Abstract

Cet ouvrage constitue les actes du colloque international sur le financement des transports urbains qui s'est tenu à Lyon en 1984. Le vrai sujet du colloque a été la crise du financement des transports urbains et en particulier du transport public. Cette crise a une apparence qui est la dérive, devenue peu supportable, du financement public des transports collectifs. Elle a une réalité, constituée de l'ensemble des processus qui déterminent cette dérive. Après avoir abordé en introduction les enjeux du financement des transports publics ainsi que l'efficacité et les dépenses des transports urbains, ce document regroupe les différents sujets traités lors d'ateliers : les tendances lourdes et les aspects macro-économiques ; les aspects institutionnels du financement ; le système urbain, système de transport et financement ; la contrepartie sociale du financement ; les nouvelles modalités de financement ; la politique de tarification ; les expériences de tarification ; la dérive et la maîtrise des coûts.

Abstract

International audience; The networks used in the Railway domain are usually heterogeneous, not enough protected and not fitted to the usual Cyber Security requirements in terms of sustainability, protection and attack detection. Furthermore, the quick evolution of the telecommunication means, the threats and the sustainability aspects have to be taken into account in order to protect the Railway system. The paper presents the first contributions on Cyber Security for railways that can be divided into three main aspects dealing with the Cyber Security of the wireless part of the railway communication system: detection, decision and Human-in-the-Loop. Part of the work will be devoted to the development of an Open Pluggable Framework (OPF). The OPF is a software framework based on automation principles. It monitors the environment, then some algorithms detect abnormal behaviours, and next, OPF decides which reaction to take and finally apply this action (e.g. an alarm or a reconfiguration). The last part " human in the loop " aims at answering the questions: what happens if the automatic countermeasures fail and how the driver can cope with the attack consequences. It consists in placing professional drivers and OCC operators (Operational Control Center) in a realistic simulator and playing scenarios involving attacks. Scenarios are deduced of a vulnerability analysis and human-system resilience is studied experimentally in observing the human abilities to detect, to understand and to react to (simulated) cyber-attacks, or to their consequences. A preliminary methodology is proposed and discussed through a concrete case study. Document type: Conference object