Abstract

The petroleum sector contributes substantially to the Nigerian economy; however, the potential benefits are diminished because of the existence of significant subsidies on imports of petroleum products. Subsidies on imported petroleum products are considered to be an important instrument for keeping fuel prices, and hence the cost of living, low. The costs of these subsidies, however, have risen dramatically in recent years along with increased volatility in world petroleum and petroleum product prices and increased illegal exportation of subsidized petroleum products into neighboring countries. Removing the subsidy on fuel is one of the most contentious socioeconomic policy issues in Nigeria today. In this paper, an economy-wide framework is used to identify the impact of removing the fuel subsidy on the Nigerian economy and investigate how alternative policies might be used to meet socioeconomic objectives related to fuel subsidies. The results show that although a reduction in the subsidy generally results in an increase in Nigeria’s gross domestic product, it can have a detrimental impact on household income, and in particular on poor households. Accompanying the subsidy reduction with income transfers aimed at poor households or domestic production of petroleum products can alleviate the negative impacts on household income. Document type: Book

Abstract

This paper uses a global general equilibrium simulation model to quantify the effects of lifting economic sanctions on Iran with and without strategic responses. Iran benefits the most, with average per capita welfare gains ranging from close to 3 percent, in the case when Iran's crude oil exports to the European Union recover to half their pre-embargo level, to 6.5 percent, in the best case of complete recovery of oil exports to the European Union, successful domestic reforms that enable a strong supply response, and increased market access for Iranian exports in developed markets. Iran could achieve benefits close to the upper range if Gulf Cooperation Council oil exporters limit their crude oil exports to support the oil price. If they do nothing, however, the price of oil will decline by 13 percent in the case of complete recovery of oil exports to the European Union, leaving net oil importers better off and net oil exporters worse off. Document type: Book