there are ways by which we can determine the ODH class fairly easily. Using the methods outlined in D0 EN-229. the components of the cryogenic pipelines are summed and grouped according to failure possibility and likely leakage upon failure. (Note that this is the reason that one type of component may be listed a multiple number of times in the appendix spreadsheet, as the different components have different possible leak rates. depending on position or size. etc.). The result is an ODH class 0. since the fatality rate has to be above 10{sup -7} for a hazard condition to be present. The fatality rates in this analysis only come within an order of magnitude of this safety limit due to using conservative estimates. Note that the 130 scfm fan must be active for the ODH status to remain O. The control room ventilation is on emergency power. An alarm attached to the fan will notify the operators of fan failure. but both the fan and the alarm can be turned off when they are not needed. The fan need not be active as long as there are no cryogens in the ATC, and the argon and nitrogen supply line valves have been secured closed. For ODH detection purposes, an ODH head has already been installed in the control room as a result of the DAB southSide ODH plan. Document type: Report

Abstract

The thermodynamic characterization of the wax point of a given crude is essential in order to maintain flow conditions that prevent plugging of undersea pipelines. This report summarizes the efforts made towards applying an Acoustic Cavity Resonance Spectrometer (ACRS) to the determination of pressures and temperatures at which wax precipitates from crude. Phillips Petroleum Company, Inc., the CRADA participant, supplied the ACRS. The instrumentation was shipped to Dr. Thomas Schmidt of ORNL, the CRADA contractor, in May 2000 after preliminary software development performed under the guidance of Dr. Samuel Colgate and Dr. Evan House of the University of Florida, Gainesville, FL. Upon receipt it became apparent that a number of modifications still needed to be made before the ACRS could be precisely and safely used for wax point measurements. This report reviews the sequence of alterations made to the ACRS, as well as defines the possible applications of the instrumentation once the modifications have been completed. Document type: Report